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Abstract
A multi-agent system (MAS) is usually understood as a system composed of interacting
autonomous agents. In this sense, MAS have been employed successfully as a modelling
paradigm in a number of scenarios, especially in Computer Science. However, the process
of modelling complex and heterogeneous systems is intrinsically prone to errors: for this
reason, computer scientists are typically concerned with the issue of verifying that a system
actually behaves as it is supposed to, especially when a system is complex.
Techniques have been developed to perform this task: testing is the most common tech-
nique, but in many circumstances a formal proof of correctness is needed. Techniques
for formal verification include theorem proving and model checking. Model checking
techniques, in particular, have been successfully employed in the formal verification of
distributed systems, including hardware components, communication protocols, security
protocols.
In contrast to traditional distributed systems, formal verification techniques for MAS are
still in their infancy, due to the more complex nature of agents, their autonomy, and
the richer language used in the specification of properties. This thesis aims at making
a contribution in the formal verification of properties of MAS via model checking. In
particular, the following points are addressed:
• Theoretical results about model checking methodologies for MAS, obtained by
extending traditional methodologies based on Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
(obdds) for temporal logics to multi-modal logics for time, knowledge, correct be-
haviour, and strategies of agents. Complexity results for model checking these logics
(and their symbolic representations).
• Development of a software tool (mcmas) that permits the specification and verifica-
tion of MAS described in the formalism of interpreted systems.
• Examples of application of mcmas to various MAS scenarios (communication,
anonymity, games, hardware diagnosability), including experimental results, and
comparison with other tools available.
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 What is a multi-agent system?
Agent.
• A person who provides a particular service (Oxford Concise Dictionary).
• - noun: a noun denoting a person or thing that performs the action of a
verb (Oxford Concise Dictionary).
• A computer program that performs various actions continuously and au-
tonomously on behalf of an individual or an organisation (Encyclopaedia
Britannica).
• One who is authorised to act for or in the place of another, with delegated
authority (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Examples: estate agent, secret
agent.
• In biology, (infectious) agents: a kind of virus (Encyclopaedia Britannica).
• In The Matrix, the term Agent is used for sentient programs that battle
the humans fighting for freedom
(from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent, September 2005).
Figure 1.1: Definition of agent from various sources.
As can be seen from Figure 1.1, there is little agreement on the actual meaning of the
word agent. Thus, what is an agent? In this thesis, agents are investigated in the realm
of computer science. It has been observed by many computer scientists that, albeit a
1
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definition able to gather general consensus is probably lacking even in this single discipline,
typically the term agent denotes an entity enjoying some form of autonomy and other
characteristics. Wooldridge and Jennings [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995] identify the
following properties of an agent:
• Autonomy : an agent is capable of operating without external intervention.
• Social ability : an agent is capable of interacting with other agents and/or with its
environment.
• Reactivity : an agent is capable of responding to external changes.
• Pro-activity : an agent is capable of behaving accordingly to its goals.
Other stronger abilities are considered in [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]. In particular,
rationality (defined as the ability of an agent to act consistently with its goals) is often
assumed when reasoning about agents.
Examples of the use of agents in computer science include agents for automatic informa-
tion retrieval from the Internet, for e-commerce, for electronic auctions, and the infamous
Microsoft Office Assistant (which disappeared from standard installations as from Mi-
crosoft Office 2000). But agents are not limited to the software domain: the two NASA
rovers Spirit and Opportunity [S. W. Squyres et al., 2004a, S. W. Squyres et al., 2004b]
have been exploring Mars’s surface for more than two years. The two rovers operate on
different regions of the planet and must be able to act autonomously: indeed, communi-
cation between Earth and Mars takes at least 20 seconds, it is not always available due to
the rotation of both planets, and it is very limited in bandwidth (12 Kbit). Thus, rovers
are “instructed” at the beginning of each sol1 to perform a certain number of “tasks”
such as “move 5m towards that rock – operate the rock abrasion tool – operate the X-ray
spectrometer”. These tasks are executed autonomously, the results are returned to Earth
for processing and new instructions are uploaded.
RoboCup [Kitano, 1998] is another example of “hardware” agents: RoboCup, now in its
ninth edition, is a competition for teams of robotic agents playing football. Research in
this subject introduced a number of innovations for autonomy, real-time reasoning, and
collaborations of agents.
The reason for such a widespread use of the concept of agent in computer science is
probably our natural attitude of ascribing certain mental qualities to complex systems,
as noted by McCarthy in his seminal paper [McCarthy, 1979]. Indeed, as systems (both
hardware and software) have grown in recent years, so did the application of the agent
paradigm in a variety of different areas.
1A sol is a Martian day.
2
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Similarly to molecular chemistry, agents are often investigated in “isolation”, as atoms
are modelled as single entities. Typically, however, agents (and atoms) interact to form
more complex structures. NASA’s Remote Agent (RA, [Muscettola et al., 1998]) is an
example of amulti-agent system [Wooldridge, 2002] for space exploration. RA is a complex
architecture, composed by a network of “small” agents, whose main component is an
autonomous planner and scheduler, designed to operate spacecrafts with minimal human
assistance. RA flew the experimental space craft DS1 between 17th and 21st of May 1999.
In this thesis the term multi-agent system (MAS) will denote a set of agents operating in
some environment [Wooldridge, 2002]. In some formalisms, including the one employed in
this thesis and the formalism of Fagin et al. [Fagin et al., 1995], the environment itself may
be modelled as an agent, thus allowing for a uniform description of a system of agents.
Multi-agent systems are employed in the description of complex scenarios, which can be
abstracted successfully by ascribing high level qualities to each agent in the system, and
by assuming that agents communicate and interact (possibly, in a rational way) with the
other agents. As noted above, Remote Agent [Muscettola et al., 1998] is an example of a
multi-agent system; many other research areas employ multi-agent systems, for instance
specification of communication and security protocols, distributed planning [Cox et al.,
2005], hardware diagnosability and recoverability, strategic games, etc. Some examples
from these domains are analysed in detail in this thesis.
The last fifteen years have seen a growing number of publications and conferences address-
ing issues related to agents and multi agent systems. How should an agent be formalised?
How should a system of agents be formalised? How should one reason about typical
agents’ stances, such as agents’ “knowledge”, beliefs, desires, etc.? How should one ex-
press properties of a single agent, and of a system of agents? This thesis takes a logic-based
approach for formalising agents; in particular, intentional attitudes of agents, in the sense
of [Dennett, 1987], are represented by means of modal operators and are interpreted us-
ing the standard Kripke semantics. Details of this approach and further discussion are
presented below.
For the purposes of this thesis, only computationally grounded [Wooldridge, 2000a] theories
for MAS will be considered. The notion of computationally grounded (logical) theory
of agency has been introduced in [Wooldridge, 2000a, Wooldridge and Lomuscio, 2000]:
intuitively, a logical theory for multi-agent systems is computationally grounded if the class
of (Kripke) models in which modalities are interpreted corresponds to the set of possible
computations of the multi-agent systems, meaning that modalities can be interpreted
directly on the set of possible computations.
It will be clear soon that computationally grounded theories of agency are essential for the
formal verification of multi-agent systems.
3
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1.1.2 Definition of the problem: verification of MAS
Imagine a situation in which ESA (the European Space Agency) has sent a
rover to Venus for scientific exploration. The first day of scientific exploration
proceeds smoothly and at the end of the first (Venusian) day the rover is ready
to start its stand-by procedure for the night. At sunset, a controller is in
charge of sending a “switch-off” message to all the scientific instruments, and
of moving to a “stand-by” state, waiting for the sun to rise. The stand-by
state is entered when no more power is required by the on-board instruments.
At sunrise, as soon as the intensity of light is sufficient, the controller resumes
power and sends messages to resume scientific activity. Unfortunately, the
controller was designed for switching off scientific instruments only, and the
panoramic camera was not included as a “scientific” instrument. Thus, at
sunset the controller senses that an instrument (the camera) is still alive, it
does not move to a waiting state and, consequently, the next day it does not
send any message: the scientific instruments remain off. Scientific equipment
includes the antenna for communication with Earth: the system is deadlocked
and the mission fails on day two.
As technology allows for systems to grow bigger, verification, intended as the process
of verifying that a system satisfies its design requirements, has to play a central role
in any development process to avoid unwanted behaviours. Verification is even more
crucial in multi-agent systems, which are intrinsically more complex than “traditional”
distributed systems: by definition, MAS are employed to capture high level properties
of large, autonomous systems. Moreover, agents in MAS are often highly autonomous
and out of direct human control, as in the Venus rover scenario above. Hence, in such
scenarios, in-depth verification can save time and money, and improve security.
Historically, verification has played a prominent role in computer science, and particularly
in software engineering and hardware design, for nearly three decades; for instance, the
idea of formal verification via model checking (defined below) appears already in [Clarke
and Emerson, 1981] and in [Quielle and Sifakis, 1981]).
Verification encompasses a number of different techniques. Testing is the most common
verification technique. Verification is performed by running a number of test cases and
by checking that the required properties hold in all tested runs. Many techniques are
available for testing [Beizer, 1990], for instance top-down testing, thread testing, syntax-
testing, etc. One of the main problems of testing is to devise a sensible set of test cases:
in the example of the Venus rover, testing might not find the deadlock, unless test cases
included a multi-day test.
This thesis will not be concerned with the problem of testing multi-agent systems; instead,
the problem of formal verification for multi-agent systems will be investigated. Formal
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verification is a class of logic-based techniques, which include theorem proving and model
checking. In particular, model checking is an automatic technique that has been proven
effective in a number of instances (details of this are introduced in Section 2.2).
The aim of this research work is to apply model checking techniques to multi-agent systems;
more in detail, the objectives of this thesis are:
• To investigate model checking techniques for the verification of multi-
agent systems: this task comprises the development of algorithms for model check-
ing, and the analysis of the complexity of the problem of model checking for MAS.
• To develop a model checker for MAS: this task consists in the development of
a software tool for model checking multi-agent systems.
• To apply the tool for the verification of typical MAS examples: in this
task, examples from the multi-agents systems literature are verified with the tool
developed in the previous task.
Correspondingly, the outcomes of this research work presented in this thesis are:
• Theoretical results about model checking MAS (algorithms and complexity results).
• mcmas (Model Checking for Multi-Agent Systems), a tool for the verification of
multi-agent systems.
• Experimental results obtained by running mcmas on a set of examples.
These outcomes are presented according to the structure presented in Section 1.1.4.
1.1.3 Applications
Automatic tools for model checking have been employed successfully in the formal verifi-
cation of various scenarios. Originally, the aim of model checking was the verification of
hardware circuits [Burch et al., 1992, McMillan, 1993]; indeed, even today, this remains
one of the most common applications of model checking in industry [Biere et al., 1999b]).
Applications of “traditional” model checking for temporal logics, however, comprise the
verification of other scenarios, including:
• Communication and security protocols: the model checker SPIN [Holzmann, 1997] is
a model checker specifically designed for the verification of protocols. Model checking
of security protocols has been investigated by many authors, starting from the mid
90’s [Marrero et al., 1997]; more references are provided in Section 2.3.
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• Software: traditionally, software programs have been verified using testing tech-
niques. In recent years various suggestions have been put forward for the automatic
verification of software. Java PathFinder [Brat et al., 2000], a tool for the automatic
verification of Java programs using model checking, is an example of these efforts.
• Diagnosability: diagnosability is the ability of some component in a system to diag-
nose the state of some other component. For instance, the ability of a controller in
a plant to detect faults is an example of diagnosability. In critical applications it is
essential that controllers are always able to diagnose the state of certain components.
It has been shown [Cimatti et al., 2003] that diagnosability can be verified by means
of model checking.
In general, model checking enables the formal verification of a variety of specification
patterns [Dwyer et al., 1998] in distributed systems. Traditionally, these patterns are
expressed using temporal logic formulae; for instance, liveness and safety are two well
known examples of temporal patterns. Many other patterns are investigated in [Dwyer
et al., 1998], which allow for a formal representation of a number of requirements.
This thesis investigates model checking for multi-agent systems: applying model checking
techniques to logic-based MAS formalisms introduces a number of benefits with respect
to “traditional” model checking, and allows for new applications. Benefits and new appli-
cations include:
1. Direct verification (i.e., without translation into existing model checkers). The
need for MAS verification grows in parallel with the use of the multi-agent paradigm
for modelling scenarios. Nevertheless, translating complex systems formalised as a
MAS into a formalism suitable for the “traditional” model checkers that are available
may not be straightforward, and it is prone to errors. Model checking MAS, instead,
allows for the direct verification of typical MAS scenarios.
2. Richer expressivity. Some requirements are more naturally expressed using in-
tentional stances, such as knowledge. For instance, in communication protocols it
is natural to reason about “knowledge” of certain messages. In this sense, model
checking MAS allows for the verification of requirements that may not be expressed
easily as temporal patterns.
3. Improved efficiency. Model checking MAS can improve the efficiency of verifica-
tion even for traditional model checking. This is the case, for instance, with diag-
nosability. Section 6.4 introduces a non-temporal characterisation of diagnosability
using agents that can reduce the size of the model being verified.
Chapter 6 motivates in further details the points above by exploring various MAS exam-
ples.
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1.1.4 Structure of this thesis
This work presents theoretical results about model checking multi-agent systems, the
implementation of a model checker for MAS, and applications of the model checker to
various examples. The overall structure of the thesis is depicted in Figure 1.2. Specifically:
• Chapter 1 provides a motivational introduction.
• Chapter 2 summarises some background material on modal logics, multi-agent sys-
tem theories, and model checking. This material enables the introduction of some
technical details in Section 2.3, which contains a literature review of model checking
in multi-agent systems.
• Chapter 3 presents an OBDD-based methodology for model checking multi-agent
systems described in the formalism of interpreted systems. Model checking algo-
rithms are presented for the verification of various modalities.
• Chapter 4 presents complexity results about model checking multi-agent systems,
both for “explicit” model checking and for “symbolic” model checking.
• Chapter 5 describes the language ISPL (Interpreted Systems Programming Lan-
guage, a language for describing multi-agent systems and their requirements), and
introduces the implementation of the model checker mcmas (Model Checking for
Multi-Agent Systems).
• Chapter 6 analyses various applications of mcmas to communication and security
protocols, to strategic games, and to diagnosability and recoverability. Experimental
results are presented and, where possible, they are compared to other model checkers.
Chapter 7 assesses the results obtained, presents open issues and sketches possible exten-
sions of this work.
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ApplicationsMCMAS
Checking MAS
Complexity of ModelModel Checking MAS
with OBDDs
Conclusion
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Introduction
Modal Logic and MAS Model Checking
Literature Review
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Chapter 7
Figure 1.2: Structure of the thesis.
Publication note: All the results presented in this thesis are the outcome of the author’s
own research, except where explicitly stated. The majority of the results have also been
published in the proceedings of various international conferences and workshops.
In particular, part of Section 2.1.7.3 appears in [Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2005c, Lomuscio
and Raimondi, 2006c].
The material in Chapter 3 appeared, in a shorter version, in [Raimondi and Lomuscio,
2004c, Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2004b, Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2005c, Raimondi and
Lomuscio, 2005a, Lomuscio and Raimondi, 2006b].
The complexity results appearing in Chapter 4 have been presented in [Raimondi and
Lomuscio, 2005b, Lomuscio and Raimondi, 2006a].
The basic implementation of mcmas has been presented in [Raimondi and Lomuscio,
2004d]; extensions of mcmas appear in [Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2004a, Raimondi and
Lomuscio, 2005c, Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2005a, Lomuscio and Raimondi, 2006b]. Chap-
ter 5 presents this material in a uniform way.
The examples and experimental results appearing in Chapter 6 have been presented in
[Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2004c, Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2004b, Raimondi and Lomuscio,
2005a, Raimondi et al., 2005]. The examples of diagnosability in Section 6.4 have been
investigated initially by Charles Pecheur and Franco Raimondi at NASA Ames Research
Center.
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Background literature
2.1 Modal logics and multi-agent systems
The model checking techniques presented in Chapter 3 rely on the logic-based character-
isation of multi-agent systems. This section introduces the relevant background of modal
logic that shall be used in the remainder of the thesis. The material presented below sum-
marises standard results appearing in [Chellas, 1980, Goldblatt, 1992, Blackburn et al.,
2001, Gabbay et al., 2003].
Following the modal logic introduction, this section introduces complexity theory, sum-
marises various logic-based MAS theories, and it presents the formalism of interpreted
systems [Fagin et al., 1995].
2.1.1 Syntax and axiomatic systems
Let P be a countable set of atomic formulae, usually denoted by p, q, . . . . The language
L of propositional modal logic is defined by the set of well-formed formulae ϕ ∈ L:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 2ϕ.
Other operators are introduced in a standard way. In particular, 3ϕ = ¬2¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ =
¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ⊥ = p ∧ ¬p, ⊤ = ¬⊥, and p =⇒ q = ¬(p ∧ ¬q). Possible readings of the
formula 2ϕ are “It is necessarily true that ϕ”, “It will always be true that ϕ”, “It ought
to be that ϕ”, “It is known that ϕ”. In the following sections other symbols may be used
for the modal operator 2, including K (to be read “it is known that”) and O (to be read
“it ought to be that”).
A schema is a set of formulae all having the same syntactic form. For example, the schema
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D: 2A =⇒ 3A
T: 2A =⇒ A
4: 2A =⇒ 22A
5: ¬2A =⇒ 2¬2A
Table 2.1: Some common names for axioms.
Name Axioms
S4 KT4
S5 KT5
Table 2.2: Some common names for logics.
2A =⇒ A is the set of formulae:
{2B =⇒ B : B ∈ L}.
A logic is a set L ⊆ L such that
• L includes all tautologies of propositional logic.
• L is closed under Modus Ponens, i.e., if A,A =⇒ B ∈ L, then B ∈ L.
Members of L are called theorems and it is usually written L ⊢ ϕ when ϕ ∈ L.
A logic is normal if:
• it contains the schema
K : 2(A =⇒ B) =⇒ (2A =⇒ 2B);
• it is closed under necessitation, i.e.,
if L ⊢ A, then L ⊢ 2A.
The smallest normal logic is denoted1 by K. Following standard conventions, KX1 . . .Xn
denotes the smallest normal logic containing the schemata X1 . . . Xn; these schemata are
also called the axioms of the logic. Table 2.1 lists the names of some common axioms.
Table 2.2 lists the names of some common logics.
Notice that a logic L is identified by a set of axioms and by a set of inference rules. For
instance, the logic K is identified by the axiom 2(A =⇒ B) =⇒ (2A =⇒ 2B), by all
propositional tautologies, and by the rules modus ponens and necessitation.
1Notice that the same symbol is used to denote a schema and a logic. It should be clear from the
context which is the intended meaning.
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Such a set of axioms together with the set of rules, is usually denoted with the name of
Hilbert-style inference system, or with the name of axiomatic system. In this sense, L ⊢ ϕ
is usually read as “ϕ is derivable from the axioms of L”, i.e., ϕ can be derived from the
axioms using appropriate inference rules of the logic L.
2.1.2 Kripke semantics
Formulae of propositional logic are interpreted by assigning a value true (⊤) or false (⊥) to
atomic formulae (also denoted with the term Boolean variables), by means of an evaluation
function V : P → {⊤,⊥}. In contrast, the interpretation of modal formulae requires more
complex structures, known as Kripke models2.
Given a set of Boolean variables P , a (Kripke) model is a tuple M = (W,R, V ), where W
is a set of possible worlds, R ⊆W ×W is a binary relation (the accessibility relation), and
V :W → 2P is an evaluation function assigning sets of Boolean variables to possible worlds
(intuitively, this is the set of variables true at a possible world). Notice that, equivalently,
V could be defined as a relation V ⊆W × P .
It is usually written M,w |= ϕ when a modal formula ϕ is true (or holds, or it is satisfied)
at world w in a model M . |= is defined inductively as follows:
M,w |= p iff p ∈ V (w);
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ;
M,w |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff M,w |= ϕ or M,w |= ψ;
M,w |= 2ϕ iff for all w′ ∈W , wRw′ implies M,w′ |= ϕ.
Intuitively, 2ϕ is true at a world w in a model M if ϕ is true at all worlds w′ that are
accessible via R from w.
A formula ϕ is true in a model M , denoted by M |= ϕ, if M,w |= ϕ for all w ∈W (some
authors say that, in this case, ϕ is valid in M).
A frame F is a pair F = (W,R), where W is a set of worlds and R ⊆W ×W is a binary
relation. Thus, a model can be seen as a pair M = (F, V ), where V is an evaluation
function as above; in this case, the model M is said to be based on F . A formula is valid
in a frame F , denoted with F |= ϕ, if M |= ϕ for all possible models M based on F .
2In fact, other semantics are possible for modal formulae. In this thesis, the semantics for temporal and
strategy operators is introduced in Section 2.1.4, and the semantics of interpreted systems is introduced in
Section 2.1.7.1. Other semantics are possible, e.g., modal algebras [Gabbay et al., 2003].
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Logic Class of frames
K All frames
KD Serial frames
KT Reflexive frames
S4 = KT4 Transitive and reflexive frames
S5 = KT5 Transitive, reflexive and symmetric frames
Table 2.3: Classes of frames.
2.1.3 Completeness and correspondence results
Let C be a class of frames, for instance the class of all frames with a finite number of
worlds, or the class of all frames in which the accessibility relation is serial (see below).
A formula ϕ is valid in a class of frames C, denoted with C |= ϕ, if F |= ϕ for all frames
F ∈ C.
A logic L (in the sense of Section 2.1.1) is sound with respect to a class of frames C if, for
every formula ϕ, L ⊢ ϕ implies C |= ϕ. A logic L is complete with respect to a class of
frames C if C |= ϕ implies L ⊢ ϕ. A logic L is determined by C if L is sound and complete
with respect to C. Equivalently, it is also said that a logic L corresponds to a class of
frames C.
Kripke semantics are particularly attractive because many modal logics correspond to
simple classes of frames, defined by imposing particular requirements to the accessibility
relation R. A relation R ⊆W ×W is
• Reflexive if, for all w ∈W , wRw.
• Symmetric if, for all w,w′ ∈W , wRw′ implies w′Rw.
• Transitive if, for all w,w′, w′′ ∈W , wRw′ and w′Rw′′ imply wRw′′.
• Serial if, for all w ∈W , there exists w′ ∈W such that wRw′.
A relation R is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. A frame
is reflexive (resp.: symmetric, transitive, serial) if its accessibility relation is reflexive (resp.:
symmetric, transitive, serial). Some well-known correspondence results are presented in
Table 2.3 (more details and formal proofs can be found in [Chellas, 1980, Goldblatt, 1992]).
2.1.4 Extended Kripke semantics
The interpretation of the 2 operator is not necessarily limited to the evaluation of a
single-step accessibility relation. This is the case, for example, with modal operators to
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reason about time, and with modal operators to reason about strategies. This section
introduces various semantics for these operators, and analyses their correspondence with
Kripke semantics.
2.1.4.1 The temporal logic CTL
Given a countable set P of atomic formulae, the language LCTL of Computational Tree
Logic (CTL, [Clarke and Emerson, 1981, Emerson, 1990]) is defined by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | EGϕ | E[ϕUϕ].
In this definition, p ∈ P is an atomic formula; EXϕ is read “there exists a path such
that at the next state ϕ holds”; EGϕ is read “there exists a path such that ϕ holds
globally along the path”; E[ϕUψ] is read “there exists a path such that ϕ holds until ψ
holds”. Notice that CTL operators are composed of a pair of symbols: the first symbol is
a quantifier over paths (E), while the second symbol expresses some constraint over paths.
Also, notice that EU is a binary operator, sometimes written as EU(ϕ,ψ).
Traditionally, the syntax of CTL includes the following operators as well:
EFϕ,AXϕ,AGϕ,A[ϕUψ], AFϕ. These are read, respectively: “there exists a path such
that ϕ holds at some future point”; “for all paths, in the next state ϕ holds”; “for all
paths, ϕ holds globally”; “for all paths, ϕ holds until ψ holds”; “for all paths, ϕ holds
at some point in the future”. These additional CTL operators can be used to ease the
specification process of various requirements but they are in fact definable in terms of the
(minimal) set of CTL operators EX,EG,EU (see below).
The semantics of CTL is given in terms of transition systems: a transition system T =
(S,Rt, V ) is a tuple in which S is a set of states, Rt ⊆ S×S is a transition relation, and V :
S → 2P is an evaluation function. The transition relation Rt models temporal transitions
between states: given two states s and s′ of S, sRts
′ means that s′ is an immediate
successor of s. It is usually assumed that every state has a successor, i.e., the transition
relation Rt is serial
3. A path π in T is an infinite sequence of states π = (s0, s1, . . . ) such
that siRtsi+1 for all i ≥ 0; the i-th state in the path is denoted by π(i). CTL formulae
are interpreted at a state s in a transition system T as follows:
3In this thesis, all transition systems are assumed to be serial; non-serial transition systems are analysed
in [Pucella, 2005].
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T, s |= p iff p ∈ V (s);
T, s |= ¬ϕ iff T, s 6|= ϕ;
T, s |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff T, s |= ϕ1 or T, s |= ϕ2;
T, s |= EXϕ iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = s and T, π(1) |= ϕ;
T, s |= EGϕ iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = s and T, π(i) |= ϕ
for all i ≥ 0;
T, s |= E[ϕUψ] iff there exists a path π and a k ≥ 0 such that π(0) = s and
T, π(k) |= ψ and T, π(i) |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ i < k.
T |= ϕ denotes that the formula ϕ holds in all states s ∈ S (notice that some authors
include a set of initial states I ⊆ S in the definition of a transition system, and they write
T |= ϕ if T, s |= ϕ for all states s ∈ I).
Given the semantics above, the following equivalences hold for CTL [Huth and Ryan,
2004]:
EFϕ ≡ E[⊤Uϕ];
AXϕ ≡ ¬EX¬ϕ;
AGϕ ≡ ¬EF¬ϕ;
A[ϕUψ] ≡ ¬(E[¬ψU(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)] ∨EG¬ψ);
AFϕ ≡ A[⊤Uϕ] ≡ ¬EG¬ϕ.
These equivalences show that all the CTL operators can be expressed using EX,EG, and
EU only.
It is worth noticing that a transition system is a Kripke model. The difference between
CTL semantics and traditional Kripke semantics lies in how the Kripke model is used:
in Kripke semantics, formulae are interpreted directly on the model, while CTL formulae
are interpreted on the possible computations arising from the model. Figure 2.1 shows a
transition system without evaluation function (or, equivalently, a Kripke frame) on the
left-hand side, and the initial branching structure of the corresponding computations on
the right-hand side.
It is possible to provide an axiomatic system for CTL and, using non-standard techniques,
it is possible to prove that CTL is sound and complete with respect to the class of serial
frames (this result was established in [Emerson and Halpern, 1985]). A detailed discussion
of this matter is beyond the scope of this thesis; more details can be found in [Emerson
and Halpern, 1985, Goldblatt, 1992].
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s0 s1 s2
s0
s1
s1
s2
s1 s2 s1
s1 s2 s1 s1 s2
Figure 2.1: A Kripke model (left) and corresponding computations (right).
2.1.4.2 Other temporal logics
This thesis is concerned mainly with branching time structures a` la CTL, but other tem-
poral semantics are sometimes referenced. This section summarises briefly the temporal
logics LTL, and µ-calculus.
LTL: In contrast to CTL, Linear Temporal Logic (LTL, [Pnueli, 1981]) is a logic to reason
about linear sequences of states. The language LLTL of LTL is defined in terms of a set
of atomic propositions P , as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Xϕ | ϕUψ | Gϕ.
Traditionally, the unary operator F is included in the syntax, even if it can be derived
from G:
Fϕ ≡ ¬G¬ϕ.
LTL formulae are interpreted in a transition system T = (S,Rt, V, I), where S, Rt, and V
are defined as in CTL, and I ⊆ S is a set of initial states. Similarly to CTL, a path π is
an infinite sequence of states π = (s0, s1, . . . ) such that siRtsi+1 for all i ≥ 0. The “tail”
of a path starting from a state si is denoted by πi, i.e., πi = (si, si+1, . . . ). Satisfaction
of a formula ϕ with respect to a path π in a transition system T is defined inductively as
follows:
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T, π |= p iff p ∈ V (π(0));
T, π |= ¬ϕ iff T, π 6|= ϕ;
T, π |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff T, π |= ϕ1 or T, π |= ϕ2;
T, π |= Xϕ iff T, π1 |= ϕ;
T, π |= (ϕUψ) iff there exists a k such that πk |= ψ and πi |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ i < k;
T, π |= Gϕ iff πk |= ϕ for all k ≥ 0.
It is written T |= ϕ when a formula ϕ holds in all paths starting from an initial state.
µ-calculus: propositional µ-calculus [Kozen, 1983] is a modal logic extended with opera-
tors for least and greatest fix-points of formulae. Given a set P of atomic formulae and a
set V of variables, µ-calculus formulae are defined as follows4:
ϕ ::= p | v | ¬p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 2ϕ | 3ϕ | µy.ϕ(y) | νy.ϕ(y).
In the definition above, p ∈ P is an atomic formula, v ∈ V is a variable, the unary operators
2 and 3 are the standard modal operators, µ and ν are the least and greatest fix-point
operators. The expression µy.ϕ(y) denotes the least fix-point of ϕ(y), where y is a free
variable appearing in ϕ.
Formulae of µ-calculus are interpreted in a transition system T = (S,R, V, V al), where
V : P → 2S is an evaluation function which assigns sets of states to atomic formulae, and
V al : V → 2S is an evaluation function from variables to sets of states. Given a transition
system T and a µ-calculus formula ϕ, the set of states in which ϕ holds, denoted by [[ϕ]],
is defined inductively as follows5:
[[p]] = V (p);
[[v]] = V al(v);
[[¬p]] = S\V (p);
[[ϕ ∨ ψ]] = [[ϕ]] ∪ [[ψ]];
[[2ϕ]] = {s ∈ S : for all s′ ∈ S such that sRs′, s′ ∈ [[ϕ]]};
[[3ϕ]] = {s ∈ S : there exists s′ ∈ S such that sRs′ and s′ ∈ [[ϕ]]};
[[µy.ϕ(y)]] =
⋂
{Q ⊆ S : [[ϕ]]V al[y←Q] ⊆ Q};
[[νy.ϕ(y)]] =
⋃
{Q ⊆ S : Q ⊆ [[ϕ]]V al[y←Q]}.
In the definition above, V al[y ← Q] is an evaluation function such that V al[y ← Q](y) =
Q, and V al[y ← Q](z) = V al(z) if z 6= y.
Propositional µ-calculus strictly subsumes CTL, in the sense that all CTL formulae
can be recasted in terms of fix-points operations and any CTL model corresponds to a
model for µ-calculus. In Section 2.2, the model checking algorithm for CTL relies on the
4For technical reasons, in this syntax negation is allowed only for atomic proposition. This restriction
does not affect expressivity; more details can be found in [Kozen, 1983].
5Notice that [[·]] depends on T , and thus it should be written [[·]]T . The subscript will be omitted when
the transition system is clear from the context.
16
Chapter 2 2.1 Modal logics and multi-agent systems
characterisation of CTL operators in terms of fix-point.
2.1.4.3 ATL
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) is a logic introduced in [Alur et al., 1997, Alur
et al., 2002] to reason about strategies in multi-player games. Given a set of atomic
formulae P , the language LATL of ATL is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉Gϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉[ϕUψ].
In the previous expression, Γ is a group of players. The formula 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ is read as “group
Γ can enforce a next state in which ϕ holds” or, equivalently, “group Γ has a strategy
to enforce Γ in the next state”. Similarly, 〈〈Γ〉〉Gϕ is read as “group Γ has a strategy to
enforce a sequence of states in which ϕ holds globally”, and 〈〈Γ〉〉[ϕUψ] is read as “group
Γ can enforce a sequence of states in which ψ eventually holds, and ϕ holds until then”.
As in the case of CTL, the operator F can be used as an abbreviation for 〈〈Γ〉〉[⊤Uϕ].
ATL formulae are interpreted in concurrent game structures. A concurrent game structure
is a tuple C = (k, S, δ, d, V ), where:
• k is a natural number, the number of players.
• S is a set of states6.
• δ is a transition function (see below).
• d : {1, . . . , k}×S → IN is a function assigning a natural number to a player number
and a state. Intuitively, this is the number of moves available to a player in a given
state.
• V : S → 2P is an evaluation function from states to sets of propositions.
Three kinds of concurrent game structures are identified in [Alur et al., 2002], based on
the properties of the transition function δ.
• In turn-based synchronous game structure “only a single player has a choice
of moves” at every time step [Alur et al., 2002]. Formally, for every state s ∈ S,
d(i, s) = 1 for all players but one. In this case, the function δ : S× IN → S assigns a
“next” state to a “current” state and a natural number, which represents the move
chosen by the moving player.
6This set is required to be finite in [Alur et al., 2002].
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• In Moore synchronous game structures all players evolve simultaneously. The
state space S is the Cartesian product of “local” state spaces S1, . . . , Sk, one for
each player, i.e., S = S1 × . . . Sk. A transition function δi : S × IN → Si, i =
{1, . . . , k} is defined for every player, assigning a “local” state to a state and to a move
identifier for player i. The “global” transition function is defined by δ(s, i1, . . . , ik) =
(δ1(q, i1), . . . , δk(q, ik)). In the previous expression, the natural numbers ij , (j ∈
{1, . . . , k}) are the identifier of the moves chosen by each player in a given state,
such that ij < dj(s) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and s ∈ S.
• In turn-based asynchronous games structures, a scheduler selects a player to
perform a move, and the evolution proceeds similarly to turn-based synchronous
systems. The scheduler is modelled using one of the players, usually player k. This
thesis is not concerned with turn-based asynchronous systems: more details about
this approach can be found in [Alur et al., 2002].
A strategy for an agent i is a function fi assigning a natural number to a non-empty
sequence of states λ ∈ S+, with the constraint that if s is the last state of λ, then
fi(λ) ≤ d(i, s). Intuitively, a strategy determines the moves of a player at any given state,
based on the player’s history. By following a strategy fi a player may enforce a certain
set of computations. Given a state s ∈ S, a set Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , k} of players, and a set of
strategies FΓ = {fi : i ∈ Γ}, the set out(s, FΓ) is the set of computations that players in Γ
can enforce. Based on these definitions, the semantics for ATL is defined in [Alur et al.,
2002] as follows:
C, s |= p iff p ∈ V (s);
C, s |= ¬ϕ iff s 6|= ϕ;
C, s |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff C, s |= ϕ1 or C, s |= ϕ2;
C, s |= 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ iff there exists a set of strategies FΓ such that, for all computations
π ∈ out(s, FΓ) it is the case that C, π(1) |= ϕ;
C, s |= 〈〈Γ〉〉Gϕ iff there exists a set of strategies FΓ such that, for all computations
π ∈ out(s, FΓ) and for all j ≥ 0, it is the case that C, π(j) |= ϕ;
C, s |= 〈〈Γ〉〉[ϕUψ] iff there exists a set of strategies FΓ such that, for all computations
π ∈ out(s, FΓ) there exists a j ≥ 0 such that C, π(j) |= ψ and,
for all 0 ≤ k < j, it is the case that C, π(k) |= ϕ.
Notice that it is possible to see ATL as an extension of the logic CTL (see [Alur et al.,
2002] for details). Also, see [Goranko and Jamroga, 2004] for various comparisons on
semantics for ATL.
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2.1.5 Many-dimensional modal logics
The logics described in Section 2.1.2 include a single modal operator 2, which may be used
to reason about a single stance of a single agent. Richer formalisms are needed when rea-
soning about multi-agent systems: this section describes many-dimensional modal logics,
which may provide a formal account of a system of agents and their stances, as illustrated
in Section 2.1.7.
Formally, given a natural number n ∈ IN , the language Ln of n-dimensional modal logic
is defined over a set of atomic propositions P by the following rule:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 21ϕ | . . . | 2nϕ.
Similarly to the mono-modal case, other operators are introduced in the standard way; in
particular, 3iϕ = ¬2i¬ϕ.
The axiomatic characterisation of n-dimensional modal logic is analogous to the mono-
modal one. An n-dimensional normal modal logic L is a set L ⊆ Ln such that:
• L includes all tautologies of propositional logic.
• L is closed under Modus Ponens, i.e., if A,A =⇒ B ∈ L, then B ∈ L.
• L contains the n schemata
Ki : 2i(A =⇒ B) =⇒ (2iA =⇒ 2iB) (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
• L is closed under necessitation, i.e.,
if L ⊢ A, then, for all i, L ⊢ 2iA.
The smallest n-dimensional normal logic is denoted by Kn.
Kripke models can provide a semantics for n-dimensional modal logic, too: a Kripke
model for an n-dimensional modal logic is a tuple M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ), where
W is a set of possible worlds, Ri ⊆ W × W (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) are n accessibil-
ity relations, and V : W → 2P is an evaluation function. Given a Kripke model
M , a world w, and a formula ϕ, satisfaction in a given state is defined as follows:
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ;
M,w |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff M,w |= ϕ or M,w |= ψ;
M,w |= 2iϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W , wRiw
′ implies M,w′ |= ϕ.
A frame for an n-modal logic is a tuple F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn). All the remaining conventions
are analogous to the mono-modal case.
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2.1.5.1 Combining logics
Multi-modal logics can be constructed by combining “smaller” logics in various ways:
see [Gabbay et al., 2003] and references therein for the numerous techniques available.
For the purposes of this thesis, only the fusion (or independent join) of two logics is
summarised below.
The fusion of two logics is denoted by L1⊗L2. Given two logics L1 and L2, their languages
L1 and L2, and their corresponding axiomatic systems H1 and H2, the logic L1 ⊗ L2 is
the smallest logic with the following characteristics:
• The language LL1⊗L2 is the union of LL1 and LL2 (it is assumed that LL1 and LL2
have disjoint sets of modal operators).
• The logic L1 ⊗ L2 is axiomatised by the set of axioms H1 ∪ H2. Notice that this
implies that no “interaction” axiom is required, i.e., there is no axiom involving
mixed modalities.
If L1 and L2 are interpreted in Kripke frames F1 = (W,R
1
1, . . . , R
1
n) and F2 =
(W,R21, . . . , R
2
m) the semantics for L1 ⊗ L2 can be defined in the Kripke frame F =
(W,R11, . . . , R
1
n, R
2
1, . . . , R
2
m) obtained by the “fusion” of the two frames F1 and F2.
Fusions of logics are particularly important because the operation of fusion preserves
various property of the original logics. For instance, soundness and completeness are
preserved, as well as decidability. In the case of multi-agent systems the operation of fusion
allows to extend, in certain circumstances, to a system of agents the results obtained for
a single agent.
An example of a logic obtained by fusion is the n-dimensional normal logic Kn, which
is the fusion of n copies of the logic K, i.e., Kn = K ⊗ · · · ⊗ K. Another example of
fusion is the logic CTLK, which is the fusion of the logic CTL with the logic S5 [Fagin
et al., 1995, Penczek and Lomuscio, 2003]: typically, the modal operator of S5 formalises
epistemic concepts. Thus, CTLK is a logic used to reason about knowledge and time.
Other examples of fusions are provided in Section 2.1.7.
2.1.6 Complexity
This section fixes the notation to reason about the complexity of decision problems and it
is based on material from [Papadimitriou, 1994]. A decision problem is a problem which
requires an answer of the form “yes” or “no”. The reachability problem is an example
of a decision problem; given a graph G = (V,E) (where V is a set of vertices and E is a
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set of edges), and two vertices v1, v2 ∈ V , reachability is the problem of establishing
whether or not there is a path from v1 to v2
7.
Turing machines offer a uniform framework to reason about the complexity of the algo-
rithms employed in decision problems. A Turing machine operates on a string of symbols
(the tape) by moving a cursor on the string and by reading/writing/overwriting symbols
on the tape at the cursor position. Formally, a Turing machine is a tuple M = (S,Σ, δ, s),
where:
• S is a finite set of states;
• Σ is a finite set of symbols, disjoint from S, called the alphabet of M . The set
Σ includes the special symbols ⊔ and , denoting a blank symbol and the “first”
symbol;
• δ : S × Σ → (S ∪ {yes,no,h} × Σ × {←,→,−} is a transition function. The states
{yes,no,h} are special halting states ofM , and the symbols {←,→,−} denote cursor
directions. The function δ is the program of the machine;
• s ∈ S is the initial state of M .
If, given an input string x ∈ (Σ\⊔)∗, a machine M halts in any of the halting states
{yes,no}, then it is said that the machine has halted. If a machine halts in a “yes” state,
then it is said that the machine accepts the input x and, by convention, it is written
M(x) = yes. If a machine halts in a “no” state, then it is said that the machine rejects
the input x and it is written M(x) = no. If the machine halts in the “h” state, the output
M(x) of M is defined to be the string on the tape at the moment of halting. If a machine
does not halt on input x it is written M(x) =ր.
A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is decided by a Turing machine M if, for all strings x ∈ L, M(x) = yes
and, for all strings y 6∈ L, M(x) = no. If a language L is decided by some Turing machine,
then L is said to be recursive.
A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is accepted by a Turing machineM if, for all strings x ∈ L,M(x) = yes
(notice that M is not required to halt when x 6∈ L). If a language L is accepted by some
Turing machine, then L is said to be recursively enumerable.
Turing machines can be generalised to multi-string Turing machines: a k-string Turing
machine (where k ≥ 1 is an integer) is a tuple M = (S,Σ, δ, s), where S and Σ are as
above, and the transition function δ takes into account the k strings of M . Formally,
7Notice that, in some classical examples, a problem is not presented as a decision problem. This is
the case, for instance, with the “travelling salesman problem” (tsp). Such problems, however, can be
presented in a decisional form. As an example, the decisional version of tsp is obtained by providing a
bound B on the length of the tour of the salesman, and by asking whether or not there exists a tour of
length B at most.
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δ : S×Σk → (S∪{yes,no,h}× (Σ×{←,→,−})k . Intuitively, δ prescribes the next symbol
and the next movement of the cursor for each string. At the start of each run all strings
start with the symbol , and the first string contains the input. The output of a k-string
Turing machine is stored in the last string. A configuration of a k-string Turing machine
is a (2k + 1) tuple (s, σ1, σ
′
1, . . . , σk, σ
′
k), defined as for single tape Turing machines.
The time required to halt by a (multi-string) Turing machine M on input x is defined as
the number of steps from the initial state to the halting state. If M(x) =ր, then the
time is +∞. A machine M operates in time f(n) where f(n) is a function f : IN → IN if,
for any string x ∈ Σ∗, the time required by M on input x is at most f(|x|). A language
L belongs to the complexity class TIME(f(n)) if L is decided by a multi-string Turing
machine operating in time f(n). Thus, a time complexity class is the set of languages that
can be decided within a certain time bound.
A k-string Turing machine with input and output is a standard k-string Turing machine
with the restriction that the first string (the input string) is a read-only string, and the
last string (the output string) is a write-only string. Given a k-string Turing machine M
with input and output, suppose that M halts in the configuration (s, σ1, σ
′
1, . . . , σk, σ
′
k)
on input x. The space required by M on input x is defined as
k−1∑
i=2
|σiσ
′
i|, i.e., the space
required is the sum of the lengths of all the strings excluding the input and the output
string.
A language L belongs to the complexity class SPACE(f(n)) if L is decided by a k-string
Turing machine with input and output operating in space f(n).
A non-deterministic Turing machine is a tuple M = (S,Σ,∆, s), where S,Σ and s are as
in standard Turing machines, and ∆ is a transition relation: ∆ ⊆ S×Σ×(S∪{yes,no,h}×
Σ× {←,→,−}. Notice that, for each configuration, there may be more than one possible
“next” configuration. Non-deterministic Turing machines can be generalised to multi-
string non-deterministic Turing machines, using a method similar to that for standard
Turing machines.
Non-deterministic Turing machines differ from deterministic machines with respect to the
definition of complexity classes. A non-deterministic Turing machine M is said to decide
language L if, given x ∈ L, M(x) = yes for some possible computation of M . Notice that
M is not required to accept x in all possible computations.
A non-deterministic Turing machine M decides a language L in time f(n) if (i) M decides
L and (ii)M does not have computation paths longer than f(n) (where n is the size of the
input). The set of languages decided by a non-deterministic Turing machine within time
f(n) is denoted by NTIME(f(n)). The complexity class NSPACE(f(n)) is defined analo-
gously to SPACE(f(n)). Table 2.4 lists the definition of some commonly used complexity
classes and their names.
22
Chapter 2 2.1 Modal logics and multi-agent systems
Name Definition
L
⋃
SPACE(log(n))
NL
⋃
NSPACE(log(n))
P
⋃
TIME(nk)
NP
⋃
NTIME(nk)
PSPACE
⋃
SPACE(nk)
NPSPACE
⋃
NSPACE(nk)
EXP
⋃
TIME(2n
k
)
Table 2.4: Some complexity classes and their definitions.
EXP
PSPACE
NP
P
L
NL
Figure 2.2: Complexity classes (from [Papadimitriou, 1994].)
A problem P1 is reducible to a problem P2 if there exists a transformation T from strings
to strings, converting any input x for P1 to an input for P2, denoted by T (x) and such that
P1(x) = P2(T (x)). It is required that the transformation T is computable by a Turing
machine belonging to the complexity class L8. If a problem P1 is reducible to a problem
P2, then P2 is said to be as hard as P1. Given a complexity class C and a problem
P ∈ C9, P is said to be C-complete if any problem P ′ ∈ C can be reduced to P . It is
possible to establish a hierarchy for complexity classes, comparing both time and space
classes. Figure 2.2 from [Papadimitriou, 1994] depicts graphically the following sequence
of inclusions:
L ⊆ NL ⊆ P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆ EXP.
It is known that L is a proper subset of PSPACE, and that P is a proper subset of EXP.
However, it is an open question which of the remaining inclusions is proper.
Given a language L, the complement of L is the language L¯ = Σ∗\L. Given a complexity
class C, the complement of C, denoted by co-C, is the set of languages defined by co-
C = {L¯ : L ∈ C}. Notice that, for any deterministic complexity class C, co-C =
8This implies that the machine computing T operates in polynomial time – see below.
9Notice that Turing machines can be seen as algorithms to solve problems. Thus, a problem P is in a
complexity class C if the Turing machine implementing an algorithm for P is in C.
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C. Important results about complexity classes are summarised in the following theorems
from [Papadimitriou, 1994]. These theorems will be employed in Section 4.2 to prove
complexity bounds for the complexity of model checking multi-agent systems.
Theorem 2.1.1. (Savitch’s Theorem, [Papadimitriou, 1994], p.149) The problem
of reachability belongs to the complexity class SPACE(log2(n)).
Theorem 2.1.2. ([Papadimitriou, 1994], p.150) The following inclusion holds:
NSPACE(f(n)) ⊆ SPACE(f2(n)).
As a corollary, notice that NPSPACE = PSPACE.
Theorem 2.1.3. ([Papadimitriou, 1994], p.153) The following equivalence holds:
NSPACE(f(n)) = co−NSPACE(f(n)).
2.1.6.1 The complexity of modal logics
The machinery presented above may be used in the definition of the complexity of a logic.
Traditionally, the complexity of a logic is defined as the complexity of the satisfiability
problem for that logic. Given a formula ϕ, satisfiability is the problem of establishing
whether or not there exists a model M and a world w of M such that M,w |= ϕ. Notice
that a complexity result for this problem gives an immediate result for the problem of
validity of a formula ϕ, as it is defined in Section 2.1.1: indeed, a formula ϕ is valid iff ¬ϕ
is not satisfiable.
The following theorems summarise complexity results for various logics:
Theorem 2.1.4. ([Blackburn et al., 2001]) Every normal modal logic extending S4.3
has an NP-complete satisfiability problem. Every normal logic between K and S4.3 has a
PSPACE-hard satisfiability problem10.
Theorem 2.1.5. ([Emerson and Halpern, 1985, Sistla and Clarke, 1985]) The
satisfiability problem for CTL is EXP-complete. The satisfiability problem for LTL is
PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 2.1.6. ([van Drimmelen, 2003])The satisfiability problem for ATL is EXP-
complete.
2.1.7 MAS theories
Many different formalisms are available for reasoning about multi-agent systems using
logics; detailed reviews can be found in [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995, Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2003b]. This section provides a brief introduction to some formalisms, while
10
S4.3 is the logic obtained by adding the axiom 2(2p =⇒ q) ∨2(2q =⇒ p) to the logic S4.
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Section 2.1.7.1 introduces the details of the framework of interpreted systems [Fagin et al.,
1995].
Cohen and Levesque’s intention logic: The key assumption of Cohen and Levesque
is that intelligent agents must achieve a rational balance between beliefs, goals, and in-
tentions ([Cohen and Levesque, 1990], p.214). To this end, they introduce a first order
multi-modal logic with four primary operators: BEL, GOAL, HAPPENS and DONE
([Cohen and Levesque, 1990], p.222). The semantics of BEL and GOAL is the usual
Kripke semantics; the accessibility relation for BEL is Euclidean, transitive and serial; the
accessibility relation for GOAL is serial. Moreover, the GOAL relation is a subset of the
BEL relation. Worlds in the formalism are an infinite sequence of events.
Besides the temporal operators HAPPENS and DONE, there are other constructs similar
to dynamic logic [Harel, 1984], such as “;” to denote a sequence of events and “?” to
denote a test action.
The standard temporal operators 2 (“always”) and 3 (“at some time”) are defined as
abbreviations:
3ϕ = ∃x(HAPPENS x;ϕ?); 2ϕ = ¬3¬ϕ.
Other constructs are derived from the basic operators; the most important is persistent
goal11:
(P-GOAL i p) = (GOAL i (LATER p)) ∧
(BEL i ¬p) ∧
[BEFORE((BEL i p) ∨ (BEL i 2¬p))
¬(GOAL i (LATER p))];
which means that an agent i has p as a persistent goal if: i has a goal that p becomes true
at some point in the future, and i believes that p is currently false, and i drops his goal
only if i believes that the goal has been satisfied, or i believes that the goal will never be
satisfied.
Intentions to act are defined as follows12:
(INTEND i α) = (P-GOAL i
[DONE i (BEL i (HAPPENS α))?;α]).
Notice that an agent drops an intention of doing an action only if the agent believes that
the action has been performed, or the agent believes that the action cannot be performed.
11The definition of LATER and BEFORE is straightforward and can be found in the original paper.
12A similar definition for “intending that something becomes true” can be found in [Cohen and Levesque,
1990].
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Condition Axiom
B ⊆sup D ⊆sup I (INTEND i E(ϕ)) =⇒ (DES i E(ϕ))(BEL i E(ϕ))
B ⊆sub D ⊆sub I (INTEND i A(ϕ)) =⇒ (DES i A(ϕ))(BEL i A(ϕ))
B ⊆ D ⊆ I (INTEND i ϕ) =⇒ (DES i ϕ)(BEL i ϕ)
B ∩ D 6= ∅ (BEL i ϕ) =⇒ ¬(DES i ¬ϕ)
D ∩ I 6= ∅ (DES i ϕ) =⇒ ¬(INTEND i ¬ϕ)
B ∩ I 6= ∅ (BEL i ϕ) =⇒ ¬(INTEND i ¬ϕ)
Table 2.5: Interaction conditions and corresponding axioms for BDI logics.
Rao and Georgeff’s BDI logic: (This presentation follows the lines of [Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2003b]). Rao and Georgeff propose a family of BDI logics (BDI stands for
Beliefs, Desires, Intentions) based on the branching time temporal logic CTL. Their logics
include the modal operators BEL, DES and INTEND for expressing beliefs, desires and
intentions. Beliefs correspond to information that an agent has about the world. Desires
correspond to states of affairs that an agent would like to achieve. Intentions correspond
to desires that an agent is committed to achieve.
The semantics of BDI modalities is based on the standard Kripke semantics. However,
each world is itself a Kripke structure for CTL logic. Hence, a world is a structure
w =< T,R > where T is a non-empty set of time points and R is a branching time
relation on T . A situation is a pair < w, t > composed of a world and a time point. The
accessibility relations B,D,I for BEL, DES and INTEND are defined on situations. The
logics proposed by Rao and Georgeff differ on the the interactions between modalities.
Interaction between relations correspond to axioms in the logic. For example, if D ⊆ I,
then for every agent i, INTEND i ϕ =⇒ DES i ϕ.
But worlds are themselves structures, so one can also reason about interactions on the
structure of worlds. If w and w′ are worlds, w ⊑ w′ means that w has the same structure
as w′, but fewer paths. Consider now two accessibility relation R and R′. R is a structural
subset of R′, denoted by R ⊆sub R
′, if for every R-accessible world w, there is an R′-
accessible world w′ such that w ⊑ w′. Similarly, R is a structural superset of R′, denoted
by R ⊆sup R
′, if w′ ⊑ w.
Various BDI logical systems can be obtained from the interactions between relations.
Examples are reported in Table 2.5.
Benerecetti, Giunchiglia and Serafini’s MATL: Multi-Agent Temporal
Logic [Benerecetti et al., 1998] is the composition of the temporal logic CTL and
the logic HML (Hierarchical Meta-Logic) to represent beliefs, desires and intentions.
HML is defined as follows. Let I be a set of agents, and O = {B,D, I} be a set of symbols,
one for each attitude. Let OI∗ = (O × I)∗, i.e., each α ∈ OI∗ is a string representing a
possible nesting of attitudes. Each α ∈ OI∗ is called a view, including the empty string
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ǫ representing the view of an “external observer”. An agent “is a tree rooted in the view
that the external observer has of it” (notice that the view that an agent has of another
agent can be different from the agent itself). A logical language Lα is associated to each
view α. Each language is used to express what is true in the representation corresponding
to α. It is imposed that Oiϕ is a formula of Lα iff ϕ is a formula of LOiα.
The semantics of {Lα}α∈OI∗ is given by means of the concept of tree. A tree is a subset
of the set of possible interpretations of a language Lα, denoted by Mα. Namely, each
interpretation is denoted by tα ∈ Mα, and a tree is a set {tα}α∈OI∗ . A compatibility
relation T is a set of trees. A tree satisfies a formula at a view iff the formula is satisfied
by all the elements that the tree associates to the view.
A Hierarchical Meta-Structure (HM Structure) is a set of trees T on Lα, closed under
containment, such that there is a t ∈ T with tǫ 6= ∅; if tα satisfies Oiϕ, then tOiα satisfies
ϕ, and if for all t′ ∈ T , t′α ∈ tα implies that tαOi satisfies ϕ , then tα satisfies Oiϕ.
MATL structures (i.e., models) are a particular kind of HM structures: each language
Lα is a CTL language. This allows for the interpretation of formulae of a language that
includes BDI and temporal (CTL) operators.
Wooldridge’s LORA: LORA [Wooldridge, 2000b] can be viewed as an extension of the
temporal logic CTL. LORA has four main components: a classical first-order component,
a BDI component, a temporal component and an action component (in a dynamic logic
style).
The BDI component is similar to the Rao and Georgeff’s formalism presented above.
The state of an agent is defined by its beliefs, desires and intentions, whose semantics is
given via standard Kripke semantics, and worlds are themselves branching time structures.
LORA also contains terms to reason about groups of agents.
The semantics of LORA is defined by means of models. A model for LORA is a structure
M =< T,R,W,D,Act,Agt,B,D,I, C,Φ >
where T is the set of all time points, R ⊆ T ×T is a branching time relation over T , W is a
set of worlds over T (see above); D =< DAg,DAc,DGr,DU > is a domain, Act : R→ DAc
associates an action with every relation in R, Agt : DAc → DAgt associates an agent
with every action, B,D,I are the accessibility relations, C is an interpretation function
for constants and Φ is an interpretation function for predicates. In the definition of D,
DAg = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents, DAc = {α,α
′, . . . } is a set of actions, DGr is a set of
non-empty subsets of DAg, i.e., groups of agents, DU is a set of other individuals. LORA
models provide the semantics for state and path formulae. Details of LORA’s syntax and
the interpretation of LORA’s formulae can be found in [Wooldridge, 2000b].
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2.1.7.1 Interpreted systems
The formalism of interpreted systems was introduced in [Fagin et al., 1995] to model a
system of agents and to reason about the agents’ epistemic and temporal properties. In
this formalism, each agent is modelled using a set of local states, a set of actions, a protocol,
and an evolution function.
• The set of local states for an agent i is denoted by the symbol Li. Elements of Li
capture the “private” information of an agent and, at any given time, local states
represent the state in which an agent is (e.g. ready and busy may be elements of
Li). Contrary to [Fagin et al., 1995], it is assumed that the set Li is finite (this is
required by the model checking algorithms).
• The set of actions for an agent i is denoted by the symbol Acti. Elements of Acti
represent the possible actions that an agent is allowed to perform. Differently from
local states, actions are “public”. Similarly to local states, here the set Acti is
assumed to be finite.
• The protocol for an agent i is denoted by the symbol Pi. The protocol is a “rule”
establishing which actions may be performed in each local state. The protocol Pi is
modelled by a function Pi : Li → 2
Acti , assigning a set of actions to a local state.
Intuitively, this set corresponds to the actions that are enabled in a given local state.
Notice that this definition may enable more than one action to be performed for a
given local state. When more than one action is enabled, it is assumed that an agent
selects non-deterministically which action to perform.
• The evolution function for agent i is denoted by the symbol ti (notice: [Fagin et al.,
1995] define a single evolution function t for all the agents, see discussion below).
The evolution function determines how local states “evolve”, based on the agent’s
local state, on other agents’ actions, and on the local state of a special agent used
to model the environment (see below). The evolution function is modelled by a
function ti : Li × LE × Act1 × · · · × Actn × ActE → Li, where n is the number of
agents in the system.
A special agent E is used to model the environment in which the agents operate. Sim-
ilarly to the other agents, E is modelled using a set of local states LE, a set of actions
ActE , a protocol PE , and an evolution function tE. As noticed above, local states for
E are “public”: all the remaining agents may “peek” at LE to determine their temporal
evolution.
For all agents including the environment, the sets Li andActi are assumed to be non-empty,
and the number n ∈ IN of agents is assumed to be finite. For convenience, the symbol Act
denotes the Cartesian product of the agents’ actions, i.e., Act = Act1× · · ·×Actn×ActE .
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An element α ∈ Act is a tuple of actions (one for each agent) and is referred to as a
joint action. The Cartesian product of the agents’ local states is denoted by S, i.e.,
S = Li × · · · × Ln × LE. An element g ∈ S is called a global state; given a global state
g, the symbol li(g) denotes the local state of agent i in the global state g. It is assumed
that, in every state, agents evolve simultaneously (notice that this requirement is similar
to the definition of Moore synchronous game structures given in Section 2.1.4.3).
The definition of a single evolution function t : S×Act→ S presented in [Fagin et al., 1995]
differs slightly from the definition of n + 1 evolution functions presented here. The two
definitions are, in fact, equivalent: t(g, a) = g′ iff, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti(li(g), a) = li(g
′)
and tE(lE(g), a) = lE(g
′) (the decomposition from a single t to n + 1 “local” transition
functions is guaranteed to be possible by the assumptions on t). As it will be clear
in Section 5.2, the definition of an evolution function for each agent helps to keep the
description of the system compact.
Given a set of initial global states I ⊆ S, the protocols and the evolution functions generate
a set of reachable global states G ⊆ S, obtained by all the possible runs of the system.
A set of atomic propositions P and an evaluation relation V ⊆ P × S are introduced
to complete the description of an interpreted system. Formally, given a set of n agents
{1, . . . , n}, an interpreted system is a tuple:
IS =
〈
(Li, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,n} , (LE , ActE , PE , tE) , I, V
〉
.
It has been shown in [Fagin et al., 1995] that interpreted systems can provide a semantics
to reason about time and epistemic properties, by means the following language:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | EGϕ | E[ϕUψ] | Kiϕ | EΓϕ | CΓϕ | DΓϕ.
In this grammar, p ∈ P is an atomic proposition, and the operators EX,EG, and EU are
the standard CTL operators; the remaining CTL operators EF,AX,AG,AU,AF can be
derived in the standard way presented above. The formula Kiϕ (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) is read as
“agent i knows ϕ”. The symbol Γ denotes a group of agents. The formula EΓϕ is read as
“everybody in group Γ knows ϕ”; the formula CΓϕ is read as “ϕ is common knowledge in
group Γ” (intuitively, common knowledge of ϕ in a group of agents denotes the fact that
everyone knows ϕ, and everyone knows that everybody else knows ϕ); the formula DΓϕ
is read as “ϕ is distributed knowledge in group Γ” (intuitively, distributed knowledge in a
group of agents is the knowledge obtained by “sharing” all agents’ knowledge).
Given an interpreted system IS , it is possible to associate a Kripke model MIS =
(W,Rt,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) to IS ; the model MIS can be used to interpret formulae of the
grammar above. The model MIS is obtained as follows:
• The set of possible worlds W is the set G of reachable global states (this is to
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avoid the epistemic accessibility of states which cannot reached using the temporal
relation).
• The temporal relation Rt ⊆ W ×W relating two worlds (i.e., two global states) is
defined by the temporal transition ti. Two worlds w and w
′ are such that wRtw
′ iff
there exists a joint action a ∈ Act such that t(g, a) = g′, where t is the transition
relation of IS obtained by the composition of the functions ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and tE .
• The epistemic accessibility relations ∼i⊆W ×W are defined by imposing the equal-
ity of the local components of the global states. Two worlds w,w′ ∈ W are such
that w ∼i w
′ iff li(w) = li(w
′) (i.e., two worlds w and w′ are related via the epis-
temic relation ∼i when the local states of agent i in global states w and w
′ are the
same [Fagin et al., 1995]).
• The evaluation relation V ⊆ AP ×W is the evaluation relation of IS .
Similarly to the definitions of Section 2.1.4, let π = (w0, w1, . . . ) be an infinite sequence of
worlds such that, for all i, wiRtwi+1, and let π(i) denote the i-th world in the sequence (the
temporal relation is assumed to be serial and thus all computation paths are infinite). Let
REΓ ⊆W ×W denote the relation obtained by taking the union of the epistemic relations
for the agents in Γ, i.e., REΓ =
⋃
i∈Γ
∼i. Let R
D
Γ denote the intersection of the epistemic
relations for the agents in Γ, i.e., RDΓ =
⋂
i∈Γ
∼i. Let R
C
Γ denote the transitive closure of R
E
Γ .
It is written MIS , w |= ϕ when a formula ϕ is true at a world w in the Kripke model MIS ,
associated with an interpreted system IS . Satisfaction is defined inductively as follows:
MIS , w |= p iff (p,w) ∈ V ,
MIS , w |= ¬ϕ iff MIS , w 6|= ϕ,
MIS , w |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff MIS , w |= ϕ1 or MIS , w |= ϕ2,
MIS , w |= EXϕ iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = w,
and MIS , π(1) |= ϕ,
MIS , w |= EGϕ iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = w,
and MIS , π(i) |= ϕ for all i ≥ 0,
MIS , w |= E[ϕUψ] iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = w, and there exists
k ≥ 0 such that MIS , π(k) |= ψ, and MIS , π(j) |= ϕ
for all 0 ≤ j < k,
MIS , w |= Kiϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W , w ∼i w
′ implies MIS , w
′ |= ϕ,
MIS , w |= EΓϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W , wREΓw
′ implies MIS , w
′ |= ϕ,
MIS , w |= CΓϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W , wRCΓw
′ implies MIS , w
′ |= ϕ,
MIS , w |= DΓϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W , wRDΓ w
′ implies MIS , w
′ |= ϕ.
Similarly to standard Kripke models, a formula ϕ is true in a model, written MIS |= ϕ, if
MIS , w |= ϕ for all w ∈W .
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A formula ϕ is true in an interpreted system IS , denoted by IS |= ϕ, iff it is true in the
associated Kripke model ([Fagin et al., 1995], p. 111). In the remainder of this thesis,
CTLK will denote the logic including the temporal operators of CTL and the epistemic
operators Ki, while CTLK
D,C will denote the logic CTLK with distributed and common
knowledge. The complexity of the satisfiability problem for CTLK and for CTLKD,C
has been investigated in [Meyden and Wong, 2003], where it has been proven to be EXP-
complete for both logics.
2.1.7.2 Deontic interpreted systems
Interpreted systems have been extended in [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2003] to include the
notion of correct behaviour. This is done by partitioning the set of local states Li into
two sets: a non-empty set Gi of allowed (or correct, or “green”) states, and a set Ri of
disallowed (or faulty, or “red”) states, such that Li = Gi ∪Ri, and Gi ∩ Ri = ∅. Given a
set of agents {1, . . . , n} and a set of atomic propositions P , a deontic interpreted system13
is a tuple
DIS =
〈
(Gi, Ri, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,n} , (GE , RE , ActE , PE , tE) , I, V
〉
.
Two new logical operators are introduced in [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2003]:
• The operator Oiϕ expresses the fact that, under all the correct alternatives for agent
i, ϕ holds.
• The operator KˆΓi , where Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is a group of agents, expresses the knowledge
that agent i has on the assumption that all agents in Γ are functioning correctly.
With slight abuse of notation, it is usually written Kˆji when Γ is a singleton Γ = {j}.
Though temporal operators are not considered in [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2003], they can
be included in the syntax of formulae evaluated in deontic interpreted systems [Raimondi
and Lomuscio, 2004a]. The syntax is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | EGϕ | E[ϕUψ] | Kiϕ | EΓϕ | CΓϕ | DΓϕ
Oiϕ | Kˆ
Γ
i ϕ.
Formulae are interpreted in deontic interpreted systems DIS by associating a Kripke
model MDIS = (W,Rt,∼1, . . . ,∼n, R
O
1 , . . . , R
O
n , V ) to DIS . The definition of the re-
lations ROi ⊆ W × W (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) is based on the set Gi for agent i: two
13Notice that the term “deontic” is used in [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2003] without any reference to obli-
gations of agents, but with the aim of reasoning exclusively about correct functioning behaviour.
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worlds w,w′ ∈ W are such that wROi w
′ iff li(w
′) ∈ Gi (notice that R
O
i does
not depend on the world w appearing on the left hand side of the relation). The
definition of all the remaining symbols is analogous to the definitions presented in
Section 2.1.7.1, as well as the definition of the semantics for formulae, except for:
MDIS , w |= Oiϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W , wROi w
′ implies MDIS , w
′ |= ϕ;
MDIS , w |= Kˆ
Γ
i ϕ iff for all w
′ ∈W and for all j ∈ Γ, w ∼i w
′ and wROj w
′
implies MDIS , w
′ |= ϕ.
Similarly to Section 2.1.7.1, a formula ϕ is true in a deontic interpreted system DIS iff it
is true in the associated Kripke model. In the remainder of this thesis, the logic which
includes temporal, epistemic, and correct behaviour operators is denoted by CTLKDD,C .
2.1.7.3 Reasoning about actions in interpreted systems
The idea of reasoning about knowledge and actions goes back to [Moore, 1990], and it
has been investigated actively in recent years. Actions are treated explicitly in interpreted
systems, but the logic languages introduced in [Fagin et al., 1995] do not include operators
to reason about actions, neither in a dynamic logic style [Harel, 1984], nor a` la ATL. This
section presents a possible approach to the analysis of actions and strategies in interpreted
systems.
A framework to reason about knowledge and actions in multi-agent systems has been
investigated in [Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003a], where the logic ATEL (Alternating-time
Temporal Epistemic Logic) is introduced. The language of ATEL is the fusion of the lan-
guages of ATL and CTLKD,C ; ATEL formulae are interpreted in alternating epistemic
transition systems (ATES). An ATES is a tuple
(Π,Σ, Q,∼1, . . . ,∼n, π, δ)
such that:
• Π is a set of atomic propositions;
• Σ = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents;
• Q is a finite set of states;
• ∼i⊆ Q×Q (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) are epistemic accessibility relations (one for each agent);
• π : Q→ 2Π is an evaluation function;
• δ : Q× Σ→ 22
Q
is an evolution function.
The definition of satisfiability for ATEL is obtained by taking the union of the rules for
ATL with the standard rules for epistemic operators.
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<A,K> <A,Q> <K,A> <K,Q> <Q,A> <Q,K>
<−,−>
Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose
Keep Change
Change
Keep
Change
Keep
Keep
Change
Keep
Change
Change
Keep
Figure 2.3: A simple card game for ATEL.
Intuitively, ATES provide a “coarser grain” semantics than interpreted systems (i.e., ATES
can be embedded [Goranko and Jamroga, 2004] in interpreted systems): thus, ATEL
formulae may be evaluated in interpreted systems, and ATEL can be seen as the fusion of
the two logics ATL and CTLKD,C , without interaction axioms between knowledge and
strategic operators. However, it has been argued [Jamroga, 2004a, Jonker, 2003, Jamroga,
2004b, Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004] that the interpretation of ATL operators in
ATEL might not correspond entirely to the original spirit of ATL [Alur et al., 2002]. The
following example from [Jonker, 2003, Jamroga, 2004b] illustrates this. An agent (the
player) plays a simple card game against another agent (the environment). There are just
three cards in the deck: Ace (“A”), King (“K)”, and Queen (“Q”). “A” wins over “K”,
“K” wins over “Q”, and “Q” wins over “A”. In the initial state no cards are distributed.
In the first step, the environment gives a card to the player and takes a card for itself. In
the second step, the player can either keep its card, or change it. The game is depicted in
Figure 2.3.
The formula 〈〈player〉〉F (win), expressing that the player has a strategy to reach a state
in which win holds, is true in the initial state of this model. Indeed, the player may guess
an action to bring about a winning state, but it is clearly not the case that the player can
always enforce a win: the player cannot distinguish between the “global” states <A,K> and
<A,Q>, and thus cannot always choose the right action (either to keep or to change). As
originally remarked in [Moore, 1990], some form of dependence must be taken in account
for actions and knowledge. However, it has been shown in [Agotnes, 2005] that there is
no interaction axiom that can be added to ATEL to express with ATL operators what
an agent can enforce.
Various solutions have been put forward to express ATL operators in a semantics based
on MAS [Jonker, 2003, Jamroga, 2004b, Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004]. Instead of ex-
ploring new logics, this thesis employs the language of ATEL extended with operators for
correct behaviour, and presents three classes of interpreted systems in which formulae this
language can be interpreted14. This logic will be denoted by CTLKD−AD,C ; formally,
14This approach is similar to the one proposed in [Fagin et al., 1995] for the interpretation of the same
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the language of CTLKD−AD,C is defined by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | EGϕ | E[ϕUψ] | Kiϕ | EΓϕ | CΓϕ | DΓϕ
Oiϕ | Kˆ
Γ
i ϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉Gϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉[ϕUψ].
In this language, it is assumed that Γ is a set of agents, and the derived temporal operators
F and A are obtained in the standard way15.
CTLKD−AD,C formulae are evaluated in a deontic interpreted system
DIS =
〈
(Gi, Ri, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,n} , (GE , RE , ActE , PE , tE) , I, V
〉
by associating an “enriched” model MeDIS to DIS . In particular,
MeDIS = (W,Rt,∼1, . . . ,∼n, R
O
1 , . . . , R
O
n , t, V ).
The “enriched” model MeDIS differs from the model MDIS presented in Section 2.1.7.2 in
that the evolution function t : G× Act→ G is carried over from DIS to MeDIS . Indeed,
the evolution function t is employed in the evaluation of ATL operators, as follows. Let
Σ = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and let preΓ(ϕ) be the set of states defined by
preΓ(ϕ) = {w ∈W |∃a ∈ ActΓ s.t. ∀a
′ ∈ ActΣ\Γ all temporal transitions labelled with the
< a, a′ > lead to a state w′ s.t. MeDIS , w
′ |= ϕ.
MeDIS , w |= 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ iff w ∈ preΓ(ϕ)
MeDIS , w |= 〈〈Γ〉〉Gϕ iff MeDIS , w |= ϕ and for all paths π from w and,
for all states wi, wi+1 of π, MeDIS , wi+1 |= phi and wi ∈ preΓ(ϕ)
MeDIS , w |= 〈〈Γ〉〉[ϕUψ] iff for all temporal paths π starting from w, the agents in
Γ may perform joint actions along the paths s.t. eventually
ψ will hold and ϕ holds along the paths until then.
Notice that the semantics presented above corresponds to the memoryless, imperfect in-
formation semantics of ATL, because actions for agent i depend on the current local state
only via the protocol Pi. A “partial” memory semantics could be defined in this formalism
by adding a vector to the local states of an agent, containing the list of previously visited
knowledge operator in various classes on interpreted systems (synchronous, asynchronous, perfect recall,
etc.).
15Notice that CTL operators may, in fact, be derived from ATL operators. Here the two classes of
operators are kept separated, to underline the difference between temporal reasoning with CTL, and
strategic reasoning with ATL.
15A joint action a for a group of agents Γ is a tuple belonging to the set ActΓ, where ActΓ is the Cartesian
product ActΓ =
Q
i∈Γ
ai. Given two joint actions a ∈ ActΓ and a
′ ∈ ActΣ\Γ, < a, a
′ >∈ Act is the joint
action obtained by the concatenation of a and a′ (with the appropriate reordering of terms, if needed).
15A joint action a for a group of agents Γ is a tuple belonging to the set ActΓ, where ActΓ is the Cartesian
product ActΓ =
Q
i∈Γ
ai. Given two joint actions a ∈ ActΓ and a
′ ∈ ActΣ\Γ, < a, a
′ >∈ Act is the joint
action obtained by the concatenation of a and a′ (with the appropriate reordering of terms, if needed).
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local states. This option is denoted by the term bounded recall.
This thesis distinguishes three classes of deontic interpreted systems to interpret
CTLKD−AD,C formulae:
1. Non-deterministic deontic interpreted systems: this is the most general class
of interpreted systems, defined in Section 2.1.7.2. In this class, ATL operators ex-
press what agents may bring about, maybe by guessing moves, and not what agents
may enforce. Nevertheless, such interpretation may be useful in certain circum-
stances.
2. Deterministic deontic interpreted systems: the general definition of deontic
interpreted systems enables agents to run non-deterministic protocols, i.e., the same
agent may non-deterministically perform different actions in the same local state.
To avoid random actions, it is possible to focus on the subclass of deontic inter-
preted systems, whose protocols are deterministic, i.e., protocols in which only one
action is associated to a given local state: Pi : Li → Acti. A deontic interpreted
system is said to be deterministic iff the protocol of each agent is deterministic (a
deterministic protocol associates a unique action to each local state). Notice that, in
deterministic interpreted systems, agents perform the same action in epistemically
equivalent states.
3. Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems: in many circumstances the class of
deterministic interpreted systems is too restrictive to be used in the specification of
MAS scenarios. In these circumstances it is useful to reason about non-deterministic
interpreted systems that are at least consistent in their selection of actions in a given
local state. For instance, in the example of Figure 2.3, it is reasonable to assume
that, if the player decides to keep its card in state <A,K>, then it should do so
in state <A,Q> as well. By extending the concepts of [Jonker, 2003, Jamroga and
van der Hoek, 2004], an agent is defined to be uniform if the agent performs the
same action in epistemically equivalent global states. A group of agents Γ ⊆ Σ is
uniform if every agent in the group is uniform. A deontic interpreted system is Γ-
uniform if all agents in Γ are uniform, whereas agents in Σ\Γ and the environment
may choose their actions freely, according to their protocol. A Γ-uniform deontic
interpreted system DISΓ is said to be compatible with a given non-deterministic
deontic interpreted system DIS if:
• The group of agents Γ is uniform in DISΓ;
• The protocols for agents in Γ of DISΓ are a restriction of the protocols of DIS
(in the sense that only one action is enabled in DISΓ, and the action is one of
the enabled actions in DIS );
• All the remaining parameters remain the same.
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Notice that, for a given non-deterministic deontic interpreted system, there may
be several Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems compatible with it, but at most∏
i∈Γ
|Acti|
|Li|. The set of Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems compatible with a
given deontic interpreted system DIS is denoted by {DIS}Γ. A formula ϕ is true
in the class of Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems compatible with a given DIS ,
and it is written DIS |=Γ ϕ, if ϕ is true in at least one of the models associated
with the deontic interpreted systems in {DIS}Γ. Application examples of Γ-uniform
deontic interpreted systems are presented in Section 6.3.
2.1.7.4 Why interpreted systems?
Interpreted systems and their extensions to reason about time, knowledge, correct be-
haviour, and actions a` la ATL) offer a suitable formalism for modelling multi-agent sys-
tems. This thesis builds on this formalism for various reasons:
• Interpreted systems are computationally grounded [Wooldridge, 2000a]: the seman-
tics of interpreted systems maps directly to runs of a system, and vice-versa. In-
deed, the description of a scenario in terms of runs of interpreted systems (using local
states, protocols, etc.) immediately provides a logic model to evaluate formulae (i.e.,
specifications).
• Differently from other formalisms, epistemic properties are not ascribed to agents
by means of sets of propositions; instead, epistemic properties are based on the
equivalence of local states.
• The concept of “local states” offers a flexible abstraction for the agents. Local states
can be “singletons”, corresponding to a very high level description of the agents.
But local states are allowed to have a more complex structure: for instance, local
states could be arrays of variables, or a combination of singletons and arrays, thereby
allowing for a “fine grained” description of agents.
• Interpreted systems are easily extensible: the original work of [Fagin et al., 1995]
includes temporal and epistemic operators only, but in the previous sections it has
been shown that various extensions are possible to include other modalities.
Some issues remain open when formalising MAS using interpreted systems, e.g., the lack of
modalities to reason about typical agents’ stances such as desires and intentions. Neverthe-
less, as shown in the examples of Chapter 6, interpreted systems are a useful abstraction,
as “frictionless” is in Physics.
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2.2 Model checking
2.2.1 Problem definition
Model checking is the problem of establishing whether or not a given formula ϕ is true
in a given model M . Notice that, unlike the problem of satisfiability of a formula, model
checking has two input parameters: the formula ϕ and the model M .
Historically, techniques to perform model checking have received little attention in modal
logic. Apart from the definition of satisfiability in a model (denoted in the previous
Section by M |= ϕ), no references to model checking techniques appear in [Chellas, 1980,
Goldblatt, 1992, Hughes and Cresswell, 1996, Blackburn et al., 2001, Gabbay et al., 2003].
Nevertheless, model checking techniques are prominent in the area of formal verification.
Using model checking, the problem of verifying that a generic system S complies with
a given specification P is reduced to the problem of verifying that a logical formula ϕP
(representing the specification P ) is satisfied in a model MS (representing the generic
system S). No particular requirements are usually imposed on S, even though, in most
cases, S is required to be finite. Traditionally, systems have been represented by means of
temporal models, i.e., LTL, CTL, or CTL∗ models, and specifications have been encoded
using the language of one of these logics. Indeed, the expressivity of temporal logics is
suitable for the description of many requirements. A pattern system for temporal logics
has been investigated in [Dwyer et al., 1998], where a pattern is defined as the “description
of a commonly occurring requirement”; for instance, safety and liveness are two commonly
recurring specification patterns, but many others can be defined (see [Dwyer et al., 2006]
for an ongoing project collecting temporal specification patterns).
The expressivity of temporal logics, combined with the possibility of abstracting generic
systems by means of logical models of temporal logics, has lead to the development of
tools and techniques for the verification of many scenarios, from hardware circuits, to
communication protocols, and software (see [Clarke et al., 1999] and references therein).
The process of representing a generic system S with a (temporal) model MS , however,
suffers from the so called state explosion problem: the number of states in the model MS
grows exponentially with the number of variables, or parallel components, constituting
the system S. For instance, modelling explicitly a simple piece of software containing
20 variables of type byte, would require a model with 25620 ≈ 1.5 · 1048 states. Thus,
one of the main challenges of model checking is the development of efficient techniques to
tackle the state explosion problem. The next sections present various solutions from the
literature.
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2.2.2 Model checking techniques
2.2.2.1 Fix-point characterisation of CTL and the labelling algorithm
This section introduces the labelling algorithm for model checking CTL. This algorithm
is based on the fix-point characterisation of some CTL operators.
LetQ be a set; an operator τ : 2Q → 2Q is said to bemonotonic if, given two setsX,Y ⊆ Q,
X ⊆ Y implies τ(X) ⊆ τ(Y ). It is possible to prove [Tarski, 1955] that a monotonic
operator τ has a greatest and a least fix-point; these are denoted by νZ.τ(Z) and µZ.τ(Z),
respectively. Let τ i(X) be defined by τ0(X) = X, and τ i+1(X) = τ(τ i(X)). If Q is finite
and τ is monotonic, then there exist integer numbers n,m such that νZ.τ(Z) = ∩iτ
n(Q)
and µZ.τ(Z) = ∪iτ
n(∅).
The monotonicity properties above are used in conjunction with the following equivalences
[Huth and Ryan, 2004] for the purpose of CTL model checking:
EGϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ EXEGϕ; (2.1)
E[ϕUψ] ≡ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ EXE[ϕUψ]). (2.2)
Let ϕ be a CTL formula, let M = (S,R, V ) be a CTL model, and let [[ϕ]]M ⊆ S denote
the set of states of M in which ϕ holds16. The equivalences above imply the following:
[[EGϕ]] ≡ [[ϕ]] ∩ [[EXEGϕ]]; (2.3)
[[E[ϕUψ]]] ≡ [[ψ]] ∪ ([[ϕ]] ∩ [[EXE[ϕUψ]]]). (2.4)
Following [Huth and Ryan, 2004], let pre∃(X) denote a procedure that, given a set X ⊆ S,
computes the set of states Y ⊆ S from which a transition is enabled to a state in X, i.e.:
Y = pre∃(X) = {s ∈ S|∃s
′.(s′ ∈ X and sRs′)}.
Using this procedure, it is possible to rewrite equations 2.3 and 2.4 as follows:
[[EGϕ]] ≡ [[ϕ]] ∩ pre∃([[EGϕ]]); (2.5)
[[E[ϕUψ]]] ≡ [[ψ]] ∪ ([[ϕ]] ∩ pre∃([[E[ϕUψ]]])). (2.6)
Let τEG,ϕ : 2
S → 2S be the operator defined by τEG(X) = [[ϕ]]∩pre∃(X), and let τEU,ϕ,ψ :
2S → 2S be defined by τEU,ϕ,ψ(X) = [[ψ]] ∪ ([[ϕ]] ∩ pre∃(X)). Equations 2.5 and 2.6
imply that [[EGϕ]] is the fix-point of the operator τEG,ϕ, while [[E[ϕUψ]]] is the fix-point
of τEU,ϕ,ψ. It is possible to prove that the operators τEG,ϕ and τEU,ϕ,ψ are monotonic,
16The subscript M will be omitted when it is clear from the context.
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mc(ϕ,M) {
ϕ is an atomic formula: return V (ϕ);
ϕ is ¬ϕ1: return S \ mc(ϕ1,M);
ϕ is ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: return mc(ϕ1,M)∪ mc(ϕ2,M);
ϕ is EXϕ1: return mcEX(ϕ1,M);
ϕ is EGϕ1: return mcEG(ϕ1,M);
ϕ is E[ϕ1Uϕ2]: return mcEU(ϕ1, ϕ2,M);
}
Figure 2.4: The labelling algorithm, from [Huth and Ryan, 2004].
mcEX(ϕ,M) {
X = mc(ϕ,M);
Y = pre∃(X);
return Y ;
}
Figure 2.5: The support procedure mcEX(ϕ,M), from [Huth and Ryan, 2004].
and that [[EGϕ]] is the greatest fix-point of τEG,ϕ, while [[E[ϕUψ]]] is the least fix-point
of τEU,ϕ,ψ [Clarke et al., 1999, Huth and Ryan, 2004]. Thus, there exist finite natural
numbers n and m such that [[EGϕ]] = τnEG,ϕ(S) and [[E[ϕUψ]]] = τ
m
EU,ϕ,ψ(∅).
The characterisation of the operators EG and EU using fix-points permits the definition
of algorithm for model checking CTL formulae, denoted with mc. The algorithm mc takes
a formula ϕ and a CTL model M as input, and operates by labelling with the string ϕ all
the states of M in which ϕ holds; equivalently, it can be said that the algorithm mc(ϕ,M)
computes the set [[ϕ]].
mcEG(ϕ,M) {
X = mc(ϕ,M);
Y = S;
Z = ∅;
while ( Z! = Y ) {
Z = Y ;
Y = X ∩ pre∃(Y );
}
return Y ;
}
Figure 2.6: The support procedure mcEG(ϕ,M), from [Huth and Ryan, 2004].
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mcEU(ϕ1, ϕ2,M) {
X = mc(ϕ1,M);
Y = mc(ϕ2,M);
Z = ∅;
W = S;
while ( Z! =W ) {
W = Z;
Z = Y ∪ (X ∩ pre∃(Z));
}
return Z;
}
Figure 2.7: The support procedure mcEU(ϕ1, ϕ2,M), from [Huth and Ryan, 2004].
Figure 2.4 presents the labelling algorithm to compute [[ϕ]], from [Huth and Ryan, 2004].
The additional procedures mcEX(ϕ1,M), mcEG(ϕ1,M), and mcEU(ϕ1, ϕ2,M) imple-
menting the fix-point characterisation presented above are presented in Figures 2.5–2.7.
2.2.2.2 Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams and symbolic model checking
This section introduces Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (obdds), and presents how the
problem of model checking a CTL formula in a model M can be reduced to the problem
of comparing two obdds.
A Boolean variable x is a variable whose value is either 0 or 1. A Boolean function of
n Boolean variables is a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Boolean formulae can be seen as
Boolean functions. For instance, the Boolean formula x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3) can be seen as the
Boolean function f(x1, x2, x3) = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
A rooted, directed graph G can be associated to every Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn)
by imposing an ordering on the variables x1, . . . , xn, and by reducing the graph (in the
sense explained below) [Bryant, 1986]. The graph G is called the Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams of f . For instance, the reduced graph associated with the Boolean function
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3) is depicted in Figure 2.8 (b), by “simplifying” the graph
depicted in Figure 2.8 (a). Formally, a graph is reduced by iteratively eliminating the
vertices which are the root of two isomorphic subgraphs, and by merging isomorphic
subgraphs. A graph is said to be reduced if it contains no isomorphic subgraphs and no
vertices v and v′ such that the sub-graphs rooted at v and v′ are isomorphic. Notice that
every vertex, except the final leaves, has two children. In the remainder, it is assumed
that the left child of a vertex corresponds to the choice of the value 0 (i.e., false) for the
variable preceding it, while the right child correspond to the choice of the value 1 (i.e.,
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Figure 2.8: obdd example for f = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
true). Thus, the leftmost path of Figure 2.8 (a) corresponds to an assignment of 0 to all
variables and, consequently, to the value 0 to the expression f(x1, x2, x3) = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨x3).
It is shown in [Bryant, 1986] that, given a fixed ordering of the Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn,
the reduced graph of any Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is unique (i.e., obdds are
a canonical representation for Boolean functions).
Boolean operators can be applied to Boolean functions; for instance the disjunc-
tion operator ∨ can be applied to two Boolean functions f1 and f2 to obtain a
third Boolean function f3 = f1 ∨ f2. Boolean functions can be composed, too:
given two Boolean functions f and g, the composition of f and g is defined by
fxi=g = f(x1, . . . , xi−1, g(x1, . . . , xn), xi+1, . . . , xn). These operators are denoted with
apply(f, g,<operator>), and with compose((f, g, xi).
The operation of Boolean quantification is particularly important for the purposes
of model checking. Formally, given a Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn), the operation
∃xi.f(x1, . . . , xn) is defined as the application of the disjunction operator to the com-
position of f with a constant function, i.e., ∃xi.f(x1, . . . , xn) = fxi=0(x1, . . . , xn) ∨
fxi=1(x1, . . . , xn). The definition of Boolean quantification can be extended to the quan-
tification over a set of variables x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) (see [Clarke et al., 1999] for more details).
Boolean quantification of a Boolean function f can be implemented for the obdd represent-
ing f ; the complexity of this operation, together with the complexity of other operations
on obdds, is presented in Section 2.2.5.
Ordered binary decision diagrams have been particularly successful in Computer Science
because they offer, on average, a much more compact representation of Boolean functions
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State Boolean vector Boolean formula
s1 (1, 1) x1 ∧ x2
s2 (1, 0) x1 ∧ ¬x2
s3 (0, 1) ¬x1 ∧ x2
Table 2.6: Boolean encoding for the states of S = {s1, s2, s3} (N = ⌈log2(3)⌉ = 2).
with respect to other canonical forms, e.g. conjunctive/disjunctive normal forms. The
application of obdds techniques to model checking forCTL has been investigated from the
beginning of the 1990s by various authors, [Burch et al., 1992, McMillan, 1993]. Intuitively,
given a CTL formula ϕ and a CTL model M = (S,R, V ), the idea of model checking
using obdds is to associate an obdd to the formula ϕ, and an obdd to the set of states
S. By comparing the two obdds it is possible to establish whether or not M |= ϕ17. The
details of this technique are presented below.
Encoding sets of states. The key idea of model checking using obdds is to represent
states (and set of states) as Boolean formulae which, in turn, can be encoded as obdds.
Let S be the set of states of a CTL model M = (S,R, V ) (notice: it is assumed that the
set of states of M is finite), and let N = ⌈log2|S|⌉. Each element s ∈ S is associated with
a vector of Boolean variables x¯ = (x1, . . . , xN ), i.e., each element of s is associated with a
tuple of {0, 1}N . Each tuple x¯ = (x1, . . . , xN ) is then identified with a Boolean formula,
represented by a conjunction of literals, i.e., a conjunction of variables or their negation18.
It is assumed that the value 0 in a tuple corresponds to a negation. An example of Boolean
encoding for the set S = {s1, s2, s3} is given in Table 2.6.
Sets of states are encoded by taking the disjunction of the Boolean formulae encoding the
single states. For instance, the set of states {s1, s3} from the example in Figure 2.6 is
encoded by the Boolean formula f = (x1 ∧ x2) ∨ (¬x1 ∧ x2).
Encoding the transition relation. Given a model M = (S,R, V ), and given an encod-
ing of the set of states S using N Boolean variables (x1, . . . , xN ), the transition relation
R ⊆ S × S may be encoded as a Boolean function. To this end, a new set of “primed”
variables (x′1, . . . , x
′
N ) is introduced to encode the relation between two states s, s
′ ∈ S. In
particular, if sRs′ holds, then s is encoded using the non-primed variables, s′ is encoded
using the primed variables, and the transition step sRs′ is expressed as a Boolean formula
by taking the conjunction of the encoding for s and s′. The whole relation R ⊆ S × S is
17This technique is traditionally identified with the term symbolic model checking. More precisely,
[McMillan, 1993] defines symbolic model checking as a technique that “avoids building a state graph by
using Boolean formulas to represent sets and relations”. Some authors [Schnoebelen, 2003] use the term
“symbolic model checking” in a more general sense to denote any technique in which the model is not
given “explicitly”, but by means of some “compact” representation (Boolean functions being one possible
choice). To avoid confusion, this thesis employs the term “symbolic model checking” in the stricter sense,
to denote model checking techniques based on Boolean functions.
18By slight abuse of notation, the same symbols xi(i ∈ {1, . . . , N}) are used to denote Boolean variables
in a vector, and atomic propositions in logical formulae.
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encoded as a Boolean formula by taking the disjunction of all the transition steps.
As an example, let R = {(s1, s2), (s2, s3), (s3, s1)} be a transition relation for the states of
the example in Figure 2.6. This transition relation is encoded by the following Boolean
formula fR:
fR(x1, x2, x
′
1, x
′
2) = [(x1∧x2)∧(x
′
1∧¬x
′
2)]∨[(x1∧¬x2)∧(¬x
′
1∧x
′
2)]∨[(¬x1∧x2)∧(x
′
1∧x
′
2)].
The labelling algorithm and Boolean formulae. The algorithm presented in Fig-
ure 2.4 returns the set of states satisfying a formula ϕ in a given modelM = (S,R, V ). The
algorithm operates recursively on the structure of ϕ and builds the set of states [[ϕ]] using
the following operations on sets: union, intersection, complementation, existential quan-
tification. When sets of states are encoded using Boolean formulae, all these operations
on sets may be translated into operations on Boolean formulae:
• the union of two sets corresponds to the disjunction of the Boolean formulae encoding
the two sets;
• the intersection of two sets corresponds to the conjunction of the Boolean formulae
encoding the two sets;
• the complementation of a set P with respect to a given set Q (i.e., P\Q) is the
conjunction of the Boolean formula encoding Q with the negation of the Boolean
formula encoding P ;
• the existential quantification of an element x in a set P is the (quantified) Boolean
formula ∃v¯x.fP , where v¯x are the Boolean variables required to encode x, and fP is
the Boolean formula encoding P .
In the basic case (i.e., when ϕ is an atomic proposition) the algorithm returns a set of
states: by encoding this set of states as a Boolean formula, the algorithm of Figure 2.4
can operate entirely on the Boolean representation of a model M = (S,R, V ) to return a
Boolean formula encoding the set of states [[ϕ]].
The labelling algorithm and model checking using obdds. All the Boolean formulae
mentioned in the previous step can be represented using obdds. Thus, the algorithm of
Figure 2.4 provides a methodology to build the obdd corresponding to the set of states [[ϕ]]
in which a formula ϕ holds for a given modelM . The problem of model checking is reduced
in this way to the problem of comparing the obdds for [[ϕ]] and for M . As obdds offer a
canonical representation for Boolean formulae, this last step is limited to the verification
that the two obdds are equal. The proof of the correctness of this approach can be found
in [Clarke et al., 1999, Huth and Ryan, 2004].
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Notes
• The process of translating the problem of model checking into the comparison of two
obdds may seem to increase the complexity of model checking. However, as it will
become clear in Section 2.2.3, the models are not built explicitly in model checking
tools; instead, the obdds representing the various parameters in the models are
obtained incrementally from a dedicated programming language, thereby permitting
the verification of models whose size would be intractable.
• The problem of verifying that a formula ϕ holds in a given model M is defined by
some authors with the term global model checking, as opposed to the problem of
local model checking, which is the problem of establishing whether or not a formula
is true at a given state in a given model. The algorithm presented in Figure 2.4 can
be employed for local model checking as well: indeed, it is sufficient to check that
the state in which a formula ϕ has to be verified is included in the set [[ϕ]].
• As mentioned in Section 2.1.4, in certain cases a CTL model includes a set of
initial states: M = (S,R, V, I). The evolution of the system is described by the
transition function R, and it may happen that not all states of S are reachable.
In this case, formulae need to be evaluated in the set of reachable states only, and
complementation must be limited to the set of reachable states. Reachable states
can be encoded as an obdd (Section 3.3 explores this issue in more detail).
2.2.2.3 SAT-based translations
Other techniques exist to perform model checking for temporal logics. This section intro-
duces techniques that reduce the problem of model checking to a problem of satisfiability
for a Boolean formula (SAT). Efficient procedures for Boolean satisfiability have been in-
vestigated and implemented since the 1960s; thus the reduction of the problem of model
checking to a Boolean satisfiability problem may benefit from the advances in this area.
Bounded model checking for LTL. The idea of reducing the problem of model checking
for LTL to a satisfiability problem was introduced in [Biere et al., 1999a], and it is based
on the concept of bounded semantics for LTL models. Intuitively, given an LTL model
M = (S,R, V, I), an LTL formula ϕ and a (finite) integer k, the expression M |=k ϕ
is read as “formula ϕ holds in M along a path of length k (starting from the set of
initial states)”. It can be proven that M |= ϕ iff there exists a finite integer k such that
M |=k ϕ. The problem M |=k ϕ is reduced to propositional satisfiability, as follows.
A propositional formula [M,ϕ]k is built such that [M,ϕ]k is satisfiable iff ϕ holds along
some path π of length k starting from the set of initial states. To construct [M,ϕ]k , a
propositional formula [M ]k if defined first to enforce valid paths of length k. Then, the
LTL formula ϕ is translated into a propositional formula [ϕ]k, and [M,ϕ]k is obtained as
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the conjunction of [M ]k and [ϕ]k: [M,ϕ]k = [M ]k ∧ [ϕ]k. The Boolean formula [M,ϕ]k is
satisfiable iff M |=k ϕ. A detailed presentation of this approach can be found in [Biere
et al., 1999a, Clarke et al., 1999].
Bounded model checking for CTL. A bounded semantics for the universal fragment
of CTL was introduced in [Penczek et al., 2002]. The universal fragment of CTL, denoted
withACTL, restricts negation to atomic formulae only, and permits universally quantified
temporal operators only. Given a CTL model M = (S,R, V, I) and an ACTL formula
ϕ, bounded model checking for CTL is similar, in spirit, to bounded model checking for
LTL, in that a Boolean formula [M,ϕ]k is built as a conjunction of two Boolean formulae
[M ]k and [ϕ]k. The technical machinery involved in ACTL model checking, however, is
substantially different from LTL due to the branching structure of CTL models (notice
that the bounded semantics for ACTL depends on a set of initial states).
Unbounded model checking. It has been shown [Biere et al., 1999a] that bounded
model checking techniques can identify false formulae in a much quicker way than obdd-
based techniques, when counter-examples can be found for small values of the bound k.
When such value is high, or when formulae are true in a model, however, there is a sig-
nificant decrease in the performance of SAT-based techniques. A possible solution for
this issue has been presented in [McMillan, 2002], introducing unbounded model checking.
Intuitively, unbounded model checking techniques are based on algorithms similar to the
algorithm presented in Figure 2.4: Boolean formulae representing sets of states are com-
puted but, instead of representing Boolean formulae using obdds and comparing obdds,
the problem of model checking is translated into a satisfiability problem for Boolean for-
mulae (typically represented in conjunctive normal form). Model checkers implementing
unbounded model checking are currently being developed, but no experimental results are
available yet.
2.2.2.4 Automata-based techniques
A different approach for model checking the logic LTL was proposed in the 1980s by [Vardi
and Wolper, 1986] using automata. An automaton is a tuple A = (Σ, Q,Q0, δ, F ) where:
• Σ is a finite alphabet;
• Q is a finite set of states, and Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states;
• δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q is a transition relation;
• F ⊆ Q is a set of final (or accepting) states.
An automaton can be represented as a graph; for instance, Figure 2.9 depicts the automa-
ton characterised by Σ = {a, b}, Q = {0, 1}, Q0 = {0} (this is indicated with an incoming
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Figure 2.9: Automaton example.
arrow in the graph), F = {0} (this is indicated with a double circle in the graph), and
δ = {(0, a, 0), (0, b, 1), (1, a, 1), (1, a, 0)}.
Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be a string; an automaton A accepts σ iff there exists a sequence of states of
(q0, q1, . . . , q|σ|) ∈ Q
∗ such that q0 ∈ Q
0, q|σ| ∈ F , and for all states in the sequence there
exist transitions (qi, α, qi+1) ∈ δ such that α is the i-th symbol in σ (such sequences are
usually called runs of A). The set of strings accepted by A is called the language accepted
by A and it is denoted with L(A). For instance, the language accepted by the automaton
in Figure 2.9 includes the strings λ (the empty string), aaaba, aabaaaba, etc.
Automata over infinite words accept strings of infinite length from Σω; their definition is
similar to the definition of automata over finite words presented above, the only difference
being the acceptance condition. Different kind of acceptance conditions can be defined,
and these correspond to different kind of automata. Bu¨chi automata are defined as follows.
Let σ ∈ Σω be an infinite string, and let i(σ) be the set of states appearing infinitely often
in a run of A accepting the string σ. Given a set F of accepting states, a Bu¨chi automaton
A = (Σ, Q,Q0, δ, F ) accepts σ iff i(σ) ∩ F 6= ∅ (i.e., at least an accepting state from F
appears infinitely often in the run). Notice that, in automata over infinite words, Q and
Σ are finite sets.
Model checking and automata (From [Clarke et al., 1999]). A model M = (S,R, V, I)
for the logic LTL can be translated into an automaton AM = (Σ, Q,Q
0, δ, F ) as follows:
• Σ = 2AP , where AP is a set of the atomic propositions appearing in V ;
• Q = S ∪ {ι}, where ι is a special state of the automaton;
• Q0 = I ∪ {ι};
• F = S ∪ {ι}, i.e., all the states are accepting;
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¬p
p
True
Figure 2.10: Automaton for the formula Fp.
mc(ϕ,M) {
Build the automaton AM ;
Build the automaton accepting ¯L(Aϕ);
Build the automaton accepting L(AM ) ∩ ¯L(Aϕ);
Check emptiness of this latter automaton;
Return YES if the automaton is empty;
}
Figure 2.11: The automata-based model checking algorithm for LTL.
• (s, α, s′) ∈ δ iff (s, s′) ∈ R and α = V (s′). Moreover, (ι, α, s) ∈ δ iff α = V (s′) and
s ∈ I.
Notice that the permitted executions of the automaton AM correspond to the possible
runs in M .
Given a LTL formula ϕ, an automaton Aϕ can be associated to ϕ such that L(Aϕ) includes
all the “allowed behaviours” of the system. The details of the construction of Aϕ for a
generic formula ϕ are beyond the scope of this summary and can be found, for instance,
in [Clarke et al., 1999]. As an example, the automaton corresponding to the LTL formula
Fp is represented in Figure 2.10.
Given an LTL model M and a formula ϕ of the same logic, M |= ϕ iff L(AM ) ⊆ L(Aϕ),
i.e., iff the language accepted by the automaton representing the model M is included
in the language “allowed” by the automaton representing the formula ϕ. The inclusion
condition can be rewritten in an equivalent way as L(AM ) ∩ ¯L(Aϕ) = ∅, where ¯L(Aϕ) is
the complement of the language L(Aϕ) with respect to the set Σ
ω. There exist construc-
tive procedures (see [Clarke et al., 1999] and references therein) to build the automata
corresponding to the complement of a Bu¨chi automaton and to the intersection of two
Bu¨chi automata. These procedures allow for the definition of a model checking algorithm
based on automata; its high-level description is provided in Figure 2.11.
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Various optimisation techniques can be employed to improve the efficiency of the algorithm
of Figure 2.11. For instance, on-the-fly model checking is an optimisation technique which
avoids building the automaton AM in the first step of the algorithm. Instead, using
this technique the automaton for ¯L(Aϕ) is constructed first, and then the automaton
accepting L(AM ) ∩ ¯L(Aϕ) is constructed iteratively by adding states of M when needed.
This technique sometimes permits to find counter-examples of false formulae in an efficient
way.
2.2.3 Model checking tools
The techniques presented in Section 2.2.2 have been implemented in a number of soft-
ware tools, from the early 1990s. This section briefly summarises three mature tools and
their programming and specification languages; other tools exist, and they are briefly
summarised in Section 2.3. The tools reviewed below have been chosen because of their
robustness, of their wide circulation and availability, and because of their relevance with
material presented in later chapters.
2.2.3.1 SPIN
The model checker SPIN (Simple Promela INterpreter) is one of the most mature model
checkers available: it was introduced in the 1980s at Bell Labs, it has been available
to the general public since 1991, and it has been continually developed since then. A
general introduction to the tool can be found in [Holzmann, 1997], while the theoretical
foundations and a detailed user manual are presented in the book [Holzmann, 2003]. The
main characteristics of SPIN are:
• It is a model checker for the temporal logic LTL.
• It is mainly aimed at verification of protocols and software. SPIN’s programming
language PROMELA (PROcess MEta LAnguage) reflects this intended use (see
below).
• It implements an automata-based algorithm for model checking and various optimi-
sation strategies, including on-the-fly model checking and partial order reduction19.
• It provides a graphical user interface (Xspin) to the model checker and to an inter-
active simulator.
19This technique is based on the observation that execution traces arising from different orderings of
interleaved concurrent processes are sometimes equivalent for the evaluation of a formula ϕ.
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mtype = { . . . };
chan = { . . . };
<type> = { . . . };
proctype SampleProcess1(<args>) {
. . .
}
proctype SampleProcess1(<args>) {
. . .
}
init {
main body
}
Figure 2.12: Structure of a PROMELA program.
The structure of a PROMELA program is represented in Figure 2.12. A program includes
a declaration section for message types (mtype), for channel types (chan), and for global
variables of various types (indicated collectively with the string <type> in the figure).
Various processes may be defined in a PROMELA program using the keyword proctype;
each process is defined by a name and by a list of accepted arguments. The behaviour
of each process is defined in its body (not shown in the figure), and each process may
include a list of local variables. Processes communicate using global variables and channels.
Processes are initially created in the init section of the program, they execute concurrently,
and they can be created by other processes.
The Xspin graphical interface acts as a “control centre” for the components of SPIN archi-
tecture (depicted in Figure 2.13). The user needs to provide a PROMELA program and
an LTL formula ϕ; the LTL formula is then translated by the tool into an appropriate
automaton. SPIN can be used as a simulator (to perform either random or interactive
simulations), or as a model checker. In the latter case, a C program implementing the
automata-based algorithm presented above is constructed and compiled, producing a bi-
nary executable that provides an answer to the model checking question.
2.2.3.2 MOCHA
MOCHA [Alur et al., 1998] is a model checker for the logic ATL presented in Sec-
tion 2.1.4.3. Two versions of MOCHA are available: cMocha and jMocha, but only the for-
mer allows for model checking ATL formulae (the latter being more simulation-oriented).
49
Chapter 2 2.2 Model checking
LTL formula ϕPROMELA code
Verifier
InteractiveRandom
Simulator
C code
TRUE FALSE
LTL translator
Figure 2.13: Structure of SPIN.
Model checking is performed in MOCHA by extending the labelling algorithm presented in
Figure 2.4 for CTL to ATL formulae: indeed, it has been shown in [Alur et al., 1998, Alur
et al., 2002] that ATL operators can be characterised using fix-points. Therefore, the
techniques presented in Section 2.2.2.2 for the verification of CTL using obdds can be
extended to the verification of ATL formulae. The details of this approach can be found
in [Alur et al., 1998].
Systems are specified in MOCHA by using the dedicated language ReactiveModules.
Each specification consists of one or more modules; each module is characterised by a
set of input variables (called external variables), by a set of output variables (called in-
terface variables), and by a set of local variables. In each module, the initial value and
the evolution of variables is controlled by a set of constructs called atoms. Instances of
modules are created at end of the file, and they are composed in parallel. Excerpts from a
ReactiveModules program are reported in Figure 2.14; the full syntax of the language
is available from [Alur et al., 2006].
MOCHA provides a graphical user interface to input programs written in ReactiveMod-
ule, and ATL formulae. Interactive simulations and model checking may be performed
either using the interface, or using command line instructions.
2.2.3.3 SMV and NuSMV
SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier, [McMillan, 1992]) and NuSMV [Cimatti et al., 2002] are
two of the most widely cited model checkers. The SMV system was developed at the
beginning of the 1990s to implement the obdd-based symbolic model checking techniques
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module SampleModule1
private v1: bool
external v2: bool
interface v3: bool
atom controls v1 reads v1 awaits v3
init [. . . ]
update [. . . ]
endatom
[. . . ]
endmodule
module SampleModule2
[. . . ]
endmodule
Main := [. . . ] ( SampleModule1 || SampleModule2 ) [. . . ]
Figure 2.14: Excerpts from a ReactiveModule program.
for CTL presented in Section 2.2.2.2 using obdds.
NuSMV is a re-implementation of the SMV system; the tool is implemented in C language
and it is available freely under an “open” license. NuSMV implements symbolic model
checking techniques for CTL and bounded model checking techniques for LTL. NuSMV
can operate either in “batch” mode or interactively using a text shell; in this case, sim-
ulations can be performed. NuSMV accepts parameters to optimise the size of obdds
by means of various heuristic functions. obdds are manipulated using the CUDD library
[Somenzi, 2005].
The input languages of SMV and NuSMV present minor differences. They both allow for
a compact description of systems using modules, which may be composed to describe the
evolution of states. The NuSMV program for a 3 bit counter is presented in Figure 2.15,
as an example to introduce the syntax of the language. A NuSMV module is identified by
a string (counter cell in the figure), it may accept input parameters (carry in), and it
may include “local” variables (value). The initial value of the module and the evolution
of the variables are defined in the section appearing under the ASSIGN keyword, using
the constructs init and next. In particular, next(value) is read as “the next value of
the variable value is obtained by taking the disjunction of the current value of it with the
value of the variable carry in, modulo 2”. The keyword DEFINE is used to introduce
a “derived” variable, i.e., a variable which is not part of the state space, but whose value
may be derived from other variables. The behaviour of the system is described in the
(mandatory) module main. In the example, three instances of the module counter cell
are created, imposing the constraints that carry out of counter i is equal to carry in of
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MODULE counter cell(carry in)
VAR value: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(value) := 0 ;
next(value) := (value + carry in) mod 2;
DEFINE
carry out := value & carry in;
MODULE main
VAR
bit0 := counter cell(1);
bit1 := counter cell(bit0.carry out);
bit2 := counter cell(bit1.carry out);
Figure 2.15: An SMV program for a 3 bit counter (from [Cimatti et al., 2002]).
counter i+ 1.
A possible execution of NuSMV in interactive mode to verify the 3 bit counter presented
above is shown in Figure 2.16. In this example, NuSMV is run interactively with the
option -int, and the file counter.smv is processed. At the command line of NuSMV
(identified by the prompt NuSMV >), the command go launches a number of preliminary
operations on the input file, including parsing the input text file and generating the obdds
for the temporal relation. The command check_spec -p "AX(bit0.value=0)" launches
the obdd-based verification of the CTL formula AX(bit0.value=0). As the formula is
false, NuSMV outputs a counter-example.
2.2.4 Review of other temporal model checkers
Other tools are available to perform model checking and simulations. These tools include:
• Model checkers for the verification of software.
– Blast (Berkley Lazy Abstraction Software verification Tool, [Henzinger et al.,
2003] ) is a model checker for the verification of C programs. It implements
automata-based verification techniques with various optimisations for the veri-
fication of reachability properties.
– cbmc is a model checker for ANSI-C programs implementing bounded model
checking techniques [Clarke et al., 2004a]. Binary versions of the tool are avail-
able from [Clarke et al., 2006].
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$ ./NuSMV -int counter.smv
NuSMV > go
NuSMV > check_spec -p "AX(bit0.value=0)"
-- specification AX bit0.value = 0 is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
bit0.value = 0
bit1.value = 0
bit2.value = 0
bit0.carry_out = 0
bit1.carry_out = 0
bit2.carry_out = 0
-> State: 1.2 <-
bit0.value = 1
bit0.carry_out = 1
NuSMV >
Figure 2.16: A NuSMV session.
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– Java PathFinder (JPF) [Brat et al., 2000] is a model checker for Java bytecode
programs, developed since 1999 at NASA Ames Research Center. JPF operates
on the explicit representation of the state space using a number of optimisation
techniques to detect deadlocks and unhandled exceptions.
• Model checkers for real-time systems. Real-time systems are systems extended
with clocks to reason about the flow of time between events [Alur and Dill, 1994].
Typically, properties of real-time systems are given in TCTL, an extension of the
logic CTL including time constraints in logical formulae. For instance, the TCTL
formula AF≤5(ready) is read as “in all future paths, the proposition ready will be-
come true in less than 5 time units”. More details about TCTL and model checking
techniques for real-time systems can be found in [Alur and Dill, 1994, Penczek et al.,
2004, Woz´na and Zbrzezny, 2005] and in the presentations of the numerous tools
available for real-time verification. These tools include Uppaal [Bengtsson et al.,
1998, Pettersson and Larsen., 2000], Kronos [Yovine, 1997, Daws et al., 1995],
Rabbit [Beyer et al., 2003], and VerICS [Nabialek et al., 2004].
• Other model checkers. Other general-purpose model checkers for temporal logic
include:
– the model checker VIS (Verification Interacting with Synthesis) [Brayton et al.,
1996], which is presented as “a system for formal verification, synthesis, and
simulation of finite state systems”. VIS supports the verification of CTL and
simulation using bounded model checking and obdd-based techniques.
– the model checker SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory) [Moura et al., 2004] is
developed by SRI International [Moura et al., 2006]. SAL implements obdd-
based and bounded model checking techniques.
2.2.5 Complexity results for model checking
Traditionally, given a formula ϕ and a model M = (S,R, V ), the complexity of temporal
logics model checking is expressed as a function of the size of the model |M | and of the
size of the formula ϕ, where |M | is defined as the sum of the number of states in S and
the number of elements in R, while |ϕ| is defined as the number of symbols appearing in
ϕ.
CTL. The algorithm presented in Figure 2.4 provides an upper bound for the complexity
of CTL model checking. Indeed, the algorithm always terminates after at most |M | · |ϕ|
steps, and thus model checking for CTL is in P [Clarke et al., 1986]. A proof for the
P-hardness of CTL model checking is presented in [Schnoebelen, 2003], which allows to
conclude that the problem of model checking for CTL is P-complete.
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Logic Complexity
CTL [Clarke et al., 1986, Schnoebelen, 2003] P-complete
LTL [Sistla and Clarke, 1985] PSPACE-complete
CTL* [Clarke et al., 1986, Sistla and Clarke, 1985] PSPACE-complete
µ-calculus [Kupferman et al., 2000] ∈ NP ∩ co-NP
Table 2.7: The complexity of model checking for some temporal logics.
LTL. The complexity of LTL model checking was investigated in [Sistla and Clarke,
1985]. Given a formula ϕ and a model M , the problem of model checking for LTL is
reduced to the satisfiability problem for an LTL formula. Intuitively, an LTL formula
ϕM is constructed in polynomial time to encode the valid runs of M , and it is shown
that M |= ϕ iff ϕM =⇒ ϕ is a valid LTL formula. Therefore, Theorem 2.1.5 provides
a PSPACE upper bound for LTL model checking. A corresponding lower bound is
presented in [Sistla and Clarke, 1985], which allows to conclude that the problem of model
checking for LTL is PSPACE-complete.
The complexity of model checking for CTL, for LTL, and for other temporal logics is
presented in Table 2.7.
The results presented above, however, do not apply to the verification of programs written
in one of the languages presented in the previous section (i.e., PROMELA, Reactive-
Modules, and SMV). In these practical instances, states and relations of temporal models
are not listed explicitly. Instead, a compact description is usually given. Thus, the com-
plexity of model checking needs to be investigated in terms of the size of the formula and
of the size of the program representing the model.
Among others, concurrent programs [Kupferman et al., 2000] offer a suitable framework
to investigate the complexity of model checking when compact representations are used,
because various languages can be reduced to concurrent programs. Formally, a program is
a tuple D = 〈AP,AC,S,∆, s0, L〉, where AP is a set of atomic propositions, AC is a set of
actions, S is a set of states, ∆ : S ×AC → S is a transition function, s0 is an initial state,
and L : S → 2AP is a valuation function. Given n programs Di = 〈APi, ACi, Si,∆i, s
0
i , Li〉
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), a concurrent program DC = 〈APC , ACC , SC ,∆C , s
0
C , LC〉 is defined as
the parallel composition of the n programs Di, as follows:
• APC = ∪1≤i≤nAPi;
• ACC = ∪1≤i≤nACi;
• SC =
∏
1≤i≤n Si;
• (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆C iff
– ∀i.1 ≤ i ≤ n, if a ∈ ACi, then (s[i], a, s
′[i]) ∈ ∆i, where s[i] is the i-th compo-
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nent of a state s ∈ S.
– if a 6∈ ACi, then s[i] = s
′[i];
• LC(s) = ∪iLi(s[i]).
(in the remainder, the subscript C is dropped when this is clear from the context).
CTL formulae can be interpreted in a (concurrent) program D by using the standard
Kripke semantics for CTL formulae in a model M = (S,R, V ). For this, define the set
of states S of M to be set of states S of D, the temporal relation R to be ∆, and the
evaluation function V to be L (more details can be found in [Kupferman et al., 2000]).
By slight abuse of notation, the term “Kripke models” is used occasionally below when
referring to the programs Di and to D.
The program complexity of model checking is defined as the complexity of model check-
ing for a given, fixed formula. Program complexity results for some temporal logics are
presented in Table 2.8.
Logic Program complexity
CTL NLOGSPACE-complete
CTL∗ NLOGSPACE-complete
µ-calculus P-complete
Table 2.8: Program complexity of model checking for some temporal logics, from
[Kupferman et al., 2000].
By analysing the program complexity of model checking concurrent programs, the authors
of [Kupferman et al., 2000] obtain complexity results for various temporal logics. Their
results are based on the definition of various kind of automata, extending the concepts
presented in Section 2.2.2.4. Table 2.9 presents their main results.
Logic Program complexity Overall complexity
CTL PSPACE-complete PSPACE-complete
CTL∗ PSPACE-complete PSPACE-complete
µ-calculus EXP-complete EXP
Table 2.9: Program complexity and complexity of model checking for some temporal logics
using concurrent programs [Kupferman et al., 2000].
The complexity of model checking tools and techniques. The results presented
above provide a lower bound for the problem of model checking temporal models specified
using PROMELA, ReactiveModules, and SMV. Indeed, a generic concurrent program
D can be encoded using any of the languages above. For instance, an SMV module can be
associated to each program Di appearing in D, and a similar approach can be employed
for PROMELA and ReactiveModules. Upper bound results for model checking some
programming languages for multi-agent systems are provided in Section 6.5.5, page 125.
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Also, the worst case complexity of model checking tools can be analysed.
• SPIN implements the automata-based techniques presented in Section 2.2.2.4; their
complexity is linear in the size of the model [Clarke et al., 1986]. However, the
size of the model is exponential in the number of processes used in the PROMELA
specification. Thus, although many optimisation techniques have been implemented
in SPIN, in the worst case the complexity of model checking a PROMELA program
using SPIN requires exponential time.
• SMV and MOCHA use (an extension of) the labelling algorithm presented in Fig-
ure 2.4, whose complexity is linear in the size of the model. As above, however, the
model has a size exponential in the number of modules employed in the program-
ming language. On average, obdd-based techniques may reduce the space required
by the labelling algorithm (and, thus, the time required to perform model checking),
but it was shown [Bryant, 1991] that for certain problems obdds have an exponen-
tial size, irrespective of the chosen ordering of the variables. Some operations on
obdds, such as reduction to canonical form and composition, require time linear
in the size of the obdds; Boolean quantification, instead, may require exponential
time. These results imply that in the worst case obdd-based model checking may
require a double-exponential time.
• NuSMV implements SAT-based techniques for LTL, as presented in Section 2.2.2.3.
It has been shown in [Clarke et al., 2004b] that the Boolean formulae generated
using SAT-based techniques may have a number of variables which is exponential in
the size of the input program. Algorithms for Boolean satisfiability may require, in
the worst case, an exponential time; thus, SAT-based techniques for model checking
are, in the worst case, doubly exponential in the size of the input.
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2.3 Model checking multi-agent systems: state of the art
This section analyses the literature concerned with model checking for multi-agent systems.
Differently from other PhD theses, this section has been placed after the introduction of
theoretical preliminaries, syntax, and notation. This choice is motivated by the technical
content of the review.
Different approaches have been proposed for the problem of verification in multi-agent sys-
tems using model checking. This section summarises a selection from the recent literature,
including both theoretical results and presentations of tools.
2.3.1 Theoretical investigations
1. A model checking procedure for multi-agent systems is presented in [Benerecetti
et al., 1998]. Here agents are modelled using MultiAgent Temporal Logic (MATL).
MATL is the fusion of the temporal logic CTL and the logicHML (Hierarchical MetaLogic)
to represent beliefs, desires and intentions. HML is defined as follows. Let I be a set of agent,
and O = {B,D, I} be a set of symbols, representing the attitudes Belief, Desire, Intention.
Let OI∗ = (O × I)∗: an element α ∈ OI∗ is a sequence of attitude-agent pairs, and it
represents a possible nesting of attitudes. Each α ∈ OI∗ is called a view, including the empty
string ǫ representing the view of an “external observer”. An agent “is a tree rooted in the
view that the external observer has of it” (notice that the view that an agent has of another
agent can be different from the agent itself). A logical language Lα is associated to each
view α. Each language is used to express what is true in the representation corresponding
to α. It is imposed that Oiϕ is a formula of Lα iff ϕ is a formula of LOiα. The semantics
of {Lα}α∈OI∗ is given by means of “trees”. A tree is a subset Mα of the set of possible
interpretation of a language Lα. Namely, each interpretation is denoted with tα ∈Mα, and
a tree is a set {tα}α∈OI∗ . A compatibility relation T is a set of trees. A tree satisfies a
formula at a view iff the formula is satisfied by all the elements that the tree associates to
the view. A Hierarchical MetaStructure (HM Structure) is a set of trees T on Lα closed
under containment such that there is a t ∈ T with tǫ 6= ∅, if tα satisfies Oiϕ, then tOiα
satisfies ϕ, and if for all t′ ∈ T , t′α ∈ tα implies that tαOi satisfies ϕ , then tα satisfies Oiϕ.
MATL structures (i.e., models) are a particular kind of HM structures: each language Lα is
a CTL language. This allows for the interpretation of formulae of a language that includes
BDI and temporal (CTL) operators.
The model checking algorithm forMATL is essentially an extension of the labelling
algorithm for CTL taking into account the appropriate data structures for the ma-
nipulation of MATL views.
2. A methodology to model check knowledge and time is presented in [Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2002]. This paper presents the logic CKLn, obtained from the fu-
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sion of LTL with S5n to reason about knowledge, with the addition of an operator
to reason about common knowledge in a group of agents. Formulae of CKLn are
evaluated over the runs of a multi-agent system, expressed in the formalism pre-
sented in Section 2.1.7.1 but without explicit references to actions and protocols.
The methodology introduced in [Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002] relies on the concept
of local propositions. Given an interpreted system IS , let R denote the set of runs
of IS ; let v,w be two integer numbers, representing the time (i.e., the number of
steps) elapsed from an initial state; a pair (r, v), where r ∈ R is a possible run,
is called a point (notice that points have been denoted with the term global states
in Section 2.1.7.1). A formula ϕ of CKLn is said to be propositional if it involves
no modal operators. A propositional formula ϕ is local to Agent i iff, for all points
(r, v), (r′, w), if (r, v) ∼i (r
′, w), then IS , (r, v) |= ϕ iff IS , (r′, w) |= ϕ. [Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2002] show that, using local propositions, the problem of CKLn model
checking can be reduced to the problem of LTL model checking. The key idea is
to reduce CKLn formulae involving the knowledge operator to a pure temporal for-
mula. For instance, the formula Kiϕ is translated into the formula G(ψ =⇒ ϕ),
where ψ is an appropriate propositional formula local to agent i. A concrete scenario
(the bit transmission problem, see Section 6.1) is verified in [Hoek and Wooldridge,
2002] using the programming language Promela and the model checker SPIN.
The main limitation of this approach is that the local propositions needed for the
translation from CKLn to LTL cannot be computed automatically, and must be
provided by the user.
3. The problem of model checking knowledge and time is also explored in [Meyden and
Shilov, 1999]. The paper considers the class of interpreted systems with perfect recall.
Intuitively, in a system with perfect recall each agent keeps a complete record of all
the (local) states he passes through. Formally, using the notion of points defined
above, in interpreted systems with perfect recall the local state of an agent i at the
point (r, v), denoted with ri(v), is a tuple ri(v) = (ri(0), . . . , ri(v)). Additionally,
the concept of synchronous systems is often associated with that of perfect recall: an
interpreted system is said to be synchronous if, for every agent i, if (r, v) ∼ (r′, w),
then v = w. [Meyden and Shilov, 1999] analyse the problem of model checking the
logicCKLn and some of its restrictions in synchronous and asynchronous interpreted
systems with perfect recall. Let LX,U,K1,...,Kn,C denote the full language of CKLn.
Similarly, let LX,K1,...,Kn,C be the restriction of the previous language without the
“Until” operator, let LK1,...,Kn,C be the restriction without temporal operators, and
let LX,U,K1,...,Kn denote the restriction without the operator for common knowledge.
The model checking technique presented in [Meyden and Shilov, 1999] extends the
automata-based model checking technique for LTL by employing a family of Bu¨chi
automata, which permits the verification of the epistemic operators. Complexity
results for model checking various perfect recall semantics are obtained by analysing
the automata-based technique; results are presented in Table 2.10.
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Language Complexity
LK1,...,Kn,C , synchronous PSPACE-hard
LK1,...,Kn,C , asynchronous undecidable
LX,K1,...,Kn,C , synchronous PSPACE-complete
LX,U,K1,...,Kn, synchronous non-elementary
LX,U,K1,...,Kn,C , synchronous undecidable
Table 2.10: Complexity of model checking for some perfect recall semantics.
4. The ideas presented in the previous item have been extended further in [van der
Meyden and Su, 2004], where an obdd-based algorithm for the verification of syn-
chronous interpreted systems with perfect recall is introduced. Their algorithm
accepts the class of formulae of CKLn whose structure is X
k(Kip) (where p is an
atomic proposition and Xk denotes a concatenation of k temporal operators X of
LTL). It is shown that the problem of model checking this class of formulae in syn-
chronous interpreted systems can be reduced to the verification of the equivalence of
Boolean formulae. Similarly to obdd-based model checking for CTL, all the oper-
ations employed in the computation of the Boolean formulae can be carried out on
their representation using obdds. This methodology is applied to the verification
of the protocol of the dining cryptographers (see Section 6.2). Experimental results
are presented for this example (see below the tool MCK for further progress along
these lines). The main issue with this approach is its limitation to a restricted class
of formulae and to a restricted subclass of interpreted systems (synchronous with
perfect recall). Nevertheless, this technique may be more efficient than others when
a scenario may be suitably formalised using synchronous interpreted systems with
perfect recall. See Section 6.5 for further details and for a discussion about this
example.
5. Bounded model checking techniques for CTL [Penczek et al., 2002] have been ex-
tended to the universal fragment of CTLK in [Penczek and Lomuscio, 2003]. In this
work, universal CTLK formulae are evaluated in interpreted systems, as presented
in Section 2.1.7.1. To this end, a bounded semantics for CTLK is defined using
k-models. Intuitively, a k-model is a structure obtained by taking all the possible
runs of length k in a given interpreted system. Let Mk
IS
be the k model associated
to a given interpreted system IS , and let MIS be the standard model associated to
IS . It is proven in [Penczek and Lomuscio, 2003] that for every CTLK formula ϕ,
MIS |= ϕ iff M
k
IS
|= ϕ for some k ≤ |M |. When ϕ is a formula of the universal
fragment of CTLK, the problem of verifying whether or not Mk
IS
|= ϕ can be re-
duced to the problem of verifying the satisfiability of a Boolean formula [Mϕ]k∧ [ϕ]k
(similarly to bounded model checking for LTL and CTL, the Boolean formula is
the conjunction of two Boolean formulae representing, respectively, the Boolean en-
coding of Mk
IS
and of ϕ). Further works along this line include [Woz´na et al., 2004]
extending the technique to the verification of correct behaviour, and [Woz´na et al.,
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2005] which introduces a technique for the verification of knowledge in real-time
systems. These approaches have been implemented in VerICS, a model checker for
multi-agent systems (see below).
6. [Otterloo et al., 2003] and [Jamroga, 2004b] present model checking techniques for
epistemic extensions of ATL. Their approach is similar, in spirit, to [Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2002] in reducing the problem of model checking for an “extended” logic
to a less expressive logic for which model checking tools and techniques exists. In
particular, [Otterloo et al., 2003] introduce Turn-Based Epistemic Systems (TBES),
an extension of Turn-Based Systems [Alur et al., 2002, Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003a]
to evaluate formulae of the logic ATEL (see Section 2.1.7.3). It is shown that the
problem of model checking an ATEL formula ϕ in a TBES T can be reduced to the
problem of verifying an ATL formula ψ in a Turn-Based system S, and a method-
ology is provided to compute the reduction. This technique provides a methodology
that enables the application of the MOCHA model checker (see Section 2.2.3.2) to
the verification of ATEL.
The reduction technique presented in [Jamroga, 2004b] differs from the previous one
in that it allows for the verification of the full language of ATEL, including the
“Until” operator, and operators for group epistemic properties. As in the previous
case, the problem of model checking an ATEL formula is reduced to the verification
of an ATL one. However, no implementation or examples are provided.
The main limitation of both approaches is the need of manual intervention in the
reduction process from ATEL to ATL. While the reductions seem feasible for small
examples, handling large scale examples manually may be impractical.
2.3.2 Model checking tools for multi-agent systems
1. A language for the specification of multi-agent systems, called MABLE, is proposed
in [Wooldridge et al., 2002]. MABLE combines agents’ distinctive notions (such
as beliefs, desires, etc.) with traditional-style programming constructs. A MABLE
program consists of a number of agents, each characterised by a unique identifier and
by a “program body” describing the agent’s behaviour. Standard constructs such
as loops and if-then-else sequences can be used in the program body of an agent.
In addition, the body of a MABLE agent may include constructs to describe the
behaviour of an agent when the agent is “unsure” about the truth value of some
logical expression; this is achieved by using constructs of the form if ϕ then P1
else P2 unsure P3. MABLE agents are allowed to perform actions resulting in
modification of the environment in which they live: this ability is captured by the
MABLE instruction do α, where α is an element of the set of actions available to
the agent (including actions for communication with other agents). The evolution
of MABLE agents is defined by the parallel composition of programs appearing in
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the body of each agent.
Each MABLE program may include a number of claims to encode the required
properties to be verified; claims are expressed using a subset of the syntax of LORA
(see Section 2.1.7). Verification of MABLE programs is performed using the model
checker SPIN: the MABLE compiler generates PROMELA code for SPIN by as-
sociating a process (see Section 2.2.3) to each agent. LORA claims appearing in
the MABLE code are reduced to LTL claims using a technique similar to the one
presented in [Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002] using local propositions. To evaluate
these “reduced” formulae, the PROMELA code is annotated with propositions cor-
responding to agents’ attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.). Similarly to [Benerecetti et al.,
1998], desires, and intentions are treated as nested data structures in the MABLE
framework.
2. The approach of [Bordini et al., 2003b, Bordini et al., 2003a] is similar, in spirit, to
the one presented in the previous point. Indeed, the problem of model checking a
language for multi-agent systems is reduced to the verification of an LTL formula
in a PROMELA model using SPIN. The language AgentSpeak(F) was introduced in
[Bordini et al., 2003b] as a restriction of the language AgentSpeak(L); the latter is a
language used to formalise a multi-agent system expressed using Rao and Georgeff’s
BDI logic (see Section 2.1.7). AgentSpeak(F) is the restriction of AgentSpeak(L) to
finite state systems, with further constraints on first order quantifications and other
technical requirements. The main difference between MABLE and AgentSpeak(F)
is that AgentSpeak(F) is a logic programming language (a` la Prolog), while MABLE
is an imperative programming language (a` la C); we refer to [Bordini et al., 2003b]
for further details.
The translation from AgentSpeak(F) and BDI specifications (using Rao and
Georgeff’s BDI logic) to a PROMELA program and an LTL specification is per-
formed automatically by a translator called CASP (Checking AgentSpeak Programs,
[Bordini et al., 2003a]). As in the case of MABLE, BDI modalities are evaluated
using nested data structures.
3. MCK (Model Checking Knowledge) is a software tool developed by Ron van der
Meyden et al. [Gammie and van der Meyden, 2004] implementing the model checking
techniques presented in [Meyden and Shilov, 1999, van der Meyden and Su, 2004] (see
above). MCK differs from the two tools listed above in that it is “self-contained”,
i.e., it does not reduce the problem of model checking for multi-agent systems to
a temporal-only problem to take advantage of existing model checkers. Instead,
MCK uses obdds to represent models symbolically, and permits the verification of
CTL and LTL formulae extended with epistemic operators for single agents and for
groups of agents. MCK makes use of an input language to describe the environment
in which agents interact, observation functions for the agents to define which part of
62
Chapter 2 2.3 Model checking multi-agent systems: state of the art
the environment each agent can observe20, the agents’ behaviour using actions, the
set of initial states, fairness constraints, and formulae to be checked. The structure of
the input language of MCK is summarised in Figure 2.17: shared variables describing
the environment are declared first; the initial state of the system is described by a
Boolean expression involving environment variables. Agents are declared using an
identifier followed by the name of a protocol (see below) and by a list of variables of
the environment that the agent is allowed to “observe”. The protocols of the agents
are defined after the declaration of the transitions for the variables of the environment
and an optional CTL formula encoding fairness conditions. Each protocol defines
the actions taken by each agent (e.g., writing some value in a shared variable). The
syntax of the formulae to be checked depends on the <specification-type> chosen:
using appropriate keywords it is possible to verify formulae under the assumption
that:
(a) The local state of an agent is defined by the observable environment variables
only;
(b) The local state of an agent is defined by the observable environment variables
and by the value of the clock (this corresponds to a synchronous interpreted
systems);
(c) The local state of an agent is defined by the observable environment variables,
by the value of the clock, and by all the past observations (this corresponds to
a synchronous interpreted system with perfect recall).
In the first case, either the full syntax of CTLK, or LTL extended with epistemic
operators can be verified. In the second case, only formulae involving the “Next”
operator (both for CTL and for LTL) and the knowledge of a single agent can
be verified. In the third case, only the LTL “Next” operator and the knowledge
of a single agent can be verified. MCK is written in Haskell and the available
package includes an implementation of the protocol of the dining cryptographers
(see Section 6.2).
4. VerICS [Nabialek et al., 2004] is a software tool for the verification of multi-agent
systems. VerICS accepts various input formalisms, including a subset of the Estelle
language (an ISO standard for the description of communicating processes), networks
of timed automata, and timed Petri nets. Interpreted systems can be encoded using
a network of un-timed automata by associating an automaton the each agent, and
formulae of CTLKDD,C can be interpreted in networks of automata. Thus, VerICS
can be employed in the verification of interpreted systems.
VerICS implements three different model checking techniques: bounded model check-
ing, un-bounded model checking, and on-the-fly model checking using abstract mod-
20In this formalism the observation function plays a role similar to the local states of interpreted systems
(see Section 2.1.7.1).
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– Type declarations
type TypeName1 = { . . . }
. . .
– Shared variables
varname1 : TypeName1
init cond = [ Boolean expression with variables above ]
– Agent declarations
agent AgentName1 ”protocol1” ( . . . env variables . . . )
. . .
agent AgentNameN ”protocolN” ( . . . env variables . . . )
– Transitions
transitions
begin
. . .
end
fairness = [ CTL formula ]
– Formulae to be verified
<specification-type> = temporal-epistemic formula
– Protocol declarations
protocol ”protocol1” ( . . . env variables . . . )
begin
. . .
end
. . .
protocol ”protocolN” ( . . . env variables . . . )
begin
. . .
end
Figure 2.17: Structure of the MCK input language [Gammie and van der Meyden, 2004].
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els (abstract models are obtained from the original model by combining into equiv-
alence classes the set of states of the original model). These techniques are imple-
mented as separate modules for VerICS and offer different model checking capabili-
ties. The bounded model checking module permits the verification of the universal
fragment of the logic CTLKDD,C ; the un-bounded model checking module permits
the verification of the full language of CTLKDD,C ; the on-the-fly module permits
the verification of reachability properties (but it cannot be used in the verification
of epistemic modalities).
More details on VerICS and its applications to multi-agent systems can be found in
the paper [Kacprzak et al., 2006]; Section 6.5 presents further details of VerICS and
a comparison with mcmas.
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Model checking multi-agent
systems using OBDDs
This chapter presents possible solutions to the problem of model checking multi-agent
systems represented in the formalism of interpreted systems. Section 3.1 defines the prob-
lem of model checking deontic interpreted systems, while Section 3.2 presents a possible
solution using existing tools. A self-contained solution to the model checking problem is
presented in Section 3.3, where algorithms are provided for the verification of formulae
in interpreted systems and a translation is defined to enable the use of obdds in the
verification process.
3.1 Problem definition
As defined in Section 2.1.7.1, an interpreted system is a tuple:
IS =
〈
(Li, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,A} , (LE, ActE , PE , tE) , I, V
〉
where A is the number of agents in the system. Each agent i is characterised by a set of
local states (Li), a set of actions (Acti), a protocol (Pi : Li → 2
Acti), and an evolution
function (ti : Li × LE × Act → Li, where Act = Act1 × Actn × ActE). The agent E
is a special agent (the environment) whose local states are “public” (this is reflected by
the agents’ evolution functions). As described in Chapter 6, agent E may be used to
capture special requirements of the environment with and in which agents interact. The
presence of E is not strictly necessary to formalise all the examples: in the remainder of
this thesis, the environment will be treated as a standard agent, the subscript E will be
dropped and, by convention, the number of agents will be denoted by n (which may or
may not include E. Notice that, when an agent is present, each evolution function ti also
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depends on LE: this scenario should be clear from the context). The Cartesian product
of the local states of the agents is denoted by S =
n
×
i=1
Li; elements of S are tuples of local
states, called global states. Given g ∈ S, li(g) denotes the i-th component of g, i.e., the
local state of agent i in global state g. In the definition of IS above, the set I ⊆ S is the
set of initial global states. Starting from the set of initial states, the protocols and the
evolution functions define a set of states that are reachable, denoted by G. Given a set
of atomic propositions AP , the evaluation relation V ⊆ S ×AP completes the definition
of an interpreted system1. As presented in Section 2.1.7.2, interpreted systems can be
extended to deontic interpreted systems by partitioning the set of local states Li into two
sets: a non-empty set Gi of allowed states, and a set Ri of disallowed states, such that
Li = Gi ∪Ri, and Gi ∩Ri = ∅.
Formulae of CTLKD−A{D,C} can be interpreted in a deontic interpreted system DIS
by associating a Kripke model MDIS to DIS (see Sections 2.1.7.1, 2.1.7.2, and 2.1.7.3).
Given a deontic interpreted system DIS and a CTLKD−A{D,C} formula ϕ, the aim of
this chapter is to define effective procedures to establish whether or not
DIS |= ϕ.
3.2 Explicit verification using NuSMV and Akka
A possible solution to the model checking problem for interpreted system may be provided
using existing tools. In particular, NuSMV can be used in conjunction with a model
verifier (see below) to perform verification. Given an interpreted system IS , verification
using these tools is performed as follows:
• An SMV program is defined, consisting of a single main module. A variable is
introduced for each set of local states and for each set of actions; for instance, if L1 =
{l11, l
2
1, l
3
1}, the SMV variable L1 is defined such that L1 : {l1-1, l1-2,l1-3}; (and
similarly for actions). The SMV construct next is used to synchronise the value of the
variables encoding actions with the value of the variables for local states, following
the protocols Pi. For instance, let P1 be a protocol such that P1(l
1
1) = {a
1
1, a
2
1} and
P1(l
2
1) = {a
3
1}. The corresponding SMV code is as follows:
next(Act1) = case
L1 = l1-1 : {a1-1,a1-2};
L1 = l1-2 : {a1-3};
1For the purposes of this thesis, the evaluation relation V needs to be defined for the set of reachable
states only, i.e., V ⊆ G× AP .
67
Chapter 3 3.2 Explicit verification using NuSMV and Akka
l1−1,l2−1
l1−2,l2−2
l1−1,l2−2
l1−2,l2−1
> [type your formula]
Figure 3.1: Akka screen-shot.
esac;
In this way actions performed in a given local state are mapped in the “next” SMV
state (this approach is usually denoted by the term “post-projection”). The evolution
functions ti are translated into appropriate SMV next constructs.
• The SMV code described in the previous point is used to compute the set of reachable
states and actions. The source code of NuSMV can be modified to print explicitly
this set in the form of a list of tuples (see [Lomuscio et al., 2003] for details), and
this list can be parsed to obtain the list of reachable global states. A possible output
is represented below:
...
-----------
l1-1,l2-1,l3-1
-----------
l1-1,l2-2,l3-1
-----------
l1-2,l2-2,l3-2
-----------
...
• Akka [Hendrik, 2006] is a Kripke model editor that supports the verification of
multi-modal formulae in the edited models. A simple Akka screen-shot is depicted
in Figure 3.1. The list of reachable states, appropriately parsed, is fed into Akka,
where epistemic-only formulae can be verified.
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Examples whose size is limited to a few dozens of reachable states can be checked using
this methodology. For instance, the bit transmission problem with a faulty receiver has 32
reachable states (see Section 6.1) and it is verified in [Lomuscio et al., 2003]. In general, the
methodology is particularly useful for small examples and for didactic purposes, because
it is very quick to implement, the state space is clearly visible, and counterexamples for
false formulae can be understood graphically.
The main limitation of this approach is the restriction of the verification to either
epistemic-only formulae using Akka, or to temporal-only formulae using NuSMV. Ad-
ditionally, the methodology requires manual intervention in the definition of the SMV
code, and it is not fully symbolic: the set of reachable states is dealt with explicitly by
Akka. Therefore, this methodology may suffer from scalability issues in large examples.
3.3 Symbolic model checking of interpreted systems using
OBDDs
This section presents a self-contained methodology for the verification of temporal, epis-
temic, correctness, and strategic modalities in deontic interpreted systems using obdds.
First, a deontic interpreted system is encoded using Boolean variables and Boolean for-
mulae; then, a verification algorithm that can operate on this representation is built pro-
gressively for model checking temporal, epistemic, and correct behaviour operators, and
operators for strategies.
3.3.1 Boolean encoding of deontic interpreted systems
Let DIS be a deontic interpreted system for a set of n agents {1, . . . , n} (this set may
include a special agent modelling the environment, see Section 3.1):
DIS =
〈
(Gi, Ri, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,n} , I, V 〉
Let Li = Gi ∪ Ri denote the set of local states for agent i, let S =
n
×
i=1
Li, and let AP be
a set of atomic propositions. In the remainder of this section the relation V ⊆ S ×AP is
represented by means of a function V : AP → 2S .
The number of Boolean variables required to encode the set of local states Li for agent i
is denoted by nv(i), and it is computed by taking the logarithm of the number of local
states in Li, that is nv(i) = ⌈log2|Li|⌉. Thus, a global state g can be associated with a
vector of Boolean variables (x1, . . . , xN ), where N =
n∑
i=1
nv(i):
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g → (x1, . . . , xnv(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variables for L1
, . . . , xj, . . . , xj+nv(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variables for Lk
, . . . , xN )
(where j =
∑
i<k
nv(i)).
The number of Boolean variables required to encode the set of actions Acti for agent i is
denoted by na(i), and it is computed by na(i) = ⌈log2|Acti|⌉. Similarly to global states,
a joint action α ∈ Act =
n
×
i=1
Acti can be univocally identified by a vector of Boolean
variables (a1, . . . , aM ), where M =
n∑
i=1
na(i).
In turn, every Boolean vector can be identified with a Boolean formula represented
by a conjunction of literals, i.e., a conjunction of Boolean variables or their nega-
tion. For instance, the Boolean vector (1, 0, 0, 1) is identified with the Boolean formula
f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ x4. Given a set of global states Q = {g1, . . . , gk},
the set Q can be univocally identified with a Boolean formula fQ: the formula fQ
is obtained by taking the disjunction of the Boolean formulae encoding each state
gi ∈ Q. For instance, if Q = {g1, g2}, g1 → (1, 0, 0, 1), and g2 → (1, 1, 0, 0), then
fQ = (x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ x4) ∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ ¬x4). A similar technique can be ap-
plied to sets of joint actions, which can be expressed as disjunction of Boolean formulae.
The encoding of local states, global states, and actions by means of Boolean formulae
permits the definition of Boolean formulae encoding agents’ protocols. As defined in
Section 2.1.7.1, a protocol Pi for agent i is a function Pi : Li → 2
Acti . Let bf(Q) be
a function that, given a set Q of states or actions (either global or local), returns the
appropriate Boolean function encoding the set. The Boolean formula fPi encoding the
protocol for agent i is defined by:
fPi =
∨
li∈Li

bf({li}) ∧

 ⊕
a∈Pi(li)
bf({a})



 .
Intuitively, this formula restricts for each local state (encoded by bf({li}) the set of actions
that can be performed by agent i. The formula
⊕
a∈Pi(li)
bf({a}) is used to capture the
requirement that a single action has to be performed in a given local state when |P (li)| > 1
for some li ∈ Li. Formally,
⊕
a∈Pi(li)
bf({a}) imposes that only one of the Boolean formulae
encoding the actions a ∈ Pi(li) is true. If |Pi(li)| = 2, this is expressed using the exclusive-
or (x-or) of two Boolean formulae. For |Pi(li)| > 2, the formula is a generalisation of the
x-or operator. A “joint” protocol is obtained by taking the conjunction of the Boolean
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formula encoding the agents’ protocols:
fP (x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aM ) =
n∧
i=1
fPi
The evolution functions ti : Li × LE ×Act→ Li are translated into Boolean functions by
introducing a new set of “primed” Boolean variables (x′1, . . . , x
′
N ) to encode the successor
of a state (either local or global). A generic pair ti(lp, aq) = lr (with lp, lr ∈ Li and
aq ∈ Acti) is translated into the Boolean function bf({lp}) ∧ bf({aq}) ∧ bf
′({lr}), and
the Boolean formula fti corresponding to ti is obtained by taking the disjunction of all
the possible such pairs2. The Boolean formula ft corresponding to the global evolution
function t defined in Section 2.1.7.1, is defined as:
ft(x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , am, x
′
1, . . . , x
′
N ) =
n∧
i=1
fti .
(where the arguments of ti are the appropriate Boolean variables to encode Li, as defined
above).
The set I of initial global states can be translated into the Boolean function fI , defined
as the disjunction of the Boolean formulae encoding the global states in I, i.e.:
fI(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∨
g∈I
bf({g}).
In the following sections the evaluation function V : AP → 2AS is associated with a
function fV : AP → B(x1, . . . , xN ) from atomic proposition to the set B(x1, . . . , xN ) of
Boolean functions over the Boolean variables (x1, . . . , xN ). Formally, given an atomic
proposition p ∈ AP , fV (p) is the Boolean function encoding the set of global states in
which the atomic proposition p holds.
The Boolean functions fPi , fP , fti , ft, fI , and the function fV are used in the next
subsections to compute the set of global states in which a CTLKD−AD,C formula ϕ
holds, denoted by [[ϕ]].
3.3.2 Model checking temporal properties
The aim of this section is to present a procedure to compute the set of states (represented
as a Boolean function) of a deontic interpreted system DIS in which a temporal-only
2Notice that this approach would require an explicit listing of all the possible local states and actions.
In the implementation of the algorithm this issue is avoided by introducing a form of default values for ti;
see Chapter 5.
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formula ϕ holds. To this end, a temporal transition relation Rt ⊆ S × S is defined to
encode that a joint action a ∈ Act exists such that two global states are related via the
the evolution function t; formally,
Rt(g, g
′) iff
(
∃a ∈ Act such that t(g, a) = g′
)
.
The temporal relation Rt can be translated into a Boolean function
fRt(x1, . . . , xN , x
′
1, . . . , x
′
N ) by quantifying over the Boolean variables encoding joint
actions. Using a standard technique, Boolean quantification is translated into a
propositional formula:
fRt(x1, . . . , xN , x
′
1, . . . , x
′
N ) =
∨
a¯∈{0,1}M
ft(x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aM , x
′
1, . . . , x
′
N ) (3.1)
(where a¯ is a vector of Boolean variables of the form (a1, . . . , aM )).
The set of global states S, the temporal relation Rt, and the evaluation function V con-
stitute a model M = (S,Rt, V ) for the logic CTL
3. Therefore, the labelling algorithm
presented in Section 2.2.2.1 can be applied to the computation of the set of states [[ϕ]] ⊆ S
in which a formula ϕ holds. The labelling algorithm mcCTLK to compute [[ϕ]] is reported
in Figure 3.2. The main differences between this algorithm and the one in Figure 2.4 are:
• The set of states computed by mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS ) is a set of global states. Differently
from states in a CTL model, global states have a further level of detail, being tuples
of local states.
• The temporal transition relation Rt is defined in terms of agents’ actions, protocols,
and transition relations. The Boolean quantification over actions in Equation 3.1
hides the underlying structure of the deontic interpreted systems when reasoning
about temporal operators only.
Similarly to Section 2.2.2.1, let pre∃ denote a procedure that, given a set of global states
X ⊆ S, computes the set of global states Y ⊆ S from which a transition is enabled to a
global state in X, i.e.:
Y = pre∃(X) = {g ∈ S|∃g
′.(g′ ∈ X and gRtg
′)}.
The procedure pre∃ is used in the algorithm of Figure 3.3 dealing with the operator EX.
The remaining procedures mcCTLK,EG and mcCTLK,EU are defined analogously to the
procedures presented in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
As noted in Section 2.2.2.2 and thanks to Equation 3.1, all the operations on sets of
3In a CTL model the temporal transition relation Rt is usually required to be serial. This requirement
reduces to a requirement of seriality for the evolution function t in DIS .
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mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS ) {
ϕ is an atomic formula: return V (ϕ);
ϕ is ¬ϕ1: return S \ mcCTLK(ϕ1,DIS );
ϕ is ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: return mcCTLK(ϕ1,DIS )∪ mcCTLK(ϕ2,DIS );
ϕ is EXϕ1: return mcCTLK,EX(ϕ1,DIS );
ϕ is EGϕ1: return mcCTLK,EG(ϕ1,DIS );
ϕ is E[ϕ1Uϕ2]: return mcCTLK,EU(ϕ1, ϕ2,DIS );
}
Figure 3.2: The labelling algorithm for the temporal fragment of CTLK.
mcCTLK,EX(ϕ,DIS ) {
X = mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS );
Y = pre∃(X);
return Y ;
}
Figure 3.3: The support procedure mcCTLK,EX(ϕ,DIS ).
global states appearing in the algorithm of Figure 3.2 may be translated into operations
on Boolean formulae. Thus, for a given deontic interpreted system DIS and for a given
temporal-only formula ϕ, the algorithm mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS ) computes the Boolean formula
encoding the set of global states in which ϕ holds. Similarly to the standard obdd-
based model checking for CTL, the Boolean formulae resulting from this algorithm can
be manipulated using obdds; details of the implementation of this algorithm using obdds
(and its extensions presented below) are presented in Chapter 5.
3.3.3 Model checking epistemic properties
This section presents model checking procedures for the epistemic operators of
CTLKD−AD,C . Given a deontic interpreted system DIS , let Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} denote
a group of agents. As defined in Section 2.1.7.1, the set of epistemic operators is com-
posed by an operator Ki to reason about the epistemic states of a single agent, by an
operator EΓ to express what everybody in a group Γ knows, by an operator DΓ to rea-
son about the distributed knowledge in a group Γ, and by an operator CΓ representing
common knowledge. Epistemic operators are evaluated in a deontic interpreted system
by employing the appropriate accessibility relation. In particular, the operators Ki are
evaluated using the epistemic accessibility relations ∼i⊆ S ×S defined by the equivalence
of local states for agent i, while the operators EΓ, DΓ, and CΓ are evaluated using the
accessibility relations REΓ , R
D
Γ , and R
C
Γ , respectively. Accessibility relations for group
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modalities are defined as follows:
REΓ =
⋃
i∈Γ
∼i;
RDΓ =
⋂
i∈Γ
∼i;
RCΓ =
(
REΓ
)∗
.
(i.e., RCΓ is the transitive closure of R
E
Γ ).
The evaluation of epistemic operators has to be restricted to the set of reachable states.
Otherwise, an epistemic formula of the form Kiϕ may result false at a global state g of a
deontic interpreted system DIS because a non-reachable global state g′ may be accessible
from g via the epistemic relation ∼i, with DIS , g
′ 6|= ϕ. Therefore, the set G of reachable
global states needs to be computed before evaluating epistemic operators. The set G is
obtained by iterating the following operator τ : S → S:
τ(Q) = I ∪Q ∪
{
g ∈ S|
(
∃g′.
((
g′Rtg
)
∧
(
g′ ∈ Q
)))}
. (3.2)
Intuitively, τ(Q) includes the set of initial states I, the set Q itself, and the set of global
states that are reachable from Q in a single time step. As the set of global states S
is finite, and the operator τ is monotonic, τ admits a (least) fix-point, which can be
computed by iterating τ(∅). Notice that all the set operations appearing in Equation 3.2
can be encoded using appropriate Boolean operations on the Boolean formulae encoding
sets of global states. Therefore, Equation 3.2 provides a constructive way to compute a
Boolean formula fG encoding the set of reachable global states.
The set of reachable states G is used to compute the set of states in which a formula of
the form Kiϕ holds, as presented in the procedure of Figure 3.4. This procedure first
computes the set of states in which the negation of the formula ϕ holds, and then builds
the pre-image of this set with respect to the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i
4. The set
of states satisfying Kiϕ is finally computed by taking the complement with respect to G
of the set obtained in the last step.
The procedures mcCTLK,E,Γ and mcCTLK,D,Γ for formulae of the form EΓϕ and DΓϕ are
presented in Figures 3.5 and 3.6.
The procedure for common knowledge is based on the characterisation of common knowl-
edge in terms of fix-point. Indeed, the equivalence [Fagin et al., 1995]:
CΓϕ⇔ EΓ(ϕ ∧ CΓϕ)
4The use of the existential quantifier is motivated by its efficient implementation using obdds.
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mcCTLK,K(ϕ, i,DIS) {
X = mcCTLK(¬ϕ,DIS );
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. g ∼i g′}
return ¬Y ∩G;
}
Figure 3.4: The support procedure mcCTLK,K(ϕ, i,DIS ).
mcCTLK,E(ϕ,Γ,DIS ) {
X = mcCTLK(¬ϕ,DIS );
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. RE
Γ
(g, g′)}
return ¬Y ∩G;
}
Figure 3.5: The support procedure mcCTLK,E(ϕ,Γ,DIS ).
mcCTLK,D(ϕ,Γ,DIS) {
X = mcCTLK(¬ϕ,DIS );
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. RD
Γ
(g, g′)}
return ¬Y ∩G;
}
Figure 3.6: The support procedure mcCTLK,D(ϕ,Γ,DIS ).
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mcCTLKC(ϕ,Γ,DIS ) {
X = mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS );
Y = G;
while ( X != Y ) {
X = Y;
Y = {g ∈ G|∃g′ ∈ G s.t. g′ ∈mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS ) and g
′ ∈ X and REΓ (g, g
′)}
}
return Y;
}
Figure 3.7: The support procedure mcCTLK,C(ϕ,Γ,DIS ).
mcCTLK,O(ϕ, i,DIS ) {
X = mcCTLK(¬ϕ,DIS );
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. gROi g
′}
return ¬Y ∩G;
}
Figure 3.8: The support procedure mcCTLK,O(ϕ, i,DIS ).
implies that [[CΓϕ]] is the fix-point of the (monotonic) operator τC : S → S defined by
τC(Q) = [[EΓ(ϕ ∧ (Q))]]. Hence, [[CΓϕ]] can be obtained by iterating τC(G).
Similarly to Section 3.3.2, all the operations on sets appearing in the procedures of Fig-
ures 3.4–3.7 can be performed on the Boolean representation of sets of global states which,
in turn, can be manipulated using obdds.
3.3.4 Model checking correct behaviour
This section introduces model checking procedures for formulae of the form Oiϕ and Kˆ
Γ
i ϕ
expressing, respectively, that ϕ holds when agent i is functioning correctly, and that agent
i knows ϕ under the assumption that agents in Γ are operating correctly. As defined in
Section 2.1.7.2, the relation ROi ⊆ S × S is defined by R
O
i (g, g
′) iff li(g
′) ∈ Gi, i.e., iff the
local state of agent i in global state g′ is an element of the set of “green” states for agent
i. The procedure mcCTLK,O for formulae of the form Oiϕ has the same structure of the
procedure for mcCTLK,K and it is reported in Figure 3.8.
The procedure for formulae of the form KˆΓi ϕ is presented in Figure 3.9. The procedure
operates similarly to the procedure mcCTLK,K , but the computation of the set Y is per-
formed by taking the intersection of the relation RKi with all the relations R
O
j such that
j ∈ Γ (in the actual implementation, the universal quantification is translated into the
conjunction of the Boolean formulae encoding the accessibility relations ROi ).
76
Chapter 3 3.3 Symbolic model checking of interpreted systems using OBDDs
mcCTLK,KH(ϕ, i,Γ,DIS ) {
X = mcCTLK(¬ϕ,DIS);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. RKi (g, g
′) and ROj (g, g
′) for all j ∈ Γ}
return ¬Y ∩G;
}
Figure 3.9: The support procedure mcCTLK,KH(ϕ, i,Γ,DIS ).
mcCTLK〈〈·〉〉X(ϕ,Γ,DIS ) {
Y = {g ∈ G|(∃a ∈ ActΓ, g′ ∈ G) s.t. (∀b ∈ Act{1,...,n}\Γ).[Rt(g, g
′) and t(g, (a ∪ b), g′)
and g′ ∈mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS ) and (a ∪ b) is consistent with the protocols in g]}
return Y ;
}
Figure 3.10: The support procedure mcCTLK,〈〈·〉〉X (ϕ,Γ,DIS ).
Similarly to the procedures in the previous Sections, the procedures mcCTLK,O and
mcCTLK,KH can operate on the Boolean representation of sets of states.
3.3.5 Model checking strategies
Actions appear in the Boolean encoding of a deontic interpreted system through the def-
inition of the Boolean variables (a1, . . . , aM ). These variables are used in the Boolean
encoding of the protocols fPi and in the Boolean encoding of the evolution functions
ti. A procedure to verify ATL-style operators in non-deterministic interpreted systems
(see Section 2.1.7.3) is obtained by quantifying over the Boolean variables for actions.
Let Γ be a group of agents, let ActΓ denote the set of joint actions of agents in Γ, i.e.,
ActΓ =×
i∈Γ
Acti. Let a ∈ ActΓ and let b ∈ Act{1,...,n}\Γ: a ∪ b denotes the joint action α
in Act whose local components belong to either a or b, with the appropriate reordering of
components. Figure 3.10 presents the procedure for verifying formulae of the form 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ
using this notation.
Intuitively, the set [[〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ]] is computed by including all the reachable states from which
a joint action in ActΓ exists, such that ϕ holds in a global state reachable from g, no
matter what actions are performed by the agents in {1, . . . , n}\Γ.
The remaining ATL-style operators 〈〈Γ〉〉G and 〈〈Γ〉〉U are verified using the appropriate
modification of the procedures in Figures 2.6 and 2.7, similarly to the verification proce-
dures employed in [Alur et al., 2002] and implemented in the model checker MOCHA (see
Section 2.2.3.2).
As noted in Section 2.1.7.3 and in Figure 2.3, the interpretation of ATL in a non-
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mc-unif(DIS ,Γ, ϕ) {
Compute the set {DIS}Γ
for each (X ∈ {DIS}Γ) {
if ( mcCTLK(ϕ,X) == G ) return true;
}
return false;
}
Figure 3.11: Model checking procedure for Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems.
deterministic deontic interpreted system may not correspond to the original spirit of ATL
in concurrent game structures. Indeed, the procedure presented above verifies what agents
in a group Γ may bring about, perhaps by guessing moves when in epistemically equivalent
states. While this is appropriate in certain circumstances, in other cases it is necessary to
express what agents can enforce (see the examples in Chapter 6 and the example in Fig-
ure 2.3). Γ-uniform interpreted systems, defined on page 35, provide a semantics closer to
the original meaning of ATL operators. Given a set of agents Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let {DIS}Γ
be the set of Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems compatible with DIS . The set {DIS}Γ
can be computed by taking all the possible restrictions of the protocols for agents in Γ; as
noted in Section 2.1.7.3, there are at most
∏
i∈Γ
|Acti|
|Li| such protocols, and thus {DIS}Γ
contains at most
∏
i∈Γ
|Acti|
|Li| elements. Figure 3.11 presents a procedure to verify whether
or not DIS |=Γ ϕ. The procedure mc-unif(DIS ,Γ, ϕ) implements the idea presented in
Section 2.1.7.3: a formula ϕ is true in a class of Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems iff
it is true in at least one Γ-uniform interpreted system compatible with DIS . Notice that
the mc-unif makes calls to the procedure mcCTLK passing a deontic interpreted system
X ∈ {DIS}Γ as a parameter.
As in the case of the previous procedures, all the operations appearing in the verification
of ATL-style operators in deontic interpreted systems (both non-deterministic and Γ-
uniform) can be expressed as operations on the Boolean representation of the parameters
which, in turn, can be expressed as obdds.
3.3.6 Discussion
The procedures appearing in Figures 3.2–3.10 can be combined in the algorithm
mcCTLK presented in Figure 3.12, which constitutes an algorithm for the verification
of CTLKD−AD,C formulae in deontic interpreted systems. Optionally, the algorithm
mcCTLK can be called by the procedure presented in Figure 3.11, thereby enabling the
verification of the full language of CTLKD−AD,C in Γ-uniform interpreted systems.
This algorithm includes a number of Boolean parameters (such as the encodings for actions,
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mcCTLK(ϕ,DIS ) {
ϕ is an atomic formula: return V (ϕ);
ϕ is ¬ϕ1: return S \ mcCTLK(ϕ1,DIS );
ϕ is ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: return mcCTLK(ϕ1,DIS )∪ mcCTLK(ϕ2,DIS );
ϕ is EXϕ1: return mcCTLK,EX(ϕ1,DIS );
ϕ is EGϕ1: return mcCTLK,EG(ϕ1,DIS );
ϕ is E[ϕ1Uϕ2]: return mcCTLK,EU(ϕ1, ϕ2,DIS );
ϕ is Kiϕ: return mcCTLK,K(ϕ, i,DIS )
ϕ is EΓϕ: return mcCTLK,E(ϕ,Γ,DIS )
ϕ is DΓϕ: return mcCTLK,D(ϕ,Γ,DIS )
ϕ is CΓϕ: return mcCTLK,C(ϕ,Γ,DIS )
ϕ is Oiϕ: return mcCTLK,O(ϕ, i,DIS )
ϕ is KˆΓi ϕ: return mcCTLK,KH(ϕ, i,Γ,DIS )
ϕ is 〈〈Γ〉〉Xϕ: return mcCTLK,〈〈Γ〉〉X (ϕ,Γ,DIS )
ϕ is 〈〈Γ〉〉Gϕ: return mcCTLK,〈〈Γ〉〉G(ϕ,Γ,DIS )
ϕ is 〈〈Γ〉〉[ϕ1Uϕ2]: return mcCTLK,〈〈Γ〉〉U (ϕ1, ϕ2,Γ,DIS )
}
Figure 3.12: The labelling algorithm for CTLKD−AD,A.
protocols, epistemic and correct behaviour relations) that are not present in the traditional
model checking algorithm for CTL. Moreover, the temporal relation Rt is not provided
explicitly, but it must be derived from other parameters, and the set of reachable states
G needs to be computed before performing the verification of formulae.
Correctness of the algorithm: The correctness of the model checking procedures for
temporal-only operators derives from the correctness of the procedures employed in the
verification of standard CTL models. To prove the correctness of the epistemic operators,
notice that the operator τ appearing in Equation 3.2 is monotonic, which guarantees
the existence of a fix-point G corresponding to the set of reachable states (this set is, by
definition, the set of states reachable from the set of initial states via temporal transitions).
The procedures in Figures 3.4–3.9 have the same structure than the temporal operator AX,
and they employ the set G defined above. A similar argument applies to the procedures
for ATL operators, which have the same structure used in MOCHA, but limited to the
set of reachable global states.
The complexity of this procedure is analysed in the next chapter.
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The complexity of model checking
multi-agent systems
This chapter presents complexity results for the problem of model checking multi-agent
systems. Section 4.1 deals with the problem of model checking aCTLKD−AD,C formula
in a model given “explicitly”. Section 4.2 investigates the complexity of model checking
in models whose representation is given in a “compact” way. Theoretical preliminaries for
the analysis of complexity were presented in Section 2.1.6, while results for temporal-only
model checking appear in Section 2.2.5.
4.1 The complexity of “explicit” model checking
Given a model M = (W,Rt,∼1, . . . ,∼n, R
O
1 , . . . , R
O
n , t, V ) and a formula ϕ of the logic
CTLKD−AD,C , the aim of this section is to investigate the complexity of establishing
whether or notM |= ϕ, as a function of |M | and |ϕ|, under the assumption that states and
relations are listed explicitly. The following theorem provides a upper bound for model
checking a particular class of logics:
Theorem 4.1.1. (From [Fagin et al., 1995], p.63) Consider a Kripke model
M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) for a logic interpreted using Kripke semantics (e.g. S5
n, Kn,
etc., see Section 2.1.2) and a formula ϕ of the same logic. There is an algorithm that,
given a model M and a formula ϕ, determines in time O(|M |×|ϕ|) whether or notM |= ϕ.
The time complexity for model checking fusion of logics (see Section 2.1.5.1) can be derived
using the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1.2. (From [Franceschet et al., 2004]) Let M = (W,R1, R2, V ) be a model
for the fusion of two logics L1 and L2, and ϕ a formula of L1 ⊗ L2. The complexity of
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model checking a formula ϕ of L1 ⊗ L2:
O(m1 +m2 + n · n) +
2∑
i=1
((O(k) +O(n)) · CLi(mi, n, k))
where mi = |Ri|, n = |W |, k = |ϕ|, and CLi is the complexity of model checking for logic
Li, as a function of mi, n and k.
A P-time algorithm for model checking common knowledge in interpreted systems is pro-
vided in [Meyden, 1998], while it is shown in [Alur et al., 2002] that model checking ATL
formulae is a P-complete problem.
The logic CTLKD−AD,C is the fusion of logics to reason about time (CTL), knowledge
and common knowledge and distributed knowledge (S5n), strategies (ATL), and of a
logic to reason about correct behaviour (using a “deontic” dimension). This observation,
together with Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, and with the complexity result forCTL appearing
in Table 2.7, implies the following:
Lemma 4.1.1. Model checking for the logic CTLKD−AD,C is a P-complete problem.
Proof. The problem is P-easy: each component of CTLKD−AD,C admits a polynomial
model checking algorithm, therefore the model checking problem for the fusion of these
logics is polynomial by Theorem 4.1.2. The problem is P-hard: model checking the
temporal fragment of CTLKD−AD,C is a P-complete problem.
4.2 The complexity of model checking compact representa-
tions
As noted in Section 2.2.5, in many applications models are not described explicitly by
listing states and relations. Instead, a compact representation is given; for instance one of
the languages presented in Section 2.2.3 may be used to describe temporal models. Under
this perspective, deontic interpreted systems can be seen as a compact representations
for CTLKD−AD,C models. Indeed, the size of the model MDIS associated to a given
deontic interpreted system DIS can be exponentially larger than DIS itself. For instance,
if DIS is composed of three agents, each of which is characterised by two local states, the
number of states of MDIS is 2
3.
The aim of this section is to investigate the complexity of model checking aCTLK formula
ϕ in a given deontic interpreted system DIS :
DIS =
〈
(Gi, Ri, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,n} , I, V
〉
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in terms of |ϕ| and |DIS |. This section shows that model checking CTLK formulae in
concurrent programs (see Section 2.2.5) is a PSPACE-complete problem. This provides
a result for the complexity of model checking deontic interpreted systems, as these can be
reduced to concurrent programs (see below).
A concurrent program D = 〈AP,AC,S,∆, s0, L〉 is obtained by the parallel composition
of n programs Di = 〈APi, ACi, Si,∆i, s
0
i , Li〉 (see page 55). Formulae of CTLK are inter-
preted in a concurrent program D in a standard way: temporal operators are interpreted
using the transition relation ∆, and epistemic operators are interpreted using epistemic
accessibility relations defined by the equivalence of the “local”components si ∈ Si of the
“global” states s ∈ S, as in Section 2.1.7.1.
The following results will be used in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1, presented below.
Lemma 4.2.1 states that, a formula EGϕ is true at a state s in a CTL model M iff
ϕ is true on a sequence of states of length |M | starting from s. Lemma 4.2.2 states that
E[ϕUψ] is true at a state s in a CTL model M iff there is a state s′ on a path starting
from s at a distance not greater than |M | from s, in which s′ |= ψ, and such that ϕ holds
in all states from s to s′.
Lemma 4.2.1. Given a Kripke model M = (S,R, V ) for CTL, a state s ∈ S, and a
formula ϕ, M,s |= EGϕ iff there exists a sequence of states π starting from s of length
|π| ≥ |M | s.t. M,π(i) |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ |M |.
Proof. IfM,s |= EGϕ, then there exists a path π from s such that, for all i ≥ 0,M,π(i) |=
ϕ; as the relation R is serial, this path is infinite (so, obviously, |π| ≥ |M |).
Conversely, if there is a path π from s of length |π| ≥ |M |, then such a path must necessarily
include a backward loop. As M,π(i) |= ϕ for all i in this loop, it suffices to consider the
(infinite) trace generated by this loop to obtain a (semantic) witness forM,s |= EGϕ.
Lemma 4.2.2. Given a Kripke model M = (S,R, V, I) for CTL, a state s ∈ S, and two
formulae ϕ and ψ, M,s |= E[ϕUψ] iff there exists a sequence of states π starting from s
s.t. M,π(i) |= ψ for some i ≤ |M |, and M,π(j) |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
Proof. If M,s |= E[ϕUψ], by the definition of the until operator, there must exist a state
s′ in which ψ holds, and ϕ holds in every state from s to s′. Moreover, the state s′ cannot
be at a “distance” greater than |M | from s. The other direction is a sufficient condition
for M,s |= E[ϕUψ].
Theorem 4.2.1. Model checking CTLK specifications in concurrent programs is a
PSPACE-complete problem.
Proof. Proof idea: given a formula ϕ of CTLK and n programs Di defining a concurrent
programD, a deterministic, polynomially-space bounded Turing machine T is defined that
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ϕ. . .. . .. . . . . .∆1 ∆2 ∆nSnS2S1
D1 D2 Dn
Figure 4.1: Input tape for the Turing machine T .
main {
state = (1, 1, . . . , 1);
repeat
if reachable(state) then
if satisfiable(¬ϕ,state) then
return yes;
else
move to next state;
end if
else
move to next state;
end if;
until last state;
return no;
}
Figure 4.2: The main loop for the Turing machine T .
halts in an accepting state iff ¬ϕ is satisfiable in D (i.e., iff there exists a state s ∈ S s.t.
D, s |= ¬ϕ). Based on this, it is possible to conclude that the problem of model check-
ing is in co-PSPACE. As deterministic complexity classes are closed under complement
(Theorem 2.1.3), this implies that the problem is PSPACE-complete (the lower bound
being given by the complexity of model checking CTL in concurrent programs).
Proof details: T is a multi-string Turing machine whose inputs are the n programs Di
and the formula ϕ. T operates “inductively” on the structure of the formula ϕ (see
also [Cheng, 1995] for similar approaches), by calling other machines (“sub-machines”)
dealing with a particular logical operator only. The input of T includes the states of the
program Si (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the transition relations, the evaluation functions and all the
other input parameters of each Di. This information can be stored on a single input
tape, separated by appropriate delimiters, together with the formula ϕ. The input tape is
depicted informally in Figure 4.1.
T returns yes iff there exists a state s ∈ S such that D, s |= ¬ϕ. The machine T iterates
over the set of states s ∈ S and checks whether ¬ϕ holds in one of these or not. If a state
is found such that D, s |= ¬ϕ, then the machine halts in a yes state; if the machine loops
over all the states without finding a state satisfying ¬ϕ, then T halts in a no state. A
high-level description of the main loop of the machine is given in Figure 4.2:
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In the program above, state is a tuple of n values (s1, . . . , sn), such that, for all i, si ∈ Si.
Notice that, since n is finite, and since |S| is finite, states can be numbered; for instance,
the state (1, 1, . . . , 1) is the state obtained by taking the first element from S1 in D1,
the first element from S2 in D2, and so on, following the order depicted in Figure 4.1.
The procedure reachable(state) verifies that s is reachable from the initial state. The
algorithm of Theorem 2.1.1 can be used here, but notice that a polynomial amount of
space is needed to store state (as it is the product of states of Di); the algorithm uses
the transition relations ∆i encoded in the input tape to verify whether two states are
connected or not.
The procedure satisfiable(ϕ,state) returns yes if the formula is satisfiable at state, and
it returns no otherwise. The procedure satisfiable operates recursively on the structure
of the formula by calling one of the machines described below. Each machine accepts a
state s and a formula, and returns either no (the formula is false at s) or yes (the formula
is true at s). Notice that each machine can call any of the other machines. The following
is a description of the formula-specific machines that may be called by satisfiable:
• The machine Tp for atomic formulae simply checks whether or not state is in
L(state), where the evaluation L is obtained from the evaluations for each pro-
gram in the input string; if the proposition is true at state, then Tp returns yes,
otherwise it returns no.
• The machine T¬ for formulae of the form ψ = ¬ϕ calls the appropriate machine for
ϕ and returns the opposite.
• The machine T∨ for the disjunction ψ = ψ
′ ∨ψ′′ first calls the machine for ψ′. If the
result is yes, it outputs yes, otherwise it returns the output of the machine for ψ′′.
• The machine TEX for formulae of the form ψ = EX(ϕ) implements the program of
Figure 4.3. The machine TEX accepts a formula ϕ and a state as input; similarly to
the main loop, the machine iterates over the set of states using the variable state2.
For each state, the machine checks whether state2 is reachable from the input
state; if this is the case, then TEX checks whether or not ϕ is satisfied at state2.
If TEX finds such a state, then it halts in a yes state; otherwise, if no state can be
found, TEX terminates in a no state. Notice that this machine uses a polynomial
amount of space (the space required to store state2).
• The machine TEU for formulae of the form E[ϕUψ] implements the program of
Figure 4.4. The machine TEU accepts two formulae and a state. The machine
operates by iterating over the set of states using the counter state2, similarly to
the previous machines. In each loop, the machine checks whether ψ holds in state2
and whether state and state2 are the same state. If this is the case, then the
machine halts in a yes state. Otherwise, the machine checks whether or not there
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TEX(ϕ,state) {
state2 = (1, 1, . . . , 1);
repeat
if reachable(state,state2) then
if satisfiable(ϕ,state2) then
return yes;
else
move to next state2;
end if
else
move to next state2;
end if;
until last state2;
return no;
}
Figure 4.3: The machine TEX .
is a sequence of states from state to state2 such that ϕ holds along the sequence.
This check is performed by the procedure path(state,state2,ϕ,N), which returns
yes if there is such a path, of length at most 2N . By Lemma 4.2.2, it is sufficient
to take N to be the logarithm of the size of the model which, in turn, can be
approximated by log(Max{|Si|}
n) ≤ n · |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}|, where |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}| is the
sum of the sizes of the programs, i.e., |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}| =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
|Di| (notice that
this value can be computed only once, at the beginning of the run). A recursive
algorithm to solve path is presented in [Papadimitriou, 1994]; this algorithm employs
at most space proportional to N , and it can be extended by adding a simple check
for the satisfiability of ϕ. As there can be at most |ϕ| checks, PATH uses at most
O(n · |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}| · |ϕ|) space (i.e., it operates in PSPACE).
• The machine TEG for formulae of the form EG(ϕ) is defined by taking the determin-
istic version of the non-deterministic Turing machine NTEG depicted in Figure 4.5.
Based on Lemma 4.2.1, this machine guesses a sequence of states of length greater
than |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}| (as above, this value can be computed at the beginning of the
run by evaluating the size of the input) in which ϕ holds. If (and when) such a
sequence is found, the machine returns yes (notice that this machine uses a polyno-
mial amount of space and always halts). By Theorem 2.1.2, it is possible to build a
deterministic machine TEG in PSPACE that returns yes iff there exists a sequence
of states of length greater than |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}| in which ϕ holds.
• The machine TK for formulae of the form ψ = Ki(ϕ) is depicted in Figure 4.6. The
machine TK accepts a formula ϕ, an index i, and a state as input; similarly to TEX ,
the machine iterates over the set of states using the variable state2. For each state,
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TEU(ϕ,ψ,state) {
state2 = (1, 1, . . . , 1);
repeat
if satisfiable(ψ,state2) then
if ( state == state2) return yes;
else
if ( path(state,state2,ϕ,N) ) then
return yes;
else
move to next state2;
end if;
end if;
else
move to next state2;
end if
until last state2;
return no;
}
Figure 4.4: The machine TEU .
NTEG(ϕ,state) {
state2 = state;
counter = 0;
repeat
guess a state2;
if (state is connected with state2) then
if ( satisfiable(ϕ,state2) then
counter = counter + 1;
else
return no;
end if
else
return no;
end if
until counter > |{Di}i∈{1,...,n}|
return yes;
}
Figure 4.5: The machine TEG.
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TK(ϕ, i,state) {
state2 = (1, 1, . . . , 1);
repeat
if reachable-k(state,state2,i)
and reachable(state2) then
if satisfiable(¬ϕ,state2) then
return no;
else
move to next state2;
end if
else
move to next state2;
end if;
until last state2;
return yes;
}
Figure 4.6: The machine TK .
the machine checks whether state2 is reachable from the set of initial states with
the procedure reachable(state2), and checks whether state2 is reachable from
state by means of epistemic accessibility relation i. This last check is performed by
the procedure reachable-k, comparing the i-th component of state and state2; if
this is the case, then TK checks whether or not ¬ϕ is satisfied at state2. If TK finds
a state satisfying the conditions above, then it halts in a no state (because this state
violates the definition of satisfiability for Ki); otherwise, if no state can be found,
TK terminates in a yes state. Notice that this machine uses a polynomial amount
of space (i.e., the space required to store the value of the counter for state2).
Each of the machines above uses at most a polynomial amount of space, and there are at
most |ϕ| calls to these machines in each run of T . Thus, T uses a polynomial amount of
space.
The PSPACE complexity result obtained above can be applied with minor modifications
to the analysis of the complexity for model checking deontic interpreted systems (and to
other formalisms, such as network of automata, see [Lomuscio and Raimondi, 2006a]). A
deontic interpreted system can be reduced to a concurrent program: each agent can be
associated with a program Di = 〈APi, ACi, Si,∆i, s
0
i , Li〉, where ACi is the set of actions
for agent i, Si is the set of local states for agent i, and the evolution function ∆i is
the temporal evolution function ti for the agent. In the formalism of deontic interpreted
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systems an agent’s evolution function may depend on other agents’ actions. The definition
of ∆i can be modified to take in account this requirement. Similarly, the definition of the
“global” evolution function t in a deontic interpreted system depends on all agents’ actions.
The definition of a concurrent program can be modified as follows:
• AP = ∪1≤i≤nAPi;
• AC =
∏
1≤i≤nACi;
• S =
∏
1≤i≤n Si;
• (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ iff ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (s[i], a, s′[i]) ∈ ∆i;
• L(s) = ∪iLi(s[i]).
Notice that, instead of taking the union, AC is now the Cartesian product of the agents’
actions ACi, and the transition function ∆ is modified accordingly; this modification only
impacts the procedure reachable, but it does not affect complexity results. Thus, given
a deontic interpreted system and a CTLK formula ϕ, it is possible to obtain a concurrent
program D of size equal to the original description using deontic interpreted systems, so
that the Turing machine T defined above can be employed to perform model checking of ϕ.
By noting that each concurrent program can be reduced to a deontic interpreted system
as well, it is possible to conclude that the problem of model checking CTLK formulae in
deontic interpreted systems is a PSPACE-complete problem.
4.3 Discussion
The proof presented in the previous section differs from the proof of PSPACE-
completeness for model checking CTL specifications in concurrent programs developed
in [Kupferman et al., 2000] and presented in Section 2.2.5, in that it does not use results
from automata theory. In this sense, the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 provides an alternative
proof of the upper bounds for model checking CTL formulae in concurrent programs,
which can be easily extended to CTLK.
Recently, [Hoek et al., 2006] presented complexity results for model checking ATL formu-
lae when models are represented in a compact way, showing that this is an EXP-complete
problem.
It is worth noticing that the verification algorithms presented in Chapter 3 require, in the
worst case, space (and time) exponential in the size of the input to perform verification.
Indeed, it is known that certain problems [Bryant, 1991] require obdds of size exponential
in the number of variables. Nevertheless, experimental results show that the average time
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and space requirements for these algorithms are well below the worst case scenario for
most of the examples (see Section 6.5).
A discussion on the complexity of model checking tools for multi-agent systems can be
found in Section 6.5.5.
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MCMAS
This chapter describes mcmas, a Model Checker for Multi-Agent Systems. mcmas is
developed in C/C++, and it should be considered a prototype model checker for multi-
agent systems to assess whether the algorithms presented in Chapter 3 may be applied
efficiently to large examples.
Section 5.1 presents an overview of the implementation. The syntax of the input language
of mcmas is given in Section 5.2, while Section 5.3 provides some implementation details.
Compilation instructions and examples of mcmas usage are presented in Section 5.4.
5.1 Overview
mcmas is a model checker for the verification of CTLKD−AD,C formulae in deontic in-
terpreted systems, with the possibility of performing verification on the class of Γ-uniform
deontic interpreted systems compatible with a given deontic interpreted systems. Deontic
interpreted systems are described in mcmas using the language ISPL (see Section 5.2).
mcmas is released under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL); the source
code, examples, and installation notes are available from [Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2006].
The structure of mcmas is depicted in Figure 5.1. The steps 1 to 14, inside the box, are
performed automatically upon invocation of the tool.
• In step 1 and 2, the input ISPL file is parsed using standard tools (Lex and Yacc),
which define the grammar of ISPL. The input file includes both the description of a
deontic interpreted system and a list of formulae to be verified. At this stage mcmas
builds an internal representation of the parameters appearing in the input file (such
as agents’ names, local states, actions, etc.) using data structures such as lists and
maps: these are manipulated using the C++ Standard Template Library (STL).
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Parse input;
Parse the formulae to check
if ( Γ−uniform required ) {
Compute the set of reachable states;
Build OBDDs for parameters;
for each compatible deontic interpreted system {
systems compatible with the ISPL input;
compute the set of deontic interpreted
Compute the set of states in which formula holds;
if ( reachable states = [[ φ ]] )
}
} else {
Build OBDDs for parameters
Compute the set of reachable states;
Compute the set of states in which formula holds;
if ( reachable states = [[ φ ]] )
}
return TRUE;
return TRUE;
return FALSE;14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
1
2
(text file using ISPL syntax)
Deontic interpreted systems description
Figure 5.1: High level description of mcmas.
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• In step 3 mcmas checks whether the parameter to perform verification in Γ-uniform
interpreted systems was provided. If this is the case, mcmas proceeds to step 4;
otherwise, it proceeds to step 10. Notice: mcmas determines the set Γ for each
formula that has to be verified by taking all the agents appearing inside any ATL
operator. Other implementation choices are possible, for instance a list of “uniform”
agents could be provided and read from the command line.
• mcmas performs step 4 only if verification in Γ-uniform interpreted systems is re-
quired. In this case, the number of deontic interpreted systems compatible with the
ISPL input is computed. As described in Section 2.1.7.3, the number of elements
of {DIS}Γ is at most
∏
i∈Γ
|Acti|
|Li|. For instance, if the set of local states for an
agent x includes a local state lx and a local state l
′
x, such that Px(lx) = {ax, a
′
x}
and Px(l
′
x) = {ax, a
′
x} (i.e., two actions are allowed in each local state), then {DIS}Γ
contains at least four elements.
• In step 6 the obdds corresponding to the Boolean encodings are built for each of
the Γ-uniform interpreted systems compatible with the given ISPL input. First,
the number of Boolean variables needed to encode global states and joint actions is
computed; then, the obdds representing protocols, evolution functions, set of initial
states, etc., are built following the procedure of Section 3.3.1, starting from the
internal representation using data structures obtained in step 2. Step 5 employs the
Cudd C library [Somenzi, 2005] for the manipulation of obdds. Notice that only
one element of {DIS}Γ is analysed in each loop, and the loop may terminate if the
condition in step 9 holds.
• The Boolean representation (using an obdd) of the set G of reachable states is built
in step 7 by computing the fix-point of Equation 3.2.
• The set of states in which a formula holds is computed in step 8, for each formula
appearing in the input ISPL file. As above, these sets are computed as Boolean
formulae using the procedures appearing in Sections 3.3.2 – 3.3.5, and they are
manipulated using their encoding with obdds. In step 9, this obdd is compared to
the obdd encoding the set of reachable states. If the two obdds are equal the loop
terminates, as a single positive witness is enough to prove DIS |=Γ ϕ. Otherwise,
the for loop continues with another Γ-uniform interpreted system. If no Γ-uniform
can be found for a particular formula, mcmas returns FALSE (step 14).
• The steps from 10 to 13 are executed when verification in Γ-uniform interpreted
systems is not required. These steps are similar to steps from 6 to 9, the only
difference being the encoding of the parameters. In this case, agents are not required
to be uniform and all the protocols may be non-deterministic.
mcmas is run from the command line and it accepts various options, in addition to the
parameter to enable verification in Γ-uniform interpreted systems. The additional pa-
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rameters include options to modify its verbosity, to inspect obdds statistics and memory
usage, to enable variable reordering; these can be used to determine the critical points in
the verification of large examples, and to fine tune the performance of the tool.
mcmas is written in C/C++ and it can be compiled on various platforms, including
PowerPC (Mac OS X 10.2 to 10.4), Mac Intel (Mac OS X 10.4), Intel (various Pentium
versions using Linux 2.4 and 2.6, and using Windows with Cygwin), and SPARC (SunOS
5.8 and 5.9). The source code has been compiled with gcc/g++ from version 2.95 till
version 3.4. The current version of mcmas is version 0.7.
5.2 The language ISPL
ISPL (Interpreted Systems Programming Language) is the input language of mcmas.
An ISPL program describes a deontic interpreted system following closely the formalism
presented in Sections 2.1.7.1 and 2.1.7.2.
5.2.1 General structure of an ISPL program
An ISPL program is composed of five sections:
1. Agents’ declarations. In this section of ISPL agents are defined using a sequence of
declarations, each of which has the following syntax:
Agent <agentID>
<agent_body>
end Agent
where <agentID> is a valid ISPL identifier (see below), and <agent_body> contains
the declaration of local states, actions, protocol, and evolution function for each
agent.
2. Evaluation function. In this section the evaluation function V : AP → 2G (see
Section 2.1.7.1) is defined as follows:
Evaluation
<proposition_declaration>
end Evaluation
<proposition_declaration> is a sequence of lines of the form
<proposition> if <condition_on_states>, where <proposition> is a valid
ISPL identifier and <condition_on_states> is a Boolean formula defining a set of
global states.
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3. Initial states. In this section the set of initial states is defined by the syntax:
InitStates
<condition_on_states>
end InitStates
where, as above, <condition_on_states> is Boolean formula defining a set of global
states.
4. Groups declaration. In this sections the groups of agents used in the for-
mulae to be verified are declared between the keywords (see Section 5.2.2)
Groups <groups_declaration> end Groups.
5. List of formulae to verify. In this section, identified by the keywords
Formulae <formulae_list> end Formulae, CTLKD−AD,C formulae to be ver-
ified are listed. The propositional formulae and the groups appearing in these for-
mulae have to be declared, respectively, in items 2 and 4 above.
Comments may be included in ISPL programs using double dashes at the beginning of a
line, for instance:
-- This is a comment
5.2.2 Formal syntax of ISPL
The basic element of an ISPL program is an identifier. An identifier is any string starting
with a letter and followed by any number of letters, digits, or underscore sign. Formally,
ID :: [a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_]*
The reserved keywords of ISPL are listed in Figure 5.2.
As described in the previous Section, an ISPL program is composed of five sections:
<Agents_list> <Evaluation> <InitialStates> <Groups> <Formulae>
• <Agent_list> is a sequence of <Agent> declarations of the following form:
<Agent> :: "Agent" ID <Agent_body> "end Agent"
where
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"Agent"
"Lstate" (local states)
"Lgreen" (green local states)
"Action"
"Protocol"
"Ev" (evolution function)
"Evaluation"
"InitStates"
"Groups"
"Formulae"
"end"
"if"
"and"
"or"
"->" (implication)
"AG" (temporal operator AG)
"EG" (temporal operator EG)
"AX" (temporal operator AX)
"EX" (temporal operator EX)
"X" (operator X for strategic modalities)
"F" (operator F for strategic modalities)
"G" (operator G for strategic modalities)
"AF" (temporal operator AG)
"EF" (temporal operator AG)
"A" (universal path quantifier)
"E" (existential path quantifier)
"U" (temporal operator Until)
"K" (epistemic operator)
"GK" (epistemic operator for everybody knows)
"GCK" (epistemic operator for common knowledge)
"O" (operator for correct behaviour)
"KH" (operator for epistemic+deontic modality)
"DK" (epistemic operator for distrib. knowledge)
Figure 5.2: ISPL reserved keywords.
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<Agent_body> ::
"Lstate = {" ID "," ID ... "};"
"Lgreen = {" ID "," ID ... "};"
"Action = {" ID "," ID ... "};"
<Protocol>
<Evolution>
Protocols are defined as follows:
<Protocol> ::
"Protocol:"
ID ":" "{" ID "," ID... "};"
ID ":" "{" ID "," ID... "};"
...
"end Protocol"
The declaration of a protocol must include a line for each local state appearing in
Lstate. Each line of the protocol starts with an identifier for the local state and it
is followed by a list of identifiers for actions in curly braces.
The evolution function of an agent is defined as follows:
<Evolution> ::
"Ev:"
ID "if" <Bool_ev_cond> ";"
ID "if" <Bool_ev_cond> ";"
...
"end Ev"
where <Bool_ev_cond> is a Boolean condition on local states and actions, defined
by:
<Bool_ev_cond> ::
<Bool_ev_cond> "or" <Bool_ev_cond>
| <Bool_ev_cond> "and" <Bool_ev_cond>
| "not" <Bool_ev_cond>
| "Lstate = " ID
| "Action = " ID
| ID ".Lstate = " ID
| ID ".Action = " ID
Notice that the last two lines in the definition of <Bool_ev_cond> permit the refer-
ence to other agents’ local states and actions, using an ID (an agent’s name) followed
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by a dot to disambiguate references (see Section 2.1.7.1 for a discussion on the evo-
lution functions). An evolution line of the form ID "if" <Bool_ev_cond> is read
as: the next local state is ID if <Bool_ev_cond> is true. It is assumed that, if none
of the <Bool_ev_cond> holds, then the agent does not change its local state. This
assumption is key to keep the description of examples compact, because only the
conditions causing a change need to be listed.
• The <Evaluation> section is defined as follows:
<Evaluation> ::
"Evaluation"
ID "if" <Eval_bool_cond> ";"
ID "if" <Eval_bool_cond> ";"
...
"end Evaluation"
Each line in the evaluation function defines a new atomic proposition of AP , identi-
fied by ID. <Eval_bool_cond> is a Boolean condition on the local states of agents,
defined by:
<Eval_bool_cond> ::
<Eval_bool_cond> "or" <Eval_bool_cond>
| <Eval_bool_cond> "and" <Eval_bool_cond>
| "not" <Eval_bool_cond>
| ID ".Lstate = " ID
• The section declaring initial states is defined as follows:
<InitialStates> ::
"InitStates"
<Eval_bool_cond>
"end InitStates"
where <Eval_bool_cond> is a Boolean condition on local states defined as above.
The set of global states for which <Eval_bool_cond> is true corresponds to the set
of initial states I.
• Groups of agents are declared in the section <Groups> as follows:
<Groups> ::
"Groups"
ID "=" "{" ID "," ID... "};"
ID "=" "{" ID "," ID... "};"
...
"end Groups"
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Each line in the Groups section starts with an identifier (the group name), followed
by a list of agents’ names in curly braces, defining the members of the group.
• CTLKD−AD,C formulae to be verified are declared in the section <Formulae>,
defined by:
<Formulae> ::
"Formulae"
<formula> ";"
<formula> ";"
...
"end Formulae"
The syntax of formulae is as follows:
<formula> ::
<formula> "and" <formula>
| <formula> "or" <formula>
| <formula> "->" <formula>
| "not" <formula>
| "AG" <formula>
| "EG" <formula>
| "AX" <formula>
| "EX" <formula>
| "AF" <formula>
| "EF" <formula>
| "A[" <formula> "U" <formula> "]"
| "E[" <formula> "U" <formula> "]"
| "K(" ID "," <formula> ")"
| "GK(" ID "," <formula> ")"
| "GCK(" ID "," <formula> ")"
| "DK(" ID "," <formula> ")"
| "O(" ID "," <formula> ")"
| "KH(" ID "," ID "," <formula> ")"
| "<<" ID ">>X" <formula>
| "<<" ID ">>F" <formula>
| "<<" ID ">>G" <formula>
| "<<" ID ">>[" <formula> "U" <formula> "]"
| ID
A simple ISPL code with two agents to test ATL operators is depicted in Figure 5.3. More
examples are described in Chapter 6.
98
Chapter 5 5.2 The language ISPL
Agent agt1
Lstate = {l11,l12};
Lgreen = {l11,l12};
Action = {a11,a12};
Protocol:
l11: {a11,a12};
l12: {a12};
end Protocol
Ev:
l12 if (Lstate = l11 ) and ( ( Action=a12 )
or ( Action = a11 and agt2.Action = a21) );
end Ev
end Agent
Agent agt2
Lstate = {l21,l22};
Lgreen = {l21,l22};
Action = {a21,a22};
Protocol:
l21: {a21,a22};
l22: {a22};
end Protocol
Ev:
l22 if (Lstate = l21) and ( ( (Action=a21) and (agt1.Action=a11) )
or ( (Action=a22) and (agt1.Action=a11) ) );
end Ev
end Agent
Evaluation
win if ( (agt1.Lstate=l12 and agt2.Lstate=l22) or
(agt1.Lstate=l11 and agt2.Lstate=l22) );
init if ( agt1.Lstate = l11 and agt2.Lstate = l21 );
end Evaluation
InitStates
( agt1.Lstate = l11 and agt2.Lstate = l21 );
end InitStates
Groups
g2 = {agt2};
g1 = {agt1};
g3 = {agt1,agt2};
end Groups
Formulae
init -> <g1>X(win);
init -> <g1>F(win);
init -> <g2> F(win);
end Formulae
Figure 5.3: A simple ISPL code.
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5.3 Implementation details
The source code of mcmas has been structured in separated “modules”, with a certain
number of shared parameters. The shared parameters include the internal representation
of the ISPL input, and the obdd variables and encodings for local states, actions, protocols,
etc. The source code of mcmas includes various subdirectories, each of which corresponds
to a specific module.
• Directory parser: this directory includes the Lex file nssis.l defining the tokens
of the grammar of ISPL, and the Yacc file nssis.y defining the formal parser for
ISPL. The parser includes C code to build the internal representation of ISPL code
as a tree, using the functions provided by the module pnode.
• Directory pnode: this directory includes C code and headers for the manipulation
of tree data structures (this module is required by Lex, which is not compatible
with C++ STL code). The building blocks of the parse tree are the nodes, defined
in pnode2.h. All the Boolean conditions, the evaluation function, the definition of
initial states, and the formulae to be verified are stored using pnode data structures.
• Directory bdd: this directory includes the C++ code and headers for the construction
and the manipulation of obdds. The definition of obdd’s variables and the construc-
tion of the obdds for all the parameters is managed by the function bddEncode()
in the file bdd.cc, which implements the procedures for Boolean encoding pre-
sented in Section 3.3.1. The verification of formulae is launched by the function
check_formula() in the file bdd.cc, implementing the algorithm of Figure 3.12.
In the case of verification for Γ-uniform interpreted systems, the same structure
presented above is repeated in the file bdduniform.cc.
obdds are manipulated in mcmas using the Cudd library [Somenzi, 2005]. This is
a C library offering a C++ interface to its functions. A simple example is reported
in Figure 5.4, showing how the overloading of the operators "+", "!", "*", "=",
and "==" permits a simple manipulation of Boolean functions.
• Directory examples: this directory contains various ISPL examples. Some of these
examples are described in detail in Chapter 6.
The root directory of the source tree of mcmas includes the file main.cc. This file contains
the function calls to parse input parameters, to perform setup operations at the beginning
of a run, and to perform cleaning operations upon completion of verification. The root
directory includes also a Makefile and installing instructions.
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int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
Cudd bddmgr; // The OBDD manager
bddmgr = Cudd(0,0); // Initialisation of manager
BDD x = bddmgr.bddVar(); // Declaration of a variable
BDD y = bddmgr.bddVar();
BDD f = x + y; // A formula
BDD g = y + !x; // Another formula
if ( f == g ) { // Comparing two formulae
cout << "f is equal to g";
} else {
cout << "f is NOT equal to g";
}
}
Figure 5.4: Simple example of Cudd usage.
5.4 Usage
The compilation of mcmas requires the following software:
• GNU C/C++ compiler.
• Lex and Yacc (or equivalent tools, such as Flex and Bison).
• Cudd library, compiled with its C++ interface.
Given the above, mcmas usually compiles easily on most Linux platforms. The compilation
under Mac OS X and Windows requires the installation of development tools, which are
not part of standard distributions. Binary versions for these systems are available from
[Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2006].
mcmas is a command line tool, and it is run with the command mcmas from a system
prompt. mcmas needs at least one input parameter: the name of the ISPL file to parse.
Other input parameters may be provided. The following is an excerpt from the output of
the command mcmas -h:
Usage: mcmas [OPTIONS] FILE
Example: mcmas -v 3 -bdd_stats myfile.ispl
Options:
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$ ./mcmas examples/btp.ispl
*****************************************************************
mcmas v. 0.7
[...]
*****************************************************************
Encoding BDD parameters...Done.
Checking formulae...
Formula number 0 is TRUE in the model
Formula number 1 is TRUE in the model
done, 2 formulae successfully read and checked
Figure 5.5: Excerpts from mcmas output.
-v Number verbosity level ( 0 -- 5, default 0 )
-pnode_info Print node manager info
-u Perform verification on uniform interpreted systems
-bdd_stats Print BDD statistics
-h This screen
It is possible to trace the verification steps by increasing mcmas verbosity. The option
-pnode_info prints statistics about the internal memory usage (i.e., the number of nodes
used). The option -bdd_stats launches a command of the Cudd library to print detailed
obdds statistics, such as number of nodes, number of reorderings, total memory used, etc.
The option -u is used to require verification in Γ-uniform interpreted systems. Figure 5.5
reports an excerpt of the output of mcmas when verifying two formulae with verbosity 0.
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Applications
This chapter presents some examples using the formalism of deontic interpreted systems,
their translation into ISPL code, and their verification using mcmas. These examples
belong to various domains: a communication and an anonymity protocol are presented,
respectively, in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. Section 6.3 presents examples of strategic reasoning in
multi-agent systems, while Section 6.4 introduces a characterisation of diagnosability using
epistemic notions. Experimental results for all the examples are reported in Section 6.5.
6.1 The bit transmission problem (with faults)
In the bit-transmission problem [Fagin et al., 1995] a sender S wants to communicate
the value of a bit to a receiver R, by using an unreliable communication channel (see
Figure 6.1). In this example, the channel may drop messages, but cannot tamper messages;
also, at any given time, the channel may transmit messages in one direction but not in
the other.
One protocol to achieve communication is as follows: S immediately starts sending the bit
to R, and continues to do so until it receives an acknowledgement from R. R does nothing
until it receives the bit; from then on, it sends messages acknowledging the receipt to S.
S stops sending the bit to R when it receives the first acknowledgement from R, and the
protocol terminates here.
This scenario is extended in [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2004] to deal with failures. There are
different kinds of faults that can be considered; here it is assumed that R may fail to
behave as intended. Two examples are discussed in this section following [Lomuscio and
Sergot, 2004]; in the first example, R may fail to send acknowledgements when it receives
a message. In the second, R may send acknowledgements even if it has not received any
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Communication channel
Sender Receiver(Environment)
Figure 6.1: The bit transmission problem.
message.
It is possible to represent the scenario described above by means of the formalism of
deontic interpreted systems, as presented in [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2004]. To this end, an
agent E representing the environment is introduced to model the unreliable communication
channel. The local states of the environment record the possible combinations of messages
that have been sent in a round, either by S or R. Hence, four possible local states are
taken for the environment:
LE = {(., .), (sendbit, .), (., sendack), (sendbit, sendack)},
where the first element in the tuple represents the action of S, the second element rep-
resents the action of R, and ‘.’ represents a configuration in which no message has been
sent by the corresponding agent.
The actions ActE for the environment correspond to the transmission of messages between
S and R on the unreliable communication channel. As mentioned above, it is assumed
that the communication channel can transmit messages in both directions simultaneously,
and that a message travelling in one direction can get through while a message travelling
in the opposite direction is lost. Thus, the set of actions ActE for the environment is taken
as:
ActE = {S−R, S→, ←R, −}.
The action “S−R” represents the action in which the channel transmits any message
successfully in both directions. The action “S→” represents a successful communication
from S to R but unsuccessful from R to S. The action “←R” represents a successful
communication from R to S but unsuccessful from S to R. Finally, the action “−”
represents the environment stopping messages in either direction. We assume the following
constant function for the protocol of the environment PE :
PE(lE) = ActE = {S−R, S→, ←R, −}, for all lE ∈ LE .
The evolution function for E records simply the actions of Sender and Receiver (details
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Final state Transition condition
(0, ack) (lS = 0 and ActR = sendack and ActE = S−R) or
(lS = 0 and ActR = sendack and ActE =←R)
(1, ack) (lS = 1 and ActR = sendack and ActE = S−R) or
(lS = 1 and ActR = sendack and ActE =←R)
Table 6.1: Transition conditions for S.
can be found in the code reported in Figure 6.2).
The sender S is modelled by taking the following set consisting of four possible local states:
LS = {0, 1, (0, ack), (1, ack)}.
They represent the value of the bit S is attempting to transmit, and whether or not S has
received an acknowledgement from R.
The set of actions ActS for S is taken as:
ActS = {sendbit(0 ), sendbit(1 ), λ}.
They represent the action of sending a bit of value 0, the action of sending a bit of value
1, and the null action. The protocol for S is defined as follows:
PS(0) = sendbit(0), PS(1) = sendbit(1),
PS((0, ack)) = PS((1, ack)) = λ.
Table 6.1 lists (in the right column) the conditions causing a transition for S to the local
state appearing in the left column.
Faulty Receiver – 1 : In this case it is assumed that R may fail to send acknowledgements
when it is supposed to. To this end, the following local states are introduced for R:
L′R = {0, 1, ǫ, (0, f), (1, f)}.
The state ǫ is used to record the fact that in the run R has not received any message from
S yet; 0 and 1 denote the value of the bit received. The local states (i, f) (i = {0, 1}) are
faulty states denoting that, at some point in the past, R received a bit but failed to send
an acknowledgement.
The set of actions for R is:
ActR = {sendack , λ}.
105
Chapter 6 6.1 The bit transmission problem (with faults)
The protocol for R is:
P ′R(ǫ) = λ, P
′
R(0) = P
′
R(1) = {sendack, λ},
P ′R((0, f)) = P
′
R((1, f)) = {sendack, λ}.
(notice: for a correct functioning Receiver it should be P ′R(0) = P
′
R(1) = {sendack}).
The transition conditions for R are listed in Table 6.2.
Final state Transition condition
0 (ActS = sendbit(0 ) and lR = ǫ and ActE = S−R) or
(ActS = sendbit(0 ) and lR = ǫ and ActE = S→)
1 (ActS = sendbit(1 ) and lR = ǫ and ActE = S−R) or
(ActS = sendbit(1 ) and lR = ǫ and ActE = S→)
(0, f) lR = 0 and ActR = ǫ
(1, f) lR = 1 and ActR = ǫ
Table 6.2: Transition conditions for R.
Faulty Receiver – 2 : In this second case it is assumed that R may send acknowledgements
without having received a bit first. This scenario is modelled with the following set of
local states L′′R for R:
L′′R = {0, 1, ǫ, (0, f), (1, f), (ǫ, f)}.
The meaning of the local states ǫ, 0, 1, (0, f) and (1, f) is as above; (ǫ, f) is a further faulty
state corresponding to the fact that, at some point in the past, R sent an acknowledgement
without having received a bit first. The set of actions is the same as in the previous
example. The protocol is defined as follows:
P ′′R(ǫ) = {sendack , λ},
P ′′R(0) = P
′′
R(1) = {sendack},
P ′′R((0, f)) = P
′′
R((1, f)) = P
′′
R((ǫ, f)) = {sendack , λ}.
The evolution function is a simple extension of Table 6.2.
For both examples, the following set of atomic propositions is introduced:
AP = {bit = 0,bit = 1, recbit, recack}.
Correspondingly, the following evaluation function is defined:
V (bit = 0) = {g ∈ G | either lS(g) = 0 or lS(g) = (0, ack)};
V (bit = 1) = {g ∈ G | either lS(g) = 1 or lS(g) = (1, ack)};
V (recbit) = {g ∈ G | either lR(g) = 1, or lR(g) = 0;
or lR(g) = (0, f) or lR(g) = (1, f)};
V (recack) = {g ∈ G | lS(g) = (1, ack) or lS(g) = (0, ack)}.
106
Chapter 6 6.2 The protocol of the dining cryptographers
The parameters above describe two deontic interpreted systems, one for each faulty be-
haviour of R; in the following, these deontic interpreted systems are denoted by DISBTP1
and DISBTP2.
Given the set AP above, various properties of DISBTP1 and DISBTP2 can be evaluated.
For example, consider the following temporal and epistemic specifications:
recack =⇒ (KS
(
KR (bit = 0) ∨KR (bit = 1)
)
); (6.1)
recack =⇒ (KˆRS
(
KR (bit = 0) ∨KR (bit = 1)
)
); (6.2)
¬EF (CS,R((bit = 0)) ∨ CS,R((bit = 1))). (6.3)
Formula 6.1 captures the fact that it is always true that, upon receipt of an acknowl-
edgement, S knows that R knows the value of the bit. Formula 6.2 expresses a similar
concept, but by using knowledge under the assumption of correct behaviour. By encoding
the examples in ISPL it is possible to verify in an automatic way that Formula 6.1 holds
in DISBTP1 but not in DISBTP2. This means that the faulty behaviour of R in DISBTP1
does not affect the key property of the system. On the contrary, Formula 6.2 holds in both
DISBTP1 and DISBTP2; hence, a particular form of knowledge is retained, irrespective of
the fault under consideration. Formula 6.3 expresses a general result about communica-
tion over a channel with a temporal delay: it is not possible to achieve common knowledge
of a message [Fagin et al., 1995].
The ISPL code corresponding to DISBTP1 is reported in Figure 6.2. The ISPL code
corresponding to DISBTP2 is available in the source tree of mcmas. Experimental results
for this example are discussed in Section 6.5.
6.2 The protocol of the dining cryptographers
The protocol of the dining cryptographers was introduced in [Chaum, 1988], and model
checking of its properties was discussed in [van der Meyden and Su, 2004] (see also Sec-
tion 2.3.1, page 60). The original wording from [Chaum, 1988] is as follows:
“Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favourite three-star restaurant.
Their waiter informs them that arrangements have been made with the maitre d’hotel for
the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryptographers might be paying for the dinner,
or it might have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The three cryptographers
respect each other’s right to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if NSA is
paying. They resolve their uncertainty fairly by carrying out the following protocol:
Each cryptographer flips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between him and the cryptog-
rapher on his right, so that only the two of them can see the outcome. Each cryptographer
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Agent Sender
Lstate = {s0,s1,s0ack,s1ack};
Lgreen = {s0,s1,s0ack,s1ack};
Action = {sb0,sb1,nothing};
Protocol:
s0: {sb0};
s1: {sb1};
s0ack: {nothing};
s1ack: {nothing};
end Protocol
Ev:
s0ack if ( ( (Lstate=s0) and (Receiver.Action=sendack) and
(Environment.Action=SR) )
or ( (Lstate=s0) and (Receiver.Action=sendack) and
(Environment.Action=R ) ) );
s1ack if [... As above ...]
end Ev
end Agent
Agent Receiver
Lstate = {empty,r0,r1,r0f,r1f};
Lgreen = {empty,r0,r1};
Action = {nothing,sendack};
Protocol:
empty: {nothing};
r0: {sendack,nothing};
r1: {sendack,nothing};
r0f: {sendack,nothing};
r1f: {sendack,nothing};
end Protocol
Ev:
r0 if ( ( (Sender.Action=sb0) and (Lstate=empty) and
(Environment.Action=SR) ) or
( (Sender.Action=sb0) and (Lstate=empty) and
(Environment.Action=S) ) );
r1 if [... as above ...]
r0f if ( (Lstate = r0 ) and (Action=nothing) );
r1f if ( (Lstate = r1 ) and (Action=nothing) );
end Ev
end Agent
Agent Environment
[... see text ...]
end Agent
Evaluation
recbit if ( (Receiver.Lstate=r0) or (Receiver.Lstate=r1) or
(Receiver.Lstate=r0f) or (Receiver.Lstate=r1f) );
recack if ( (Sender.Lstate=s0ack) or (Sender.Lstate=s1ack) );
bit0 if ( (Sender.Lstate=s0) or (Sender.Lstate=s0ack));
bit1 if ( (Sender.Lstate=s1) or (Sender.Lstate=s1ack) );
end Evaluation
InitStates
( (Sender.Lstate=s0) or (Sender.Lstate=s1) ) and
( Receiver.Lstate=empty ) and ( Environment.Lstate=none );
end InitStates
Formulae
recack -> K(Sender,(K(Receiver,bit0) or K(Receiver,bit1)));
recack -> KH(Sender,Receiver,K(Receiver,bit0) or K(Receiver,bit1));end Formulae
Figure 6.2: ISPL code for the bit transmission problem (excerpts).
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then states aloud whether the two coins he can see – the one he flipped and the one his
left-hand neighbour flipped – fell on the same side or on different sides. If one of the
cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what he sees. An odd number of
differences uttered at the table indicates that a cryptographer is paying; an even number
indicates that NSA is paying (assuming that the dinner was paid for only once). Yet if a
cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything from the utterances about
which cryptographer it is.”[Chaum, 1988]
This protocol is the basic building block for the definition of more complex infrastructures
enabling anonymous communication over public networks (see, for instance, [Goldschlag
et al., 1999]). Notice that similar versions of the protocol can be defined for any number
of cryptographers greater than three.
An instance of this example with three cryptographers is encoded in the formalism of
deontic interpreted systems by introducing three agents Ci (i = {1, 2, 3}) to model the
three cryptographers, and one agent E for the environment.
The environment is used to select non-deterministically the identity of the payer and
the results of the coin tosses. A local state for the environment is a string of the form
< c1c2c3p >, where ci ∈ {H,T}, (i = {1, 2, 3}) represents the result of the coin toss (Head
or Tail) for coin i, and p ∈ {1, . . . , 4} represents the payer (p = 4 means that the company
paid for the dinner). This makes a total of 32 elements in the set LE encoding the possible
local states for the environment. It is assumed that the environment can perform only one
action, the null action. Therefore, the protocol PE is simply mapping every local state to
the null action. Also, there is no evolution of the local states for the environment.
The local states of a cryptographer i (i = {1, 2, 3}) are modelled as a string < cipiui >
representing, respectively, whether the coins that a cryptographer can see are equal (ci =
E) or different (ci = D), whether the cryptographer is the payer (pi = Y ) or not (pi =
N), and whether the number of “different” utterances reported is even (pi = E) or odd
(pi = O). Considering that all these parameters are not initialised at the beginning of the
run (ci = pi = ui = n), there are 27 possible combinations of these parameters, hence the
set LCi encoding the local states of cryptographer i contains 27 possible local states. For
each cryptographer the following set of actions is introduced:
Acti = {nothing , sayequal , saydifferent}.
Actions are performed in compliance with the protocol stated above:
PCi(< ENn >) = PCi(< DY n >) = {sayequal};
PCi(< EY n >) = PCi(< DNn >) = {saydifferent}.
That is: the action of the cryptographer is sayequal if either (i) the cryptographer sees two
equal coins and did not pay for the dinner and no utterances have been made yet, or (ii)
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Final state Transition condition
< EY n > lC2 =< nnn > and (lE =< HHH2 > or lE =< THH2 > or
lE =< HTT2 > or lE =< HTT2 >)
< DY n > lC2 =< nnn > and (lE =< HTH2 > or lE =< TTH2 > or
lE =< HHT2 > or lE =< HHT2 >)
< ENn > lC2 =< nnn > and (lE =< HHH1 > or lE =< THH1 > or
lE =< HTT1 > or lE =< HTT1 > or
lE =< HHH3 > or lE =< THH3 > or
lE =< HTT3 > or lE =< HTT3 > or
lE =< HHH4 > or lE =< THH4 > or
lE =< HTT4 > or lE =< HTT4 >)
< DNn > lC2 =< nnn > and (lE =< HHT1 > or lE =< THT1 > or
lE =< HTH1 > or lE =< HTH1 > or
lE =< HHT3 > or lE =< THT3 > or
lE =< HTH3 > or lE =< HTH3 > or
lE =< HHT4 > or lE =< THT4 > or
lE =< HTH4 > or lE =< HTH4 >)
< EY O > lC2 =< EY n > and ( (ActC1 = saydifferent and ActC3 = saydifferent) or
(ActC1 = sayequal and ActC3 = sayequal ) )
. . . . . .
Table 6.3: Transition conditions for C2.
the cryptographer sees two different coins and did pay for the dinner and no utterances
have been made yet. The conditions for saydifferent are similar. In all the remaining cases
the protocol PCi prescribes the action nothing .
The evolution function for a cryptographer Ci lists the conditions causing a change in the
local state of Ci. Table 6.3 lists some the transition conditions for cryptographer 2 (the
conditions counting the number of utterances are not listed explicitly). The conditions for
the remaining cryptographers are defined in a similar way.
As it is clear from Table 6.3, the manual encoding of the example may be cumbersome.
In this case, and in other examples presented below, it is more convenient to implement
a generator of ISPL code using a traditional programming language (such as C++). The
source code of mcmas includes a generator for this example which takes the number of
cryptographers as input, and produces as output the ISPL code corresponding to the
encoding presented above.
The following set AP of atomic propositions is defined to reason about the example with
three cryptographers:
AP = {paid1,paid2,paid3, even,odd}.
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Correspondingly, the following evaluation function is introduced:
V (paid1) = {g ∈ G | lC1(g) =< ∗Y ∗ >};
V (paid2) = {g ∈ G | lC2(g) =< ∗Y ∗ >};
V (paid3) = {g ∈ G | lC3(g) =< ∗Y ∗ >};
V (even) = {g ∈ G | lCi(g) =< ∗E > for every i};
V (odd) = {g ∈ G | lCi(g) =< ∗O > for every i}.
< ∗Y ∗ > denotes a local state in which the value of pi is Y (i.e., the cryptographer paid
for dinner), while < ∗E > and < ∗O > denote local states in which the value of ui is either
E or O (i.e., either an even or an odd number of utterances have been made). Various
properties of this deontic interpreted system, denoted by DISDC3, are expressed using
AP . For instance:
DISDC3 |= (odd ∧ ¬paid1) =⇒ AX(KC1(paid2 ∨ paid3) ∧ ¬KC1(paid2) ∧ ¬KC1(paid3)).
This formula expresses the claim made at the beginning of this section: if the first cryp-
tographer did not pay for dinner and the number of “different” utterances is odd, then
the first cryptographer knows that either the second or the third cryptographer paid for
dinner; moreover, in this case, the first cryptographer does not know which of these two
is the payer. Analogously, it is possible to check that, if a cryptographer paid for dinner,
then there will be an odd number of “different” utterances, that is:
DISDC3 |= (paid1 ∨ paid2 ∨ paid3) =⇒ AF (odd).
Consider now the group Γ of the three cryptographers. An interesting property to check
is the following:
DISDC1 |= even =⇒ AX(CΓ(¬paid1 ∧ ¬paid2 ∧ ¬paid3)).
This formula expresses the fact that, in presence of an even number of “different” utter-
ances, it is common knowledge that none of the cryptographers paid for the dinner. Hence,
in this protocol common knowledge can be achieved anonymously. Experimental results
for this example are discussed in Section 6.5.
Similarly to the bit transmission problem, instances of the protocol where one or more
of the cryptographers do not behave correctly (i.e., they “cheat”) can be analysed. More
details can be found in [Kacprzak et al., 2006].
6.2.1 A different encoding
The encoding presented above is not the most efficient encoding of the protocol of the
dining cryptographers. For instance, the number of utterances (even or odd) is stored
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separately in each cryptographer, but this information is required only once; similarly,
the outcomes of coin tosses are stored in the environment, and each cryptographer has
repeated information about them (seeing two equal or different coins).
A different encoding is proposed in [Kacprzak et al., 2006], where an agent is associated to
each coin and an agent is introduced to “count” the utterances. Verification is performed
by taking the distributed knowledge in a group of agents: intuitively, each group contains
all the information needed by a cryptographer, as defined above. This encoding permits
an improvement of the performance of mcmas in the order of 30% on average (see the
experimental results appearing in [Kacprzak et al., 2006]).
Essentially, this is an automata-based approach translated into the ISPL language. A
discussion of the relationships between automata and agents is beyond the scope of this
thesis; more details about it and a comparison with other techniques to encode the protocol
of the dining cryptographers can be found in [Kacprzak et al., 2006] and in Section 6.5.
6.3 Strategic games
This section presents three examples of strategic reasoning in deontic interpreted systems.
The first two examples make use of uniform agents, because part of the information is
hidden. The third example in Section 6.3.3 is an example of a game with perfect informa-
tion, and it is shown that the encoding using deontic interpreted systems is as natural as
the standard game-theoretic approach.
6.3.1 A simple card game
The example depicted in Figure 2.3 and described in Section 2.1.7.3, page 33 (see also
[Jonker, 2003, Jamroga, 2004b]), is encoded in the formalism of deontic interpreted systems
by introducing two agents: one agent P encodes the player, and another agent encodes
the environment. Local states for P are defined as follows:
LP = {a1 , k1 , q1 , a2 , k2 , q2}
representing that P holds Ace, King on Queen, either in step 1 or in step 2 (i.e., after
changing the card). The actions for P are:
ActP = {keep, swap,none}
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Final state Transition condition
a2 (lP = a1 and Action = keep) or
(lP = k1 and Action = swapandlE = q) or
(lP = q1 and Action = swapandlE = k) or
k2 (lP = k1 and Action = keep) or
(lP = a1 and Action = swapandlE = q) or
(lP = q1 and Action = swapandlE = a) or
q2 (lP = q1 and Action = keep) or
(lP = k1 and Action = swapandlE = a) or
(lP = a1 and Action = swapandlE = k) or
Table 6.4: Transition conditions for P .
and they are performed in compliance with the following protocol:
PP (a1 ) = PP (k1 ) = PP (q1 ) = {keep, swap};
PP (a2 ) = PP (k2 ) = PP (q2 ) = {none}.
Intuitively, the protocol prescribes that P can either keep or change its card in the first
round, while in the next round no action is performed. The transition conditions for P
are listed in Table 6.4, and they translate formally the possible evolution of the system
depicted in Figure 2.3.
The environment is modelled with the following set of local states:
LE = {a, k , q}.
It is assumed that the environment does not perform actions, therefore ActE = {none}.
The protocol PE maps every state to this action, and there is no evolution of local states.
Only one proposition is introduced, expressing that the player wins the game:
AP = {pwin}
with the corresponding evaluation function:
V (pwin) = {g ∈ G | (lP (g) = a2 and lE(g) = k)
or (lP (g) = k2 and lE(g) = q)
or (lP (g) = q2 and lE(g) = a)}.
Let DISCards denote the deontic interpreted system described above. The ISPL code
corresponding to DISCards is depicted in Figure 6.3. As expected, it is possible to verify
that
DISCards |= init =⇒ 〈〈P 〉〉X(pwin)
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(where init is a proposition true in the set of initial states). However, in a {P}-uniform
deontic interpreted system, it is possible to verify that
DISCards 6|={P} init =⇒ 〈〈P 〉〉X(pwin).
This last check is performed by including the option -u in the command line of mcmas.
6.3.2 RoadRunner and Coyote
This example illustrates further the different meaning of ATL operators in Γ-uniform
deontic interpreted systems and in non-deterministic deontic interpreted systems.
RoadRunner is running in a hilly region of the desert; the main road splits in two small
lanes just before the entrance of two tunnels under a mountain. RoadRunner can pick
randomly either tunnel; the tunnels are identical and very narrow. Coyote knows Road-
Runner has to enter one of the two tunnels, and so he has bought a special tunnel-blocking
device from ACME Inc. to catch RoadRunner. The device may be placed in front of either
exit of the tunnel (see Figure 6.4).
The example is modelled as a deontic interpreted system DISRC by taking two agents,
an agent C for Coyote and an agent R for RoadRunner. The set of local states for
RoadRunner includes two local states:
LR = {left , right}
representing which tunnel RoadRunner is going to enter. The only action defined for R is
run, and the protocol assigns this action to every local state. Moreover, local states of R
do not change.
Coyote is modelled by means of three local states:
LC = {planning , catch , fail}.
The set of actions for Coyote is as follows:
ActC = {placeleft , placeright ,none}.
Actions are performed in compliance with the following protocol:
PC(planning) = {placeleft , placeright}
PC(catch) = PC(fail) = {none}.
The evolution function for Coyote prescribes that the next local state for C is catch if
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Agent env
Lstate = { a,k,q};
Lgreen = { a,k,q};
Action = { none,none2 };
Protocol:
a: {none};
k: {none};
q: {none};
end Protocol
Ev:
a if ( Lstate = a);
end Ev
end Agent
Agent player
Lstate = {a1,k1,q1,a2,k2,q2};
Lgreen = {a1,k1,q1,a2,k2,q2};
Action = {keep,swap,none};
Protocol:
a1: {keep,swap};
k1: {keep,swap};
q1: {keep,swap};
a2: {none};
k2: {none};
q2: {none};
end Protocol
Ev:
a2 if ( ( Lstate = a1 ) and (Action=keep) ) or
( (Lstate = k1 ) and (Action=swap) and (env.Lstate=q)) or
( (Lstate = q1 ) and (Action=swap) and (env.Lstate=k));
k2 if ( ( Lstate = k1 ) and (Action=keep) ) or
( (Lstate = a1 ) and (Action=swap) and (env.Lstate=q)) or
( (Lstate = q1 ) and (Action=swap) and (env.Lstate=a));
q2 if ( ( Lstate = q1 ) and (Action=keep) ) or
( (Lstate = k1 ) and (Action=swap) and (env.Lstate=a)) or
( (Lstate = a1 ) and (Action=swap) and (env.Lstate=k));
end Ev
end Agent
Evaluation
pwin if ( (player.Lstate = a2) and ( env.Lstate=k) ) or
( (player.Lstate = k2) and ( env.Lstate=q) ) or
( (player.Lstate = q2) and ( env.Lstate=a) );
end Evaluation
InitStates
( ( player.Lstate=a1 and env.Lstate=k ) or
( player.Lstate=a1 and env.Lstate=q ) or
( player.Lstate=k1 and env.Lstate=q ) or
( player.Lstate=k1 and env.Lstate=a ) or
( player.Lstate=q1 and env.Lstate=a ) or
( player.Lstate=q1 and env.Lstate=k ) ) and
( env.Action=none and
(player.Action=keep) or (player.Action=swap) );
end InitStates
Groups
g1 = {player};
end Groups
Formulae
init -> <g1>X(pwin);
-- init is a proposition true in the set of initial states
end Formulae
Figure 6.3: ISPL code for the card game.
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RoadRunner
Right
TunnelTunnel
Left 
Left exit Right exit
Figure 6.4: Diagram for RoadRunner and Coyote.
lC = planning and Coyote places the special device in front of the tunnel chosen by
RoadRunner; in the other case the local state changes to fail (notice: the evolution function
for C depends on the local state of R, which is treated in this example as the environment).
In the initial state, the local state of C is planning , and the local state of R is either left
or right . One proposition is introduced to reason about this example: AP = {catch},
with the corresponding evaluation function:
V (catch) = {g ∈ G | lC(g) = catch}.
By using mcmas Coyote discovers that:
DISRC |= init =⇒ 〈〈C〉〉X(catch)
i.e., it is the case that in the initial state Coyote has a strategy to catch RoadRunner
(where init is a proposition true in the set of initial states). In fact, any external observer
could verify that Coyote knows this very well:
DISRC |= KC(init =⇒ 〈〈C〉〉X(catch)).
Unfortunately, immediately after placing the ACME device in front of the tunnel, Coyote
realises that he was assuming a lucky guess on where to place the device. Indeed, under
the assumption Coyote is uniform, the formula turns to be false:
DISRC 6|={C} init =⇒ 〈〈C〉〉X(catch).
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From RoadRunner’s point of view, however, it is more useful and prudent to reason about
what the clumsy Coyote may bring about. Thus, RoadRunner should be more interested
in the verification of the non-deterministic deontic interpreted system to discover that
it is possible that Coyote catches him. In other words, to analyse the scenario from
RoadRunner’s point of view, it is possible to check:
DISRC |= KR(init =⇒ 〈〈C〉〉X(catch)).
6.3.3 Nim
Nim is a two player game where players in turns remove any number of objects from one
of a certain number of heaps. Typically, 3 heaps are present and the game starts with 3
objects in the first heap, 4 in the second, and 5 in the third. The player who takes the
last object wins. In a variation of this game, called Mise`re, the player who takes the last
object loses. This is a game with perfect information.
The example is modelled as a deontic interpreted system by introducing three agents: one
agent for each player and one agent for the environment, encoding the three heaps. The
set of local states for the environment includes all the possible combinations of objects in
the heaps (for the case of 3-4-5 heaps, there are 60 possible states). The environment does
not perform any action; the local states of the environment change only according to the
actions performed by each player.
The set of local states for the players includes a copy of the local states of the environment
(which the agents can observe), and their actions include all the possible moves that can
be performed, i.e., removing a number of objects from a heap (there are 60 such actions
in the case of 3-4-5 heaps), and a “waiting” action when the other player is moving. In a
given local state, the protocol for the agent permits all the actions which remove a number
of objects less or equal to the number of remaining objects in each heap. The evolution
function for the players either copies the local state of the environment, or it moves the
agent to a waiting state.
Two propositions are introduced, in addition to the proposition init which holds in the
set of initial states:
AP = {p1 removelast,p2 removelast}.
The evaluation function defines the proposition p1 removelast to be true when the first
player observes that all the heaps are empty (notice that the observation of an agent
follows the action of removing objects). The proposition p2 removelast is defined analo-
gously. Similarly to the example of the protocol of the dining cryptographers presented in
Section 6.2, the ISPL code representing the deontic interpreted system DISNim for Nim
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is generated using a C++ program, included in the source distribution of mcmas. The
model checker confirmed the known result that the first player can force a win both for
the Nim and the Mise`re scenario, by verifying the following formulae:
DISNim |= init =⇒ 〈〈player1〉〉[¬player2 removelast U player1 removelast]
DISNim |= init =⇒ 〈〈player1〉〉[¬player1 removelast U player2 removelast]
Experimental results for this example are reported in Section 6.5.
6.4 Diagnosability and other specification patterns
Diagnosability is defined as the feasibility of a diagnosis in a given system, based on the
observations of sensors and actuators of the system. A formal investigation of diagnos-
ability appears in [Sampath et al., 1995, Cimatti et al., 2003]. In particular, given a CTL
model M = (S,R, V, I), [Cimatti et al., 2003] define a diagnosis condition to be a pair of
non-empty sets of states c1, c2 ⊆ S of the system; a diagnosis condition is usually written
(c1⊥c2), where ⊥ is a separator for the two sets of states. Given a set of variables of the
system that can be observed by a diagnoser, a diagnosis condition (c1⊥c2) is diagnosable
iff there are no two execution traces π1 and π2 such that π1 leads to a state in c1 and π2
leads to a state in c2, with the additional constraint that the observable variables remain
the same for all the states in π1 and π2. For instance, fault detection is expressed in
terms of a diagnosis condition as (fault⊥¬fault): this means that there are no two traces
such that one trace leads to a faulty state and the other to a non-faulty state when the
observable variables remain the same.
It has been shown by [Cimatti et al., 2003] that a temporal-only model checker like NuSMV
can be used for the formal verification of diagnosability. The key idea is two build two
copies of the system, run them in parallel and constrain the observable variables of both
copies to remain equal using the tools provided by the model checker (e.g., using the INVAR
construct in NuSMV). For instance, a copy of the system may be encoded with a NuSMV
module called test, and the other copy may be encoded with a module called twin. If
the execution mode of the module is described by a private variable called mode, which
takes the value faulty when the module is in a faulty state, then fault detection can be
expressed by the formula:
AG(¬(test.mode = faulty ∧ twin.mode 6= faulty)).
A number of systems have been diagnosed using this technique [Cimatti et al., 2003].
The formal verification of diagnosability can benefit from a temporal-epistemic character-
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isation, and by treating the diagnoser and the system as agents. Indeed, diagnosability is
expressed naturally by ascribing a form of knowledge to a diagnoser: a diagnoser is able
to diagnose a diagnosis condition (c1⊥c2) iff the diagnoser always knows whether ¬c1 is
the case, or ¬c2 is the case. This can be expressed formally in the framework of deontic
interpreted systems: the system in which diagnosability needs to be verified may be mod-
elled by introducing a particular agent D (the diagnoser) that stores in its local states
the observable variables, and the original system may be modelled by another agent S,
“observed” by the diagnoser. In this way, diagnosability is expressed by the formula:
AG(KD(¬c1) ∨KD(¬c2)).
Notice that the knowledge operator forces the observable variables to remain unchanged;
also, this definition of diagnosability is based solely on one model, thereby reducing the
size of the problem to be verified if compared to temporal-only model checking.
The concept of distributed knowledge in a group permits a generalisation of the concept
of diagnosability. Let ∆ be a subset of the set of agents in a deontic interpreted system:
intuitively, ∆ is a set of a diagnosers, each of which is responsible for the monitoring of a
particular aspect of the system (e.g., a part of the observable outputs) while ignoring the
remainder. A diagnosis condition (c1⊥c2) is diagnosable by a group of agents iff
AG(D∆(¬c1) ∨D∆(¬c2))
The following example illustrates the verification of diagnosability in deontic interpreted
systems encoding an electrical circuit composed of a cascade of circuit breakers, a source,
and LEDs. This example is part of the test examples of the tool Livingstone, “a model-
based health monitoring system developed at NASA Ames Research Center” [Pecheur and
Simmons, 2000]1. The circuit is represented in Figure 6.5.
Each circuit breaker is allowed to be in one of the following states: on, off, tripped,
blown, ufault. on and off are “green” states. tripped is a resettable fault, blown
is a non recoverable fault, and ufault denotes an unknown fault. A Controller sends
(arbitrary) commands to the circuit breakers, and a Diagnoser reads the commands and
the outputs as defined in the Livingstone model.
Various assumptions can be made while modelling this example as a deontic interpreted
system DISCirc. Here the following are considered:
• Each circuit breaker is an agent; each led is an agent; the source is an agent.
• For each circuit breaker, it is assumed that a commander agent is allowed to send
1The formal encoding of this example has been carried out while the author was visiting Dr. Charles
Pecheur at NASA Ames Research Center, between July and September 2004.
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led1
source cb1
cb2
cb3
cb4
cb6
cb7
cb5
led4
led3
led2
Figure 6.5: A circuit for diagnosability.
random commands to the circuit breakers.
• Two diagnosers are introduced: the first can see the output of the source, the second
can see the LEDs.
The ISPL code for this example has been obtained by translating the Livingstone specifi-
cation into ISPL code, and it is available from the examples/ directory of mcmas.
As an example of diagnosability, it is possible to check that the diagnoser obtained by
considering the distributed knowledge of the two diagnosers is not able to detect faults
correctly, i.e.:
DISCirc 6|= AG(D∆(faulty) ∨D∆(¬faulty))
where faulty =
∨
fi is a proposition denoting that some component i of the circuit is
not working correctly (encoded by the proposition fi), and ∆ is the group composed by
the two diagnoser agents for the output and the LEDs. This is because, under the above
assumptions, the diagnoser is not able to distinguish between “correct” off states and
faulty states. The same result can be obtained by using the twin model of the circuit and
by verifying it using NuSMV. Experimental results for the two approaches are presented
in Section 6.5.
6.4.1 Verification of recoverability
The use of deontic interpreted systems enables the verification of other more complex
specification patterns, that are not expressible (or, at least, not in an easy way) using
temporal-only formulae. The aim of this section is to provide a formal description and an
example of properties such as “the diagnoser knows that, assuming correct behaviour of
the system, the system will recover from a given faulty state” (recoverability is the ability
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of a system to recover from some faulty state).
Instead of using the “deontic” accessibility relations ROi , correct behaviour can be char-
acterised in terms of local propositions [Lomuscio and Sergot, 2003, Anderson, 1958]. Let
gi ∈ AP be a proposition true in the green states of agent i (notice that these propositions
are part of Livingstone models and thus, in the examples from NASA Ames, no manual
intervention is required to encode these propositions). For any deontic interpreted system
DIS , the following equivalences hold:
DIS |= Oiϕ⇔ (gj =⇒ ϕ);
DIS |= Kˆji ϕ⇔ Ki(gj =⇒ ϕ).
Let f ∈ AP be a proposition denoting some faulty state, and let ϕ be a formula denoting
some desired states of affairs. Then, the ability of a diagnoser ∆ to diagnose recoverability
from f on a deontic interpreted system DIS , assuming “correct” functioning conditions
for the agents in Γ, can be expressed as:
DIS |= f =⇒ D∆(¬E[FΓ U (FΓ ∧ ¬ϕ)]).
In the previous expression, FΓ =
∧
i∈Γ
gi is a Boolean expression composed by the conjunc-
tion of the local proposition denoting correct behaviour for agents in Γ. Intuitively, the
“until” part of the formula states that there is no “correct” temporal path from “faulty”
states which will not reach a state in which ϕ holds. This fact, in turn, is distributed
knowledge between the diagnosers.
A concrete example of recoverability is expressible using the example presented in Fig-
ure 6.5 and its formal encoding presented in the previous Section. Let g cb be a formula
obtained by taking the conjunction of the local propositions expressing correct behaviour
for all the circuit breakers. Let led on be a proposition denoting the global states in
which LEDs are on. It is possible to verify automatically with mcmas that the following
formula does not hold in DISCirc:
DISCirc 6|= faulty =⇒ D∆(¬E[g cb U (g cb ∧ ¬led on)]).
Intuitively, the formula expresses that the diagnoser is not able to diagnose recoverability
because circuit breakers may be in unrecoverable faulty states, and the diagnoser cannot
distinguish them from recoverable faulty states.
6.5 Experimental results
This section presents the experimental results obtained in the verification of the examples
presented above using mcmas. Notice that, for all the examples, time results are not
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|M | obdds variables Memory (MBytes)
DISBTP1 ≈ 4 · 10
6 19 ≈ 4.5
DISBTP2 ≈ 4 · 10
6 19 ≈ 4.5
Table 6.5: Space requirements for the bit transmission problem.
Model construction Verification Total
0.045sec <0.001sec 0.045sec
Table 6.6: Running time (for one formula) for the bit transmission problem.
affected by the structure of the formula, nor by the number of formulae being verified.
This is caused by the fact that time required by the algorithm of Figure 3.12 is a fraction
(in the order of 0.1% – 0.5%) of the time required for the construction of the obdds
representing protocols, temporal relations, reachable states, etc. Therefore, it makes sense
to discuss simply the time required “for an example”: this is the time reported in the
tables below. All the tests have been performed using a 2.8GHz Intel Pentium IV, 1GB
of RAM, running Linux 2.6.8, with the exception of the diagnosability example.
6.5.1 The bit transmission problem
In this example there are 4 local states and 3 actions for S, 5 (or 6) local states and 2
actions for R, and 4 local states and 4 actions for E. In total, the size of the state space
is ≈ 2 · 103. The size of the model is defined here as the size of the state space with the
addition of the size of the relations. The size of the relations can be approximated with
the size of the state space to the power of two, hence |DISBTP1| ≈ |DISBTP2| ≈ 4 · 10
6
(notice that the sizes of both cases are very similar). Also, a measure of the size of the
model is given by the number of Boolean variables used to encode local states and actions.
Table 6.5 reports the space requirements for DISBTP1 and DISBTP2.
Average time results for the bit transmission problem (both examples) are reported in
Table 6.6. The verification time for one formula has been computed by evaluating the
time difference between two runs of the same ISPL code, but with a different number of
formulae. In the first run only one formula has been verified, while in the second run 20
formulae have been verified.
6.5.2 The protocol of the dining cryptographers
The protocol of the dining cryptographers is suitable for testing the scalability of mc-
mas, because the ISPL code corresponding to any number of cryptographers is generated
automatically by a C++ code taking the number of cryptographers as the only input
parameter (this generator is distributed with the source code of mcmas).
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N.Crypt. |M | obdds vars. obdds nodes Memory (MBytes)
3 ≈ 7 · 1013 46 ≈ 104 ≈ 4.4
4 ≈ 2 · 1018 62 ≈ 6 · 104 ≈ 5.2
5 ≈ 2 · 7.522 76 ≈ 8 · 104 ≈ 5.6
6 ≈ 1.2 · 1027 90 ≈ 1.6 · 105 ≈ 7.1
7 ≈ 2 · 1031 104 ≈ 1.7 · 105 ≈ 7.5
8 ≈ 1.3 · 1036 120 ≈ 1.2 · 107 ≈ 230
Table 6.7: Space requirements for the dining cryptographers.
N.Crypt. Model construction Verification Total
3 1.1sec <0.1sec 1.2sec
4 5.1 <0.1 5.2
5 18.7 <0.1 18.8
6 125.9 ≈0.1 126.0
7 649 ≈0.1 649
8 9643 ≈1 9644
Table 6.8: Running time (for one formula) for the protocol of the dining cryptographers.
Table 6.7 presents the memory requirements for the verification of scenarios from three
to eight cryptographers (the size of the model is defined as in the previous section). This
table shows the number of obdd nodes allocated to encode the parameters: notice that
this is typically a fraction of the size of the model. Such a difference shows that the
reduction in the state space obtained using obdds is significant in this example.
Average time requirements for the verification of one formula are reported in Table 6.8.
6.5.3 Strategic games
The ISPL code corresponding to DISRC and DISCards generates very small examples.
To evaluate the performance of the verification of ATL operators using mcmas, the Nim
example has been verified using 3-4-5 heaps (this example is denoted by DISNim345) and
with 5-5-5 heaps (this example is denoted by DISNim555). Space results for all the exam-
ples are reported in Table 6.9. Notice that the number of obdds variables required for
DISNim345 is similar to the number of variables for DISNim555: this is caused by the fact
that 60 local states are possible for the environment in the case of 3-4-5 heaps, and 125
local states in the case of 5-5-5 heaps. In the first case, 6 Boolean variables are required,
while in the second case 7 Boolean variables are required. Although the difference in the
number of variables is small between the two examples, the number of obdd nodes and
the Memory usage increase by a factor of ten. Thus, it seems that this example does not
scale up as well as the example of the dining cryptographers, probably because a “good”
reordering of variables cannot be found by the obdd library to reduce the number of
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Example obdds vars. obdds nodes Memory (MBytes)
DISCards 13 ≈ 400 4.1
DISRC 9 115 4.1
DISNim345 51 ≈ 7 · 10
4 ≈ 7.1
DISNim555 57 ≈ 8 · 10
5 ≈ 41
Table 6.9: Space requirements for strategic games.
Example Model construction Verification Total
DISCards 0.15 sec < 0.01sec 0.15sec
DISRC 0.19 < 0.01 0.19
DISNim345 18 < 0.2 18
DISNim555 248 ≈ 0.3 248
Table 6.10: Running time (for one formula) for strategic games.
nodes.
Time results for these examples are reported in Table 6.10. Notice the difference in time
between DISNim345 and DISNim555, for the same reasons presented above.
While the time results for non-deterministic and Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems
are the same for the examples DISCards and DISRC , it is likely that for larger examples
the time requirements for verification in Γ-uniform deontic interpreted systems will be
larger. In this case, the verification time may depend on the structure of the formula
(false formulae requiring more time).
6.5.4 Diagnosability
The performance of mcmas to verify diagnosability has been investigated in comparison
with the performance of NuSMV. Space and time results for the verification of one formula
using either mcmas or NuSMV are reported in Table 6.11. The experimental results have
been obtained using a 3.0 GHz Intel Pentium IV, 2GBytes of RAM, running Linux 2.6.9,
available temporarily at NASA Ames.
The results in Table 6.11 refer to the verification of one formula for diagnosability. Sim-
ilarly to the other examples, verification of recoverability using mcmas requires a similar
amount of time and space.
Tool Time OBDDs vars
mcmas 2.39sec 90
NuSMV 10.47sec 235
Table 6.11: Average verification results for diagnosability.
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6.5.5 Discussion
The experimental results presented above show that the performance of mcmas remains,
on average, well below the worst case requirements.
• Space requirements. The size of a model generated from ISPL code is exponential
in the size of the code itself. For instance, consider the sizes of the models in
Table 6.7: these range from 1013 to 1036 by increasing (linearly) the number of
cryptographers. Structures of this size cannot be dealt with explicitly using the
hardware currently available (1000Gbytes = 1012 bytes is the size of the biggest hard
drive available at present). Nevertheless, the encoding of this example is reduced to
structures of size < 107 using mcmas and obdds, thereby enabling verification of
examples that cannot be verified using an explicit manipulation of the parameters
appearing in the algorithm of Figure 3.12. As mentioned in Section 4.3, it is known
that under certain circumstances the size of the obdds representing the Boolean
formulae may be exponential in the number of Boolean variables (thereby matching
the size of the “explicit” model). However, this appears not to be the case for any
of the examples verified with mcmas, in line with previous experiments.
• Time requirements. As mentioned in Section 2.2.5, page 57, the operation of
Boolean quantification on obdds may require time exponential in the number of
variables. The time required for the actual verification of formulae (after the con-
struction of the necessary parameters) shows that this is not the case for the examples
above. Indeed, verification requires a number of quantification operations when tem-
poral operators need to be verified, but the time required for verification is typically
a fraction of the time required for the construction of the parameters. By running
mcmas with increased verbosity it is possible to check that the time required for
the construction of the parameters is influenced by the search of a reordering of
variables that offers a compact representation of the obdds (this is known to be a
NP-complete problem). This appears to be the bottleneck for the verification of the
large examples presented above.
• Complexity considerations. The complexity of model checking an ISPL program
can be estimated by reducing it to a concurrent program (see Section 4.2), using
the simple mapping provided in [Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2005b]. Therefore, model
checking temporal-epistemic properties in ISPL programs is a PSPACE-complete
problem (notice that this is true also for VerICS programs). However, the actual
implementation of mcmas requires, in the worst case, an exponential time to perform
verification, because obdds are used. The same result applies to all the available
model checkers for multi-agent systems.
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While the aim of this thesis is not to build the most efficient model checker for multi-agent
systems, it still makes sense to compare the experimental results obtained using mcmas
with other model checkers. The comparison can be carried out on two levels:
1. Qualitative comparisons. The model checkers mentioned in Section 2.3 all have
different input languages. For instance, MCK defines local states of agents using
observation functions, and VerICS uses networks of automata to model multi-agent
systems. If a single example were to be encoded using these model checkers and
using mcmas the results would be, in fact, three different examples. For instance,
the protocol of the dining cryptographers can be encoded using any of the previous
model checkers. However, the size of the model generated using the input language
of MCK (which can be estimated using the number of Boolean variables required to
encode the parameters) would be much smaller than the model generated by mcmas
or VerICS, thanks to the possibility of using observation functions in MCK. There-
fore, for this particular example and for a given number of cryptographers, MCK
would verify always a smaller model. In other instances a network of communicat-
ing automata is more efficient than MCK (for instance, to model mutual exclusion
problems).
Under this perspective, MCK seems to be more suitable for examples where infor-
mation is shared among the agents, as it can be stored as part of the environment.
mcmas and VerICS, instead, seem to be more suitable for “autonomous” agents, with
a particular emphasis on coordination using shared actions in VerICS. Coordination
via shared actions may ease the description of examples in certain circumstances
(e.g., mutual exclusion), but it may not be suitable in others (e.g., when agents act
autonomously, for instance in the bit transmission problem).
2. Quantitative comparisons. Taking into account the above observations, a com-
parison of different model checkers has been presented in [Ditmarsch et al., 2005]
and in [Kacprzak et al., 2006]. The first paper compares MCK, mcmas, and the tool
DEMO for the verification of propositional dynamic epistemic logic2 on the verifi-
cation of a particular example: the Russian cards game. For this example, the tool
DEMO performs better than MCK and mcmas (which have comparable results),
because the input language of DEMO can encode this example in an efficient way.
VerICS and mcmas are compared in [Kacprzak et al., 2006]. The approach taken
in this work is different from other comparison attempts, in that a common rep-
resentation for an example is defined first, and then formulae are verified in the
common representation. In particular, the protocol of the dining cryptographers is
encoded using a network of automata in VerICS, while mcmas defines an agent for
every automaton defined in VerICS: this approach defines two models of identical
size. Various formulae are verified, including the following (where n is the number
2The tool is available from [Ditmarsch et al., 2006].
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N. crypt. mcmas time VerICS for 6.4 VerICS for 6.5
4 4sec ≈ 31000sec < 1sec
5 6 ≈ 106000 < 1sec
6 424 N/A < 1 sec
8 8101 N/A < 1 sec
100 N/A N/A 4sec
1000 N/A N/A 520
Table 6.12: Experimental results for mcmas and VerICS.
of cryptographers):
AG(even =⇒ K1(
∧
i∈{1,...,n}
¬paidi)); (6.4)
AG(¬paid1 =⇒ K1(
∨
i∈{2,...,n}
¬paidi)). (6.5)
The first formula expresses the true claim that, if there is an even number of ut-
terances, then the first cryptographer knows that none of the cryptographers paid
for the dinner. The second formula is false, and it expresses that if the first cryp-
tographer did not pay for the dinner, then he knows that some of the remaining
cryptographers paid for it. The time required for the verification of these formulae
is reported in Table 6.12. These results confirm that the verification time in mcmas
is not affected by the structure of the formula: Formula 6.4 and Formula 6.5 required
the same amount of time for verification, reported in the first column. On the con-
trary, verification times for VerICS are crucially dependent on the structure of the
formula being verified. The reason is the structure of the bounded model checking
algorithm implemented by VerICS: if a counter-example is found with a small value
of the bound (as in the case of 6.5) verification is extremely efficient and the tool can
check examples with up to 1000 cryptographers (last column). For true formulae,
however, maximal paths need to be encoded as Boolean formulae, and this operation
may be inefficient: this is confirmed by the time results for Formula 6.4.
These experimental results show that there is no “best” model checker, nor “best” tech-
nique. Instead, depending on the example being verified, a tool may be better than
another because of its input language and other features, and a verification technique may
be better than another due to the particular structure of the formulae being verified.
Given the comparisons above, the techniques and the tool presented in this thesis seem to
offer, on average, a satisfactory performance.
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Conclusion
7.1 Contribution
The goal of this thesis has been the development of techniques and tools for the formal
verification of multi-agent systems using model checking. The main contributions to this
area of research are summarised below:
• Theoretical contributions: traditional obdd-based methodologies for temporal-only
model checking have been extended to multi-modal logics for time, knowledge, cor-
rect behaviour, and strategies. To this end, the Boolean encoding of the parameters
required by the model checking algorithm has been redefined in terms of the for-
malism of deontic interpreted systems. Additionally, complexity results have been
presented for model checking these logics, and for model checking compact represen-
tations.
• Development of mcmas: this is a software tool developed in C/C++ for the au-
tomatic verification of deontic interpreted systems. The tool defines the language
ISPL for describing examples and it implements obdd-based procedures for efficient
verification.
• Application examples: various multi-agent systems scenarios have been encoded,
including communication and anonymity examples, hardware diagnosability, and
strategic reasoning. Experimental results have been presented confirming the effec-
tiveness of this approach.
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7.2 Benefits and comparisons
Traditional temporal-only specification patterns (in the sense of [Dwyer et al., 1998]) en-
able the formalisation of a number of requirements for complex systems. In many circum-
stances, however, model checking techniques for multi-agent systems introduce substantial
benefits with respect to temporal-only model checking. These benefits include:
• a richer expressivity: in addition to temporal reasoning, multi-agent systems allow
to reason about “knowledge” (and other modalities) in a formal way, for instance
when describing communication and security protocols;
• a more intuitive language for expressing requirements: the key properties of many
scenarios are difficult to express in terms of temporal-only logic. The addition of
other modal operators make clearer the correspondence between logic formulae and
plain text requirements;
• an improved efficiency: as shown in the example of diagnosability, the direct verifi-
cation of other modalities, in addition to the temporal modalities, may reduce the
complexity of the verification problem.
This thesis specifically addressed the above points by providing model checking method-
ologies and a prototype model checker, that has been tested against a number of examples.
Comparisons. References and comparisons with related work appear in previous chapters
(in particular, see Section 6.5.5, page 126). On a theoretical level, the main contributions
of this thesis differ from the works presented in Section 2.3 in various respects. Differently
from [Benerecetti et al., 1998] the methodology presented here is computationally grounded,
in the sense of [Wooldridge, 2000a]. Also, instead of relying on existing model checkers as
in [Wooldridge et al., 2002] and [Bordini et al., 2003b, Bordini et al., 2003a], Chapter 3
introduced a self-contained methodology, which avoids the translation into temporal-only
model checkers.
The algorithms and the implementation presented in this thesis use obdds and, in this re-
spect, they differ from all the SAT-based approaches presented in Section 2.3 (Section 6.5.5
has investigated the differences between the two techniques in more detail, using experi-
mental results).
Although [Gammie and van der Meyden, 2004] use obdds, they restrict the verification to
a particular class of interpreted systems, and do not consider a number of operators that
are available in mcmas; these include operators to reason about distributed knowledge,
common knowledge, “correct behaviour” and strategies of agents. Moreover, as mentioned
in Section 6.5.5, the input language of MCK and mcmas are substantially different, and
they are suited for different classes of examples.
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7.3 Future work
This thesis has shown that model checking for multi-agent systems introduces a number
of benefits with respect to temporal-only model checking. Nevertheless, some issues need
to be addressed before model checking for multi-agent systems reaches the maturity of
traditional model checking. In particular, open issues not considered in this thesis include:
• Correspondence between actual system and the input of model checkers: this prob-
lem arises for both traditional and MAS model checkers, when large examples have to
be encoded using a manual translation. Even if computationally grounded theories
of agency [Wooldridge, 2000a] (and the corresponding verification methodologies)
are a necessary condition for the verification of such examples, the correspondence
between an actual system and its representation requires care. In the case of model
checkers for MAS a further issue arises when encoding a scenario using agents: what
is an agent? The example presented in Section 6.4 is a concrete instance of this is-
sue: Livingstone models are composed of so called “modules” (for instance, a circuit
breaker is a module). But are all modules agents? Is a circuit breaker an agent?
This kind of correspondence is an open question.
• In many circumstances, understanding why a formula is false in a model may be
as useful as knowing that a formula is true in a model. Counter-examples can be
generated automatically by some temporal model checkers1; unfortunately, even in
the case of temporal-only model checkers, counter-examples are typically difficult to
understand. Counter-examples may become even more complex after introducing
non-temporal modalities. Thus, the effective generation of human-readable counter-
examples for multi-agent systems needs to be addressed with care in a mature model
checker for multi-agents systems. In parallel with this issue, fairness conditions
[Clarke et al., 1999] need to be introduced to avoid obviously un-wanted behaviours
of agents.
• Deontic interpreted systems offer a computationally grounded, fine grain semantics
for multi-agent systems. In certain cases this fine grain semantics could be refined
further by introducing variables to describe the local states of the agents. This is the
case, for instance, with the example in Section 6.4: the diagnoser could be described
more easily using one variable for each observable. This change would require a
complete redefinition of the protocols, the evolution and the evaluation functions, but
it would make deontic interpreted systems an even more “computationally grounded”
semantics for multi agent systems.
• Optimisation techniques usually included in temporal model checkers have not been
introduced in mcmas. Techniques that could be implemented in mcmas include
1Model checkers for multi-agent systems do not support this feature yet.
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abstraction, on-the-fly model checking, caching, and strategies for reordering obdd
variables.
• A graphical interface and an on-line version of mcmas are currently under develop-
ment, with the aim increasing the number of potential mcmas users.
.
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